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ABSTRACT 
 
Nowadays, natural disasters are more frequents and destructives compared to the past, causing many 
deaths and injuries. Existing hospitals are defined essential structures that have the goal to protect the 
public health of citizen. They are called to resist not only to the impact of a disaster, but also to be 
operational in that case. Operational means that all the components of a health facility such as structures, 
architectural elements, contents, lifelines, key staff and the whole organizational system have to be 
functional. That objective is a challenge for the existing structures, especially for those built with obsolete 
seismic codes and in high seismic hazard areas like Lima. Furthermore, in case of an emergency, health 
facilities are called to response as a network in order to be more efficient and resilient. It implies that 
hospitals have to be managed not only at small-scale referring to the single hospital, but also at large-scale 
referring to the whole health system composed by all the health facilities involved in a determined area. 
Transfer of patients, staffs, water and medicines, can be moved under the coordination of a headquarters 
in this way. 
Starting from a developed health sector contingency plan in case of earthquakes for Lima metropolitan 
area, an assessment of the seismic performance of health facilities at large and small scale was carried out. 
At large-scale, two exploratory models were developed. The first one adapts to evaluate the basic seismic 
response capacity of hospitals, while the second one useful to assess the hospital treatment capacity of 
health facilities in the aftermath of a seismic event. Both models were carried out considering structural 
and nonstructural building damages using fragility curves provided by international standards, given the 
lack of Peruvian curves. Both models were proposed for a case study of 41 hospitals in Lima 
metropolitan. 
Given the lack of data about Peruvian building fragility curves, for a high rise infilled reinforced 
concrete hospital building, fragility curves were developed through the capacity spectrum approach 
including record-to-record variability. The method also allowed to to assess at small-scale the seismic 
structural performance of the investigate hospital building using the capacity analysis method. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 IMPORTANCE OF THE HOSPITAL SYSTEMS IN CASE OF EARTHQUAKES 
As a part of the Euro-Latin America partnership in natural Risk mitigation and protection of the 
Cultural Heritage project (ELARCH), it funded under the Erasmus Mundus Action 2 Partnership and 
coordinated by the University of Basilicata (UNIBAS), the major research task consists in the assessment 
of the seismic performance of existing hospitals in Lima metropolitan area. 
In the last years, natural disasters become more frequents due to the climate changing and the 
population growth. The climate chance creates the conditions for the onset of natural disasters such as 
hurricanes and inundations; while the population growth causes that people occupy areas at risk such as 
riverbanks or flood risk areas. Disasters cause injured due to their destructive force and after the impacts, 
an increasing demand of medical care is registered. For this reason hospitals play a key role after the 
impact of a disaster; in fact, they are the infrastructure designed to cope with an increase in injured 
demand in case of an emergency. Their scope is not only to resist to the impact of a natural disaster, but 
also to be operative during the emergency, in order to provide medical attention to the injured. 
According to the Peruvian studies an earthquake up to 8.0Mw can impact the costal Peruvian areas 
around Lima with tsunami consequences (PREDES, 2012). About 770000 injured are expected, and a 
range from 2481 to 64515 people would require some form of surgical treatments (Bambarén, C., Uyen, 
A. & Rodriguez, M., 2017). This demand for health care will require a coordinated effort and an adequate 
response of the health sector with its healthcare facilities. Past Peruvian earthquake experiences have 
denoted the poor medical attention during the emergencies, the disorderly responses of the health 
institutions and the vulnerability of the healthcare facilities (Chapin et al., 2009; OPS/OMS, 2010; Santa- 
Cruz et al., 2017). For this reasons in the presented research two models to assess the performance of the 
health facilities in Lima in terms of response capacity in case of earthquakes are presented. The first model 
(Liguori, et al., In Press) focuses on the capacity of the health sector with its health facilities to response  
an emergency after the impact of a strong earthquake. Physical damage to the structures, backup of power, 
water, gases and medicines, availability of radio equipment and owned ambulances by the hospitals were 
selected as variables of the capacity. The second model aims to the assessment of the hospitals to treat 
surgically people in the aftermath of a seismic event. Both models were conceived after the participation 
of the author in the development of the health sector contingency plan in case of a strong earthquake in 
Lima Metropolitan area, which is also presented in this work. The models use Probabilistic Seismic Risk 
Analysis (PSRA) with fragility curves to assess the seismic performance of the investigated hospitals. A 
number of 41 hospiatals, previuslly analyzed by the research group of the Pontifical Catolich University of 
Peru (PUCP), were taken into accunt as case study (Santa-Cruz et al., 2017). Given the lack of abboundant 
data about Peruvian building fragility curves, those provided by the international database (HAZUS) were 
used to analysze the case study. 
Taking into account the lack of data about Peruvian fragility curvevs, the last part of the research is 
focused on the development of the fracility curves of a high rise infilled reinforced concrete frame 
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hospital pavilion. Fragility curves are generated according to the capacity spectrum approach for seismic 
fragility assessment including record-to-record variability developed by the research group of the London 
Global University (UCL) it named FRACAS (EPICenter, 2017). A comparison among the obtained 
fragility cureve with those provided by HAZUS is also provided. 
 
1.2 ASSUMPIONS 
The first assumptions of the research is that innovative quantitative and qualitative models that assess 
the seismic performance of hospitals at large-scale can be developed. 
The second one is that improvements about Peruvian Probabilistic Seismic Risk Assessment can be 
achieved developing local building fragility curves, taking into account axial, bending moment, and shear 
failure mechanisms in the mathematical model. 
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Hospitals are classified as essential facilities by many design building codes around the world. According 
that, they have not only the objective to resist an earthquake, but also to be operative in case of seismic 
event in order to provide medical care to the affected community by the natural disaster. To be operative, 
hospitals have to be prepared at physical, human and organizational level. Adequate medical care can be 
provided only if hospital buildings suffer slight damages, the health operators have sufficient skills, and a 
good emergency organization is provided by the facilities and health institutions. According to the all 
aforementioned aspects, the major objective of the research work is to assess the seismic performance of 
Lima’s hospitals, while the specific goals are as follow: 
1. present a Health Sectorial Contingency Plan (HSCP) against a strong earthquake in Lima 
metropolitan area. It is useful to understand how the response in case of emergencies is organized 
and how it is assessed; 
2. develop a first model to quantify the Basic Seismic Response Capability (BSRC) of the hospitals  
in Lima Metropolitan area; 
3. generate a second model capable to assess the Hospital Treatment Capacity (HTC) of the 
healthcare facilities in the investigated area; 
4. develop fragility curves for a high rise infilled reinforced concrete hospital building. 
The first objective represents the start point of to the emergency response of the hospitals and the 
health institutions in Lima metropolitan area. The plan was developed in 2016 (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016) 
by the financial support of the European community, and the work of several institutions such as the 
Peruvian Ministry of Health (MINSA), the social security insurance (EsSalud) the Pan-American Health 
organization (PAHO), representative of crucial institutions (firefighters, civil protection, politicians, police 
etc.), and seismic risk mitigation experts (including the author) from the PUCP and the National 
University of Engineering (UNI). Aspects such as risk analysis, capacity assessment, organizational model 
for the response, operational procedures, response coordination, plan test and suggestions for future 
planning are presented. 
The second goal is a first framing of the investigated topic, on which the second model was 
subsequently based. It is a combined quantitative and qualitative approach with the purpose to assess the 
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seismic response capacity of the health sector in Lima metropolitan area. A probabilistic model that takes 
into account aspects such as structural and nonstructural damages, supplies, availability of key staff and 
organizational aspects possessed by the healthcare facilities, is presented. 
In the third objective the number of people that can receive surgical treatments in the aftermath of a 
seismic event is assessed. Probabilistic approach using a damage model based on fragility curves is used. 
Since there are insufficient data about Peruvian building fragility curves, the last goal aims to reduce the 
gap of data by developing fragility curves for a high rise infilled reinforced concrete frame hospital 
building. 
 
1.4 MOTIVATIONS 
Lima, the capital of Peru, is built on one of the most active seismic area in the world, where the South 
American and the Nazca plates impact. The metropolis is inhabited by more than ten millions of 
inhabitants and it has a built environment highly vulnerable to seismic actions (Blondet et al., 2004; 
PREDES, 2012). Lima metropolitan is composed by forty-nine districts and three main health institutions, 
the Minister of Health (public institution; MINSA), the social security (semipublic institution; EsSalud) 
and the private sector, (clinics). It is obvious that such city with high seismic hazard should be prepared to 
cope with a natural disaster like earthquakes in order to decrease the economic and human losses caused 
by potential damages. 
According to the expected seismic hazard in Lima Metropolitan, many injured would require medical 
care in case of a severe earthquake, thus operational hospitals capable to ensure adequate medical care are 
required. In the past, many Peruvian hospitals suffered severe physical damages and structural collapses, 
and for that reasons, the medical attention to patients was limited or not provided (MINSA, 2005; Chapin 
et al., 2008; OPS/OMS, 2010). The Peruvian seismic hospitals vulnerability is enough documented (Santa 
Cruz et al., 2013; INDECI, 2011), highlighting the low probability of the structures to continue working 
after an earthquake. The questions are how coordinate will be the emergency response in Lima 
metropolitan area in case of a seismic event and how many people can receive surgical treatments in case 
of an emergency. The solution of these above-mentioned questions was the mayor motivation of the 
research. 
Checking the Peruvian state of the art about structural and nonstructural performance of hospital 
buildings, it was found a lack of data about Peruvian building fragility curves useful for the probabilistic 
seismic risk assessments. The lack of information has created the motivation to develop fragility curves for 
a high rise infilled reinforcement concrete frame hospital pavilion. 
 
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH WORK 
The report describes three main aspects: the presentation of a contingency plan for the health sector in 
Lima metropolitan area in case of a high magnitude earthquake, the development of two models useful to 
assess the seismic performance of health facilities at metropolitan scale, and the fragility curves 
development for a high rise infilled reinforced concrete frame hospital building. The study is divided in 
five chapters. The first one is dedicated to the introduction of the conducted research. 
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The second chapter is focused on the presentation of the contingency plan for the health sector in Lima 
metropolitan area in case of a high magnitude earthquake. The chapter starts analyzing the state of the art 
about the contingency plan development, then it presents the methodology used for the presented 
contingency plan and, at last, it illustrates the contingency plan developed for the analyzed case study. 
The third heading describes two models developed to assess the basic seismic response capacity and the 
hospital treatment capacity of health facilities at large-scale. Both models are introduced by the state of the 
art in the investigated area, then the used methodologies are described, and finally, the discussion of the 
obtained results is provided. 
The fourth chapter presents the development of fragility curves for a high rise infilled reinforced 
concrete hospital building. In the chapter is described the used methodology to develop the curves, the 
seismic response performance of the investigated structure and the achieved results. 
The last section of the manuscript is devoted to the conclusion of the conducted research. The summary 
of the results, the limitations of the methodologies, the improvements that can be implemented, and the 
future research suggestions are provided for each of the aforementioned analyzed aspects. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 HEALTH SECTOR CONTINGENCY PLAN IN CASE OF 
EARTHQUAKES FOR LIMA’S HOSPITALS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The contingency plan responds to the urgent need to count with an operational tool in order to organize 
the response of the health sector against an emergency caused by the impact of an earthquake. 
The overall objective of the HSCP is to provide an adequate health attention to the injured during the 
first seven days and with emphasis in the first 72 hours in the aftermath of a seismic event. 
The specific objectives of the contingency plan are as follow: 
 determine the risk scenarios that can affect the health sector in case of an earthquake; 
 establish the organization of the health sector during the emergency; 
 determine the operational procedures necessary for the health sector to cope with the emergency 
(alert, coordination, mobilization, response and business continuity procedures). 
The plan determines the responsibilities and the actions that must be taken and implemented during the 
emergency. The HSCP contains the general information of the analyzed hospital systems, the seismic risk 
analysis, the responsibilities and the actions that decision makers and key stuff have to follow during the 
emergency. The HSCP involves the Lima metropolitan, Provinces of Lima and Callao regions as shown in 
Figure 2-1 (white, red and violet areas in the map). 
All the health facilities under the administration of the health organization of the Ministry of Health, 
regional government of Callao, regional government of Lima’s provinces, the social security (EsSalud), the 
armed forces, private sector, municipalities and non-governmental organizations (ONGs) are called to 
respect the contents and procedures of the plan. 
The first part of the chapter describes the development of the contingency plan for the health sector in 
Lima metropolitan area against a strong earthquake. A state of the art about several methodologies to 
develop contingency plans is also included. Since the plan is focused on the seismic hazard, other possible 
risks are not taken into account. The HSCP is developed according to the planning methodology 
proposed by the PAHO and MINSA (OPS, MINSA, & EsSalud, 2014). The plan was developed from 
2014 to 2016 by the collaboration between MINSA, EsSalud, the Peruvian Pan-American Health 
Organization (PAHO) and the financial support of the European Union (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016). 
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Figure 2-1. Map of the area interested by the contingency plan (from Gobierno Regional Lima, 
2004, Gobierno Regional del Callao, 2004. Elaboración: Grupo GEA). 
A working group composed by representatives of MINSA, EsSalud and PAHO was selected to develop 
the plan. During the development phase, the directors of the involved hospitals, representative of crucial 
institutions (firefighters, civil protection, politicians, police etc.), seismic risk mitigation experts (including 
the author) from PUCP and the National University of Engineering participated to the meetings in order 
to better develop all the phases of the contingency plan. Four rounds of meetings were done during the 
development phase, the first and the second rounds dedicated to the hospitals and the health 
organizations to formulate the procedures at pre-hospital and hospital level (Figure 2-2.A). The third 
round focused on improving the preparedness and the organization of the disaster departments of 
MINSA and EsSalud about the alert, the coordination, the mobilization, the response and business 
continuity procedures (Figure 2-2.B). The last meeting concerned about the implementation of the 
response strategy such as the Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs1) (Figure 2-2.C). 
The HSCP was developed for Lima metropolitan, Provinces of Lima and Callao regions as shown in 
Figure 2-1, and it focused on 52 hospitals belonging the public (MINSA) and semipublic sector (EsSalud), 
but it is applied for all the health institutions and health facilities in the analyzed area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Emergency Medical Technician. Is a group of medical staff such as doctors, nurses and rescuers trained to give medical care 
to victims in the area of an accident (in field). 
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Figure 2-2. A) First and second round of meetings dedicated to the hospitals and the health 
organizations about the procedures at pre-hospitals and hospital level. B) Third round of 
meetings about the preparation of the health organization to the alert, coordination, mobilization, 
response and business continuity procedures. C) Fourth meeting round concerned about the 
implementation of response strategy such as emergency medical thespians (EMTs2) 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1aOdcJIdeqg) 
 
 
 
 
2 Emergency Medical Technician. Is a group of medical staff such as doctors, nurses and rescuers trained to give medical care  
to victims in the area of an accident (in field). 
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2.2 STATE OF THE ART 
Natural disasters such as earthquakes affect thousands of people, houses and infrastructures producing 
not negligible economic losses every year around the world. The number of the major natural disasters  
and the consequent economic losses in the last thirty-five years are reported in Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4. 
Analyzing the last-mentioned figures, it is evident the increasing trend of the catastrophic events and they 
relative losses. 
Figure 2-3. Number of major natural disasters for each year (1980-2017) grouped by event type 
(Munich Re Group, 2018) 
 
 
Figure 2-4. Overall and insured losses (1980-2017) (Munich Re Group, 2018) 
Strengthening the disaster preparedness at global, regional, national and local level is a key to save lives, 
to protect goods and to accelerate the recovery time from crisis. At global level the most important 
principles are dictated by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2015) adopted in 
2015 by United Nations (UN). The Sendai framework is a 15-year agreement to prevent new and reduce 
existing disaster risks by implementing measures that prevent the hazard, the exposure and the 
vulnerability to the disasters, increase preparedness for the response and the recovery, and thus 
strengthening resilience. The framework focus on four priorities for action for the UN such as 
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understanding the disaster risk, strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk, investing in 
disaster risk reduction for resilience, and enhancing disaster preparedness for an effective response and 
recovery. To achieve the aforementioned priorities for action, first of all risks analysis have to be done, 
then adequate disaster preparedness and contingency policies have to be adopted and promoted at global, 
regional, national and local level. In the last years, several methodologies and frameworks have been 
developed to manage risks and to redact contingency plans in order to improve the preparedness and the 
response of people to the adverse phenomena. In the following sections four methodologies to plan the 
disaster risk mitigations and the health care preparedness, by adopting contingency planning, are 
presented. 
 
2.2.1 Risk management framework 
An interesting standardized methodology for risk management was proposed by (Pliefke et al., 2006) 
within the International PhD program on “Mitigation of risk due to natural hazards on structure and 
infrastrucutres”. The framework provides support for risk managers who wants to manege disasters and 
hazards that can affect people, structures and infrastractures. According to the methodology (Pliefke, 
Sperbeck, & Urban, 2006), the Risk Managment process consists of three main parts which are the Risk 
Identification, the Risk Assessment and the Risk Treatment as illustrated in Figure 2-5. 
 
Figure 2-5. Risk Management framework by Pliefke et al. (2006) 
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Accompanying all the risk management steps there is the Risk Monitoring, which highlight the exchange 
of information of all people involved in the Risk Management process (Figure 2-5). The Risk Identification 
allows identifying the hazards that can endanger the functionality of the analyzed system. The Risk 
Assessment regards the quantification of the risk and two main steps are identified: risk analysis and risk 
evaluation. As reported in the risk analysis (Figure 2-5), aspects like hazards, exposures, vulnerabilities and 
losses are quantified; while in the risk evaluation the quantified risks are classified and compared. Finally, 
the Risk Treatment concerns the decisions about how to treat a risk, for example to mitigate, to transfer, to 
accept or to reject it. If a risk is mitigated more decisions and a project implementation, about how to 
mitigate it, have to be developed. 
 
2.2.2 Contingency planning by the International Federation of Red Cross (IRRC) 
Contingency plans should always be develop when there is a high level or probability that a disaster or 
an emergency situation may occur. It is a task of many institutions and groups, such as governments, 
senior managers, sector technicians, voluntaries, administrative staff, logisticians, United Nation partners 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to develop contingency plans. A guideline about effective 
preparedness and response to emergency situations is provided by the International Federation of Red 
Cross (IFCR, 2012). The guideline provides an overview of the key elements to develop contingency plans 
at local, national, regional and global level. Contingency planning aims to prepare an institution to respond 
well to a specific hazard, event or risk (e.g. earthquakes, floods or disease outbreaks), and establishing 
operational procedures for the response, the latter based on the expected requested resources and 
capabilities. According to the guideline, the contingency planning process can be broken down into three 
simple questions: 
 What is going to happen? 
 What are we going to do about it? 
 What can we do ahead of time to get prepared? 
The guide helps to the planners to response these three questions during the contingency plan 
development. The process is divided in five main steps as illustrated in Figure 2-6. The steps are: prepare, 
analyze, develop, implement and review. Prepare sets out the key definitions about preparedness (how to plan), 
when and where to plan. Contingency plans are necessary where there is a risk that could  affect the 
normal operation of a system (social, economic or natural). It can be developed at local, national, regional 
and global level. Given the complexity and the importance of the process, the development of 
contingency plans is assigned to multidisciplinary trained teams. In the preparation phase the data 
collected in advance can facilitate the entire development of the plan. For instance, laws, previous plans, 
references and opinions of external decision makers can be useful for the planning. 
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Figure 2-6 Essential chain of the contingency plan process by IFCR (2012) 
Analyze represents the section dedicated to the investigation about what is going to happen. Since the 
contingency planning is based on scenarios, the analysis phase focuses on the risks and their impact on 
people and communities. First of all, it is necessary to analyze the hazards, which can be natural or man- 
made such as hurricanes, earthquakes and terrorism attacks. Second, it is required an evaluation of the 
elements at risk (people, houses, infrastructures etc.) in combination with their vulnerabilities and 
capabilities. Physical, organizational and institutional vulnerability have to be assessed too. Combining the 
hazard and the vulnerability of the analyzed elements, the risk is assessed as illustrated in Table 2-1. There 
is no limitation about the methodologies to quantify the risk with its components (hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability); usually qualitative methods based on the hazard and frequency levels are the most common 
(Table 2-1). Once the risk is defined, it is possible to estimate the disaster impacts, such as number of 
killed or affected people, humanitarian needs and so on. When the risks and the impacts are known the 
capacity to intervene on them is evaluated. In this phase all the resources, internal and external to the 
analyzed system are taken into account and evaluated. At last, possible scenarios about what can happen 
are created in order to design the response phase. 
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Table 2-1. Risk analysis by IFRC (2012) 
 
 
Hazard 
Level of 
hazard 
Exposed 
elements 
Level of 
vulnerability of the 
element exposed 
 
Risk level 
Earthquake       High  Hospitals Low Medium 
 
The development phase responds to the question “What the organization is going to do in response to the disaster?” 
(IFCR, 2012). In order to answer the question, the guide suggests dividing the ideas into a hierarchy or 
ranking order, in this way solving strategies and goals can be fixed. Then, the goals can be break down  
into a series of separate objectives and a set of activities. In the development phase it is important to 
define when to activate the plan, in which circumstances, and who will manage what. It is during the 
development phase that are defined the responsibilities of each person involved in the planning, the 
decision-making process, and the coordination of all the forces and resources (internal and external) 
involved in the response. 
The implementation step answers the question “What can we do ahead of time to get prepared?” (IFCR, 2012). 
This phase is essential because it allows evaluating the real reactivity and availabilities in field. Having 
modeled scenarios, it is possible to simulate them and see what is available and what is needed in filed. 
Usually it is called gap analysis. During the implementation, it is essential to check the existence of 
standard operating procedures (SOPs). The purpose of those procedures is to ensure that certain tasks in 
case of emergency are carried out in a specific way and by key people. Another important aspect is to 
possess a good system of information and telecommunication. It is important to verify who and how the 
information is gotten. A good network between local, national and international organizations should be 
present. It is also important to have functioning logistic and human resources. It is fundamental establish 
the needed supplies and how they have to be mobilized or sourced. The contingency planning process is 
efficient only if who provide the emergency response and who receive assistance know what to do. Spread 
awareness among the population and the governmental institutions about risks and how to respond in 
case of emergency is a key to be prepared. Training the people involved in the contingency planning can 
be the best way to correctly perform in case of an adversity. At last, the only way to know the 
effectiveness of a contingency plan is to test it with a simulation and if it is necessary review the plan. 
 
2.2.3 Contingency planning by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is the primary coordination mechanism for humanitarian 
assistance. It was established in June 1992 in response to the United Nations to strength the humanitarian 
assistance. According to the IASC, contingency planning is a management tool used to analyze the impact 
of potential crises and ensure that adequate and appropriate actions are made in advance in order to 
respond in a well-timed, efficient, and proper way to the needs of the affected populations (IASC, 2007). 
It is useful to anticipate and solve adversities that in most cases arise during the humanitarian response. 
The contingency planning is arranged by IASC (2007) in four basic components: preparation, analysis, 
response planning, and implementing preparedness as illustrated in Table 2-2. 
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Table 2-2. Contingency planning process by IASC (2007) 
 
 
Preparation 
Prepare for and organize the 
inter-agency contingency 
planning process 
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Analysis 
Analyze hazards and risks, 
formulate scenarios and 
develop planning assumptions 
 
 
 
Response 
Planning 
Define response objectives 
and strategies 
Define management and 
coordination arrangements 
Develop and consolidate 
response plans 
Implementi 
ng 
Preparedness 
Enhance preparedness and 
keep update the planning 
process 
The first step of the contingency planning process starts with the selection of the steering group  
among senior decision-makers able to provide strategic directions and guidance to the process. Then, the 
focus passes to the analysis of hazards and their potential risks as well as to the analysis of vulnerabilities 
and capacities of the investigated system. The analysis step starts assessing all the potential hazards like 
earthquakes, floods or conflicts and their impact on the studied system. Then, the probability of 
occurrence of the hazards is evaluated (Figure 2-7), in order to define the risk level of each hazard in this 
way. 
 
Figure 2-7. Risk analysis by IASC, 2007 
Once determined the risks, it is important to develop scenarios in order to explore and analyze the 
possible emergencies and try to make assumptions. In this way, it is possible to define specific projections 
of emergency needs (shelters, food, key stuff, etc.), affected sectors, people and resources involved in the 
response. The next step is to define the objectives of the response, and the strategies to achieve them. 
Given the complexity of the response, a coordination mechanism should be developed and implemented 
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in the contingency plan. For example, the plan should establish aspects like the needed resources, the 
mobilization of them and the relationship with external actors. Once the objectives, strategies, 
management and coordination arrangements are defined, the plan is redacted. After the management and 
the coordination phase, the contingency plans have to be implemented, thus preparedness actions should 
be identified and applied. Some actions are training humanitarian staff and partners, identifying and 
establishing collaborative arrangements with local implementing partners and raising awareness about 
some risks and disaster. At last, to ensure the functionality of the plan some indicators have to be 
established and monitored in order to review the plan during the time. 
 
2.2.4 Guideline for health system disaster planning 
The Pan-American Health Organization in collaboration with the Peruvian Ministry of Health carried 
out a guideline to design institutional health contingency planes. According to PAHO/MINSA (2014), 
hospitals systems have to response to several internal or external threats caused by natural disasters such 
as epidemics or increase in demand for health care and so on. Those events can affect the capacity of the 
hospitals to provide medical care in emergency situations. In order to ensure a continuous care to the 
people, hospitals system have to count with business contingency and response plans (BCPs). The first 
ones are defined as the series of proceedings to ensure the continuous operation of critical services, while 
the second ones are the document with the goal to organize all the activities and processes for the 
emergency response. In this section only details about the development of the response plan are given. 
According to the guideline the contingency plan should include the elements as follow: 
a) risk analysis; 
b) analysis of the capabilities; 
c) formulation of scenarios; 
d) goals; 
e) organizational model; 
f) functions and activities useful for the response; 
g) operating procedures; 
h) coordination. 
A response plan starts with a risk analysis based on the identification and the evaluation of the hazards 
and the vulnerabilities as well as the assessment of the capacities of the analyzed hospital system. Based on 
the risk analysis, it is possible to hypothesize some probable response scenarios, to formulate the response 
objectives of the plan and to identify the activities and response functions. The guide provides a list of key 
points to be followed during the development of the contingency plan as shown in Table 2-3. The list is 
divided in three parts, preparation, plan development and response plan test. More details about the contents of 
the list are given in the next sub-chapters. 
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Table 2-3 Checklist for processing the response plan 
 
Preparation 
Establishment of the working group who has the mission to develop the response plan 
Designation of functions and responsibilities of the workgroup 
Set up of the work plan for the formulation of the response plan 
Collection of useful existing data, for instance laws and standards useful for the plan 
redaction 
Plan development 
General information of the analyzed hospital system 
Risk analysis 
Identification and assessment of the hazards 
Identification and assessment of the vulnerabilities 
Risk assessment 
Capacity assessment 
Inventory of the resources 
Amplification capacity 
Portfolio of emergency services 
Hypothesis about possible emergency scenarios 
Response plan goals 
Response functions 
Response activity management 
Information management 
Medical operations 
Accidents control 
Logistical and administrative support 
Response organization (coordination of key staff, operating assistance teams and 
brigades) 
Operative procedures 
Plan activation 
Triage and injured attention 
Specific event responses 
Personal evacuation 
End of the emergency 
Coordination 
Reference of the emergency victims 
External organizations support 
Revision of the congruence between the response plan and other emergency plans 
Test and maintenance of the response plan 
Strategy for the validation of the plan (simulation) 
Plan revision according to the validation 
Plan approval 
Dissemination of the plan 
Revision and periodic updating 
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2.2.4.1 Risk analysis 
The risk analysis has the objective not only to assess the occurrence probability of an event that generate 
an emergency situation in a hospital system, but also to identify the consequences that it has on the health 
service and the increase of demand for hospital care. The analysis consists in the identification and the 
assessment of the hazards and vulnerabilities in case of an adverse phenomenon. A qualitative approach 
based on levels and colors is proposed by PAHO/MINSA (2014) to carry out the risk analysis. Three 
qualification levels are considered in the risk analysis, low/possible (green tag), medium/probable (yellow 
tag) and high (red tag) as shown in Table 2-4. The analysis is composed by four steps as follow: 
1. hazard identification; 
2. assessment of the probability of recurrence of the hazards; 
3. vulnerability assessment; 
4. risk assessment. 
The risk analysis starts with the identification of the hazards and their probability of occurrence 
(possible, probable and very likely), then the level of vulnerability of each component of the risk (people, 
stokes and process) is assessed. The probability of occurrence of the hazard and the three components of 
the risks are grouped in a single roble as shown in Table 2-4. Three combinations of the rhombus are 
possible to define the high and medium risk level, while only two combinations are possible for the low 
risk level. Once the the combination is found, the risk level of each hazard is assigned (Table 2-4). 
 
Table 2-4 Qualification of the risk level 
 
 
Risk level 
Combination of the level of hazard and 
vulnerability for each analyzed risk 
 
High 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
2.2.4.2 Capacity assessment 
The capacity assessment consists in the determination of the available resources in case of an 
emergency. All the organizations have to count with own physical, human and materials resources in order 
to satisfy the needs of a possible increase demand of patients caused by a hazard. The steps necessary to 
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carry out the capacity assessment are as follow: 
 inventory of the resources; 
 strategy to amplify the capacities of the hospital system; 
 assessment of the medical attention capacity; 
 determination of the portfolio of the emergency services. 
A complete inventory of all the available resources useful to care patients in case of emergency has to be 
redacted. After that, a strategy to amplify the capacity of patient attentions is found. The strategy consists 
in the identification of some areas to house services as triage, hospitalization and outpatient attention. All 
the spaces have to possess water, electric power and all the resources necessary for the specific uses. The 
assessment of the capacity attention has the goal to assess the resources as follow: 
 beds; 
 intensive care unit beds (ICU); 
 operating theatres; 
 delivery rooms; 
 blood bank. 
At last, for each hospital a full list of the service provided in case of emergency has to be carried out. 
Some typical hospital activities and their relative importance in an emergency are provided in Table 2-1. 
 
Table 2-5. Hospital activities and relative importance in an emergency (WHO, 2000) 
 
Hospital activities Importance Hospital activities Importance 
Trauma and orthopedics 5 Hemodialysis 4 
Intensive Care Inuit 5 Internal Medicine 3 
Urology 5 Gynecology – Obstetrics 3 
Emergency Care 5 Administration 3 
Sterilization 5 Neonatology 3 
Diagnostic Imagine 5 Respiratory Medicine 2 
Pharmacy 5 Neurology 2 
Nutrition 5 Ophthalmology 2 
Transport 5 Filing – Case Manage 2 
Recovery 5 Dermatology 1 
Blood Bank 5 Psychiatry 1 
Outpatient / Administration 4 Oncology 1 
Pediatric Surgery 4 Otorhinolaryngology 1 
Pediatrics 4 Dental Services 1 
Laboratory 4 Therapy - Rehabilitation 1 
Laundry Services 4   
Hypothesis about possible scenarios 
Once the risks and the capabilities are defined, it is the moment to hypnotize the emergency scenarios, 
to define the goals of the response plan, to identify the response functions of the hospitals, and to 
describe the activities for the response. 
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The hypotheses about possible scenarios have to include: 
 the event that create the disaster; 
 general characteristics of the event; 
 effects of the event on patients and health staff; 
Two types of scenarios can usually affect the hospitals, the first one which create increasing demand for 
hospital care and physical damage to the structures, and the second one which create only increasing 
demand of patients. 
Response plan goals 
The major goal of the response plan is an adequate performance of the hospital systems to the adverse 
phenomenon, while the specific objectives are as follow: 
 medical attention of the victims; 
 hospital evacuation; 
 protection of patients and health staff; 
 public health control. 
 
2.2.4.3 Response functions 
In order to fulfill the specific objectives, the hospital directory has to implement specific response 
functions to face the emergencies. Some specific functions are as follow: 
 conduct the response activities; 
 manage the information; 
 medical operations; 
 accidents control; 
 administrative and logistics support. 
It is important that the emergency has to be conducted by the director of the hospital and the 
emergency management group. After that, manage correctly the essential information during an 
emergency means to facilitate the process to make decisions and to establish relations with internal and 
external supports. Medical operations have the goal to safe as much as possible people from emergencies 
and accidents. They are related not only to the pre-hospital medical attention (in the field), but also to the 
hospital medical attention (at the hospital). Response functions have to be formulated also for accidents, 
in fact, the planning should contains the tasks to manage external or internal accidents to the hospital, 
which are conducted by key staff, trained for those activities. In addition, the administrative and the 
logistic support refer to the maintenance and the recovery of all services useful for the medical operations. 
Some administrative and logistical activities can be the acquisition of emergency products, maintenance of 
the transportation and telecommunication system and so on. At the end of the response functions, there is 
the response organization, which concerns the organization model, in case of an emergency, of the staff 
and the departments of a hospital system. The goal of the organizational response model is to control and 
eliminate the adverse phenomena. The organizational model is developed and applied by internal or 
external trained staff. 
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Response activity management 
The task of managing the response is entrusted to the hospital director or to the emergency 
management group. The activities to be managed during the emergency are as follow: 
 analysis of the emergency situation; 
 plan response activation; 
 alert declaration; 
 decision making; 
 coordination among internal and external authorities; 
 hospital representation during the meeting for the response; 
 monitoring and evaluation of the response activities; 
 report redaction; 
 end-of-emergency declaration. 
Information Management 
This step supports the making decision process, the relationship between the hospital with others 
hospitals, the families of the victims and the media. The activities included in the information  
management function are as follow: 
 emergency management control room implementation; 
 damage evaluation and needs analysis; 
 compilation and consolidation of information; 
 processing and information analysis; 
 reports elaboration; 
 hospital census of the attended people; 
 coordination among the hospital network and the external organization that support the response; 
 communication with the victims’ families and the media. 
Medical operations 
This function includes all the activities focused on the hospitalization and the pre-hospitalization of 
victims generated by the adverse phenomena. The function is carried out by medical key staff (nurses, 
doctors, rescuers etc.). The objective of the medical operations is to safe as much as possible people 
during the emergency. The pre-hospital attention concerns all the processes applied in the place of the 
event and during the transportation of the victims, whereas the hospital attention regards the activities 
conducted at the hospital in order to provide medical care. The pre-hospital and hospital attention 
activities are subdivided as follow: 
Pre-hospitalization 
 implementation of the advance medical post (AMP). The advance medical post is a field structure 
with key medical staff with the mission to attend and to classify injured in field (in function of the 
physical damage), and then to distribute them to the hospitals; 
 medical attention of injured; 
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 triage; 
 first treatment of the patients; 
 victim registrations; 
 if necessary, distribution of the patients to the hospitals. 
Hospitalization 
 injured attention; 
 triage; 
 treatment or observation of the patients; 
 intensive therapy; 
 surgical treatment of the injured; 
 corpses management; 
 transportation of the patients among the hospital network; 
 supply management. 
Accidents control 
This procedure includes all the activities to control internal or external accidents. The accidents control 
activities are as follow: 
 damage evaluation and needs analysis. Identification and registration of the damages, 
determination of the most important activities and necessary resources to control the accidents; 
 staff and equipment protection; 
 accidents management. It includes all the activity to avoid the expansion of the accidents and their 
secondary effects; 
 rescue of the injured. 
Logistic and administrative support 
The logistic and administrative support functions have as goal the maintenance and the recuperation of 
the essential services useful for the medical operations. This function is related to the administration, the 
finances, the logistic, the employees, the purchases and the maintenance of the hospital services. The 
activities to take into account in the logistic and the administrative support are as follow: 
 emergency contracts; 
 transportation; 
 management of economic resources; 
 emergency repairs; 
 personnel management; 
 telecommunication; 
 computer system. 
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Response organization 
The response organization refers to the organizational model of the hospital department during the 
emergency. The components of the model are as follow: 
 identification of crisis staff; 
 operating assistance teams; 
 medical brigades; 
 external support teams. 
The crisis staff in the Peruvian contest is called “working group for the disaster risk management”, and it has 
the task to coordinate the response activities during the emergency. The crisis staff is composed by the 
general director of the hospital and the leader of the administrative and the emergency department. The 
operating assistance teams are the responsible of the medical attention to the victims. They manage all the 
aspects regarding the administration, care and logistic of the emergency response. The medical brigades 
have the responsibility to control external or internal accidents (fires, evacuations or gas leaks for 
example). It is task of the medical brigades to face a fire, to rescue people for the accidents, to ensure 
security, to assess damages and so on. At last, the external support teams are work groups that come from 
other structures in order to support, for instance, the medical attention of the and the evaluation of 
damages. 
 
2.2.4.4 Operative procedures 
It is obvious that a response plan has to include operative procedures that facilitate the emergency 
response. The response plan is activated in case of an emergency and all the resources are called to face 
the adversity. 
The activation of the plan starts with a notification of the adverse phenomena, by phone or radio 
communication for example. Once the alarm is verified and officially validated, the director of the hospital 
system declares the alert and the alarm in the hospital. After that, all the key stuff is called to respect all the 
procedures included in the response plan in order to face the emergency. The triage and the attention of 
the victims are activated. All the procedures, specifically for potential risks or events, are activated 
(attention of injured with rare epidemics or at contact with dangerous materials, evacuation etc.) After the 
response, it is fundamental to establish the criteria useful to decide if the emergency is finished or not. The 
emergency can be declared finished, for instance when all the information of the attended patients are 
registered, when the administrative documents are in line with the administrative department, when the 
work shift on key staff (doctors, nurses, administrative and support) return to the normality, when 
suspended activities are restarted and so on. The operational procedures close the activities with an 
evaluation about the application of the response plan in order to improve future responses. 
 
Coordination 
The coordination refers to the management system of the hospitals (or the health sector) during the 
emergencies. Nowadays, hospitals are called to work as a network, thus it is crucial to coordinate the 
transportation system, the attention and the hospitalization of patients among the health facilities or 
among health facilities with different level of complexity. The response plan especially the coordination 
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part has to establish for example, how to take reference about the victims (from the pre-hospitalization to 
the hospitalization), and identifying organizations that can support the response during the emergency 
(Red Cross, Peruvian Army, police and others). 
 
2.2.4.5 Test and maintenance of the response plan 
The last aspect before the validation of a contingency plan is its test. It is important to know if the plan 
really works and meets the needs of the organization or system that has to implement it. It is important to 
define strategies to test the plan before to implement it and if necessary, making the last corrections  
before the implementation. The plan is officially validated after a test carried out by the workgroup 
responsible of its development. After the plan is implemented, it is periodically maintained and actualized; 
in order to prevent it does not become obsolete. 
 
2.3 CONTINGENCY PLAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.3.1 Risk analysis in the interested area 
 
2.3.1.1 Seismic Hazard 
The seismic hazard is assessed according to the prediction studies carried out in Lima by PREDES 
(2012). Two seismic scenarios were defined by PREDES to organize the response of different public 
sectors in Lima Metropolitan in case of an emergency. Both events have a return period (Tr) of 100 years. 
The first scenario is named probable event with a 7.2 Mw, while the second one called maximum probable 
event with an 8.0Mw. Additional characteristics about the probable seismic events that can impact the 
frontal cost of Lima are listed in Table 2-6. 
 
Table 2-6 Main features of the expected seismic scenery 
Name 
characteristic 
 
Characteristic 
Maximum intensity 8 Mw 
Expected 
acceleration 
 
from 0.35 to 0.4 (g) 
 
Epicenter 
in front of the Lima 
coast 
Hypocenter (depth) 33 (km) 
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2.3.1.2 Exposure 
As anticipated in the introduction, the HSCP involves the areas of Lima metropolitan, Callao and Lima’s 
provinces. Lima metropolitan and Callao are constituted by 49 districts and inhabited by more than 10 
million of inhabitant as illustrated in Figure 2-8. 
 
 
 
District name 
N° of 
inhabitant 
District name 
N° of 
inhabitant 
1. Ancón 43 951 26. San Luis 58 454 
2. Santa Rosa 19 047 27. San Isidro 55 692 
3. Ventanilla 356 040 28. Miraflores 84 649 
4. Callao 426 649 29. Surquillo 93 102 
5. La Punta 3 955 30. Barranco 30 698 
6. Carmen-Legua-Reynoso 43 156 31. San Borja 114 688 
7. Bellavista 78 489 32. Santiago de Surco 351 725 
8. La Perla 64 111 33. Chorrillos 330 483 
9. Carabayllo 305 963 34. Santa Anita 231 486 
10. Puente Piedra 357 837 35. Ate 638 345 
11. San Martín de Porres 711 149 36. La Molina 175 237 
12. Los Olivos 377 532 37. Lurigancho-Chosica 221 070 
13. Comas 532 403 38. Chaclacayo 44 271 
14. Independencia 220 654 39. Cieneguilla 47 860 
15. San Juan de Lurigancho 1 105 725 40. Pachacámac 131 037 
16. Lima 276 861 41. San-Juan-Miraflores 409 113 
17. Breña 77 291 42. Villa-María-Triunfo 454 861 
18. Rímac 167 617 43. Villa El Salvador 469 189 
19. El Agustino 194 474 44. Lurín 86 263 
20. San Miguel 138 226 45. Punta Hermosa 7 755 
21. Pueblo Libre 77 743 46. Punta Negra 8 015 
22. Jesús María 73 439 47. San Bartolo 7 833 
23. Magdalena del Mar 55 876 48. Santa María del Mar 1 638 
24. Lince 51 054 49. Pucusana 17 340 
25. La Victoria 174 958   
 
Figure 2-8. Map of Lima’s districts and number of inhabitants for districts 
According to PREDES (2012) a number of injuries from 72313 to 779338 would require medical 
attention. In Table 2-7 are shown the percentages of area and people at risk according to four seismic risk 
levels, very high, high, medium and low; while in Table 2-8 are illustrated the probable consequences on 
people and buildings of both seismic scenarios described in the hazard section. In addition, Table 2-9 
shows the expected demand for surgical procedures for sequential range of hours in the aftermath of a 
seismic event (Bambarén, C., Uyen, A. & Rodriguez, M., 2017). 
 
Table 2-7 Areas and habitants exposed to seismic risk by PREDES (2012) 
Risk levels 
Surface 
area [ha] 
Surface 
area [%] 
Habitants 
[n°] 
Habitants 
[%] 
Very high 11247 13.76% 904 512 9.65% 
High 41533 50.80% 4886677 52.13% 
Medium 28681 35.08% 3572375 38.11% 
Low 291 0.36% 10563 0.11% 
Total 81754 100% 9374127 100% 
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Table 2-8 Probable consequences according to PREDES (2012) 
Elements Scenery with 7.2 Mw Scenery with 8.0 Mw 
Destroyed buildings 11572 122540 
Uninhabitable buildings 34705 193489 
Dead 7588 68006 
Injured 72313 779338 
 
Table 2-9 Demand for hospital care by Bambarén et al. (2017) 
 
Demand 
  
for hospital 
care (surgical 
procedures)    
  
 
Range of hours  Minimum  Average  Maximum  
Within 24 h 1042 14069 27096 
Between 24-48 h 1612 21774 41935 
Between 48-72 h  1910  25794  49677  
Total 2481 33499 64515 
In the investigated area a list of 116 health facilities was proposed to respond to an emergency (MINSA 
& EsSalud, 2016). Among them, fifty-six are classified as hospitals, ten as national health institutions and 
the last fifty structures as private clinics. Sufficient analysis data are possessed by hospitals and national 
health institutions (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016), no abundant data are present about the clinics (given their 
private administration), while only 41 hospitals have adequate analysis data (Santa-Cruz, Palomino, 
Liguori, Vona, & Tamayo, 2017). Sufficient data means that it is known the global visual screening 
vulnerability index of the facility (Hospital Safety Index, ISH, developed by PAHO/WHO, 2015), the list 
of the provided essential medial services, the accessibility of the hospitals, the number of beds and 
operating theatres, the availability of alternative communication system (radio system for instance) and 
ambulances owned. In case of adequate analysis data, additional information about the hospital buildings 
such as years of construction, structural typologies, heights, built areas, provided health services, number 
of beds, number of surgical rooms and soil types, are provided too. 
 
2.3.1.3 Vulnerability and risk assessment 
In the case study only the vulnerability of the health facilities was taken into account, while for what 
concerns people they were considered only in the exposure model in order to define the scenarios. The 
vulnerability of the hospitals was assessed according to the Hospital Safety Index (ISH) methodology 
developed by PAHO/WHO (2015). It is a rapid visual screening methodology that allows to assess the 
vulnerability of stractures accordig three leves, high (red or C), medium (yellow or B) and low (green or 
A). The ISH approach assess the vulnerabilty of the building according its structural, non structural and 
organizational vulnerabilities. Data about ISHs carried out by each hospital were collected by the 
contingency plan developers in 2016 (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016) and organized in an electornic excel  
sheet. Results of the vulnerability assessment are shown in Table 2-10. 
Chapter 2: Health sector contingency plan in case of earthquakes for Lima’s hospitals 
37 
 
 
 
Table 2-10. Vulnerability results of hospitals following ISH methodology 
 
Hospit 
al code 
ISH  Hospi 
tal code 
ISH 
1 C 27 B 
2 C 28 C 
3 B 29 C 
4 C 30 B 
5 C 31 B 
6 B 32 A 
7 C 33 B 
8 C 34 B 
9 B 35 C 
10 C 36 A 
11 C 37 C 
12 C 38 C 
13 C 39 B 
14 B 40 C 
15 C 41 A 
16 B 42 A 
17 C 43 A 
18 B 44 A 
19 B 45 B 
20 B 46 A 
21 B 47 A 
22 B 48 A 
23 B 49 C 
24 C 50 C 
25 B 51 C 
26 B 52 A 
 
Since the ISH index takes into account structural, nonstructural and organizational aspects, it was used 
as the operational indicator of the hospitals in case of an earthquake. It is useful to remember that only 
hospitals with ISH green tag (code A) have high probability to continue working in the aftermath of a 
seismic event. 
 
2.3.1.4 Boundary conditions 
In order to evaluate the risk scenarios, some boundary conditions were identified in the case study as 
follow: 
a) accessibility to health facilities (traffic). Currently are present physical barriers to the mobility 
between various urban sectors of Lima metropolitan, for instance rivers, mountains, enclosed 
spaces (airports, stadiums, etc.), roads with steep slopes and other major roads difficult to cross. 
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At night, more than 50% of the urban areas would present a good accessibility, mainly in the 
central part of Lima, while eight districts would present a poor accessibility (Pachacutec, Ancon, 
Puente Piedra, San Juan de Lurigancio, Rimac north, Molina, Chorrillos and Villa el Salvador) as 
illustrated in Figure 2-9. During the daylight hours, the central and the peripheral parts of Lima 
city have a forced accessibility due to the traffic congestion (Figure 2-9). A complete list of the 
hospital accessibility during daytime or at night is shown in Table 2-11. 
With regard to the vulnerability of bridges, the evaluation carried out by INDECI (2011) shows 
that the two bridges that cross the river Rimac (Unión and Dueñas) show a medium level of 
vulnerability which indicates the possibility to stop working after an earthquake. 
A B  
Figure 2-9. A. Daytime quality of the traffic. B. Night quality of the traffic (INDECI, 2011) 
b) for what concerns public safety, the Armed Forces are concentrated in Callao (in proximity to the 
port and airport), Jesus Maria, San Borja, Chorrillos and Surco districts. The police stations are 
fairly well distributed, in the urban space with a strong concentration in La Victoria and San Luis, 
while at night they are concentrated in the central districts between Magdalena and Surco. In this 
regard, many health facilities have difficulty in requesting support by the security forces in order 
to secure the perimeter of the buildings from potential risk events or social disorder; 
c) about fires and other accidents, firefighters are concentrated in the center of Callao, Rimac, 
Magdalena, Surquillo and north of Chorrillos. Research and rescue groups are concentrated on  
the axis Rimac-Lince, except Protection Civil Group located in Villa Maria del Triunfo. The 
debris mackerel companies that can facilitate cleaning of affected areas are located in the 
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industrial hub Lima-Callao, Ate, and Miraflores. The districts of San Juan de Lurigancho, Chosica, 
Villa El Salvador, Chorrillos and Lurín valley (Cieneguilla, Pachacamac) would not count on own 
resources such as support groups for the first attention and debris mackerel companies; 
d) soil types. According to soil studies (INDECI, 2009), 68% of the hospitals of the MINSA and 
EsSalud and the 81% of the clinics are built on a soil with good seismic characteristics. 
e) age of buildings. Most of the MINSA’s hospitals have an average of over 40 years old and they 
have been built according obsolete seismic code. The 50% of hospitals are in the range of 26-50 
years old, another 30% of hospitals havev a range of 10 to 25 years old and the remaining 20% of 
facilities are in the range of 51 to 100 years old. The age of the buildings highlights the antiquity 
of the structures, thus their potential structural and nonstructural vulnerabilities; 
f) operation in case of disaster. Based on the safety assessment of the hospitals (ISH), it was 
observed that 22 establishments have a high probability to stop working during and after the 
disaster, while 30 others have an average or high probability to continue operating (20 hospitals 
with ISH=B and 10 with ISH=A). 
 
Table 2-11. Accessibility to the health facilities 
 
Hospi 
tal code 
Daytime 
accessibility 
Night 
accessibility 
 Hospi 
tal code 
Daytime 
accessibility 
Night 
accessibility 
1 Good Good 27 Terrible Terrible 
2 Regular Regular 28 Terrible Good 
3 Regular Good 29 Good Good 
4 Good Regular 30 Terrible Good 
5 Good Regular 31 Good Good 
6 Good Regular 32 Good Good 
7 Good Terrible 33 Regular Regular 
8 Good Regular 34 Regular Regular 
9 Good Good 35 Good Regular 
10 Good Good 36 Regular Terrible 
11 Good Regular 37 Regular Regular 
12 Regular Regular 38 Terrible Terrible 
13 Regular Terrible 39 Good Good 
14 Regular Regular 40 Good Regular 
15 Regular Terrible 41 Good Regular 
16 Good Good 42 Good Good 
17 Regular Terrible 43 Good Regular 
18 Regular Regular 44 Good Good 
19 Good Good 45 Good Good 
20 Good Regular 46 Regular Regular 
21 Terrible Terrible 47 Good Good 
22 Regular Regular 48 Good Good 
23 Regular Regular 49 Regular Regular 
24 Good Good 50 Regular Regular 
25 Good Good 51 Regular Regular 
26 Good Regular 52 Good Terrible 
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2.3.1.5 Capacity assessment 
 
Inventory of resources 
Essential resources and services for the hospital emergency attention were assessed according surveys 
carried out during meetings from 2015 to 2016 by the plan developers and the directors of the hospitals 
involved in the plan. The capacity assessment started whit the inventory of the essential resources to face 
an emergency. The autonomies of water, electricity, medicines and gases, beds, operating theaters and 
ambulances owned were chosen as the essential resources needed for the response of the hospitals in 
emergency conditions. The data about the essential resources for each hospital analyzed are shown in 
Table 2-12. 
 
Table 2-12. Essential resources of the investigated hospitals 
 
Hospital 
code 
 
Water 
autonomy 
[h] 
Electric 
power 
autonomy 
[h] 
Gases 
and 
medicines 
autonomy 
[h] 
 
N° 
of 
beds 
 
Operating 
theatres 
 
Ambulanc 
es owned 
 
Available 
radio 
1 72 72 72 477 7 3 Yes 
2 72 12 24 451 5 3 Yes 
3 48 72 168 656 5 3 Yes 
4 48 120 168 697 13 5 Yes 
5 24 72 168 822 10 5 No 
6 72 48 168 57 2 3 No 
7 48 48 168 89 3 2 Yes 
8 12 72 168 241 5 3 Yes 
9 24 120 168 476 8 3 Yes 
10 48 120 168 344 6 2 No 
11 48 72 168 590 0 2 No 
12 72 72 120 70 2 4 No 
13 48 12 12 71 3 2 No 
14 48 72 168 230 0 2 Yes 
15 12 72 168 217 3 3 No 
16 72 72 72 91 3 2 Yes 
17 12 12 12 79 2 2 No 
18 12 24 24 38 1 1 No 
19 24 24 48 105 2 2 Yes 
20 72 120 168 219 6 3 Yes 
21 48 168 168 430 10 0 No 
22 24 120 168 1638 21 0 No 
23 72 48 168 886 21 0 No 
24 12 120 24 235 6 0 No 
25 72 168 168 102 6 0 No 
26 72 168 168 109 2 0 No 
27 120 168 168 15 2 0 No 
28 12 24 24 68 3 0 No 
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Hospital 
code 
 
Water 
autonomy 
[h] 
Electric 
power 
autonomy 
[h] 
Gases 
and 
medicines 
autonomy 
[h] 
 
N° 
of 
beds 
 
Operating 
theatres 
 
Ambulanc 
es owned 
 
Available 
radio 
 
 29 24 24 24 88 4 0 No  
 30 72 24 24 53 2 0 No  
 31 72 24 24 60 2 0 No  
 32 48 24 24 154 0 0 No  
 33 12 120 24 55 4 0 No  
 34 24 24 24 43 2 0 No  
 35 72 72 168 511 12 0 No  
 36 72 72 168 455 9 6 Yes  
 37 24 24 12 0 0 0 No  
 38 72 120 168 224 2 4 Yes  
 39 48 120 168 87 0 2 Yes  
 40 72 24 24 11 3 3 No  
 41 72 72 168 387 9 2 Yes  
 42 48 72 168 230 8 0 No  
 43 72 168 168 100 6 0 No  
 44 12 48 / 0 0 0 No  
 45 24 24 24 49 2 0 No  
 46 72 72 168 312 13 0 No  
 47 72 72 168 65 2 2 No  
 48 48 72 168 214 7 0 No  
 49 24 24 24 526 3 2 Yes  
 50 24 24 24 48 0 1 Yes  
 51 24 24 24 101 4 1 Yes  
 52 12 12 12 507 7 3 Yes  
 
Expansion capacity 
An important aspect that can make the difference in case of an emergency is the availability of 
expansion areas where to house emergency services such as triage, hospitalization, observation of injured 
and so on. The expansion capacity was evaluated taking into account possible expansion areas (internal or 
external) possessed by the health facilities or near them such as green areas, parching and big hall 
underused. To be considered appropriate, the spaces have to count with electricity and water in order to 
install, if necessary, field hospitals, triage, first hospitalization and other emergency services. For the case 
study, it was considered only the availability (yes or not) by the hospitals of external or internal expansion 
area as illustrated in Table 2-13. From the obtained data was estimated that 33 hospitals, of the 52 
analyzed, possess internal expansion areas, while 17 structures present external expansion areas, and only 
10 hospitals possess both, external and internal expansion areas. 
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Table 2-13. Availability of expansion areas 
Hospital 
code 
Internal 
expansion 
  area  
External 
expansion 
area  
 
Hospital 
code 
Internal 
expansion 
  area  
External 
expansion 
area  
1 Yes Yes  27 Yes No 
2 Yes No  28 No No 
3 Yes No  29 No No 
4 Yes Yes  30 No Yes 
5 Yes No  31 Yes Yes 
6 No No  32 Yes Yes 
7 No No  33 Yes No 
8 No No  34 Yes Yes 
9 Yes No  35 Yes No 
10 Yes No  36 Yes No 
11 Yes No  37 No No 
12 No No  38 Yes No 
13 No No  39 Yes No 
14 Yes No  40 Yes No 
15 Yes No  41 Yes No 
16 No Yes  42 Yes No 
17 No Yes  43 No No 
18 Yes Yes  44 No No 
19 Yes No  45 No Yes 
20 No Yes  46 Yes No 
21 Yes Yes  47 Yes Yes 
22 No Yes  48 Yes No 
23 No Yes  49 Yes Yes 
24 No No  50 No No 
25 Yes No  51 Yes No 
  26  Yes  Yes    52  Yes  No  
 
Portfolio of emergency services 
In case of an adversity, several medical services are useful to face the emergency. A complete list of 
typical hospital activities and their relative importance in an emergency is provided in PAHO-WHO 
(2000). Since the case study takes into account only the seismic hazard, some activities were considered 
essential for the capacity analysis as shown in Table 2-14. Traumatology, neurosurgery, burn unit, 
hemodialysis and general surgery were selected as essential activities in case of an emergency. A complete 
list of the hospital services possessed by the analyzed health facilities is illustrated in Table 2-14. 
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Table 2-14. Hospital activities considered essential for an emergency 
Hospital 
code 
Traumatology Neurosurgery Burn unit Hemodialysis 
General 
surgery 
1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Yes No Yes No Yes 
3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4 Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
6 Yes No Yes No Yes 
7 Yes No Yes No Yes 
8 Yes No No No Yes 
9 Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
10 Yes No Yes No Yes 
11 No No No No No 
12 Yes No No No Yes 
13 Yes No No No Yes 
14 No No No No No 
15 No No Yes No Yes 
16 No No No No Yes 
17 Yes No No No Yes 
18 No No No No Yes 
19 No No No No Yes 
20 Yes No Yes No Yes 
21 Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
22 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
23 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
24 Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
25 Yes No No No Yes 
26 Yes No No No Yes 
27 Yes No No No Yes 
28 Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
29 Yes No No No Yes 
30 Yes No Yes No Yes 
31 Yes No Yes No Yes 
32 No No No No Yes 
33 Yes No No No Yes 
34 Yes No No No Yes 
35 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
36 No No No No Yes 
37 No No No No No 
38 No No Yes No Yes 
39 No No No No No 
40 No No No No Yes 
41 No No No No Yes 
42 Yes Yes No No Yes 
43 No No No No No 
44 No No No Yes No 
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 Hospital 
code 
Traumatology Neurosurgery Burn unit Hemodialysis 
General 
surgery 
 
 45 Yes No No No Yes  
 46 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 47 No No No No No  
 48 Yes Yes No No Yes  
 49 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 50 No No No No No  
 51 Yes No No No Yes  
 52 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
From Table 2-14 it is evident that the hospitals do not possess all the specialties useful in case of 
emergency, thus for the patient’ medical attention, an adequate coordination should be carried out. 
 
2.3.1.6 Emergency scenarios 
Based on the hazard and the vulnerabilities of the exposed elements (health facilities and people), four 
possible risk scenarios were defined as shown in Table 2-15. The four risk scenarios are: damage to the 
physical structure, functional collapse of the health facilities, isolation of the hospitals and looting of 
health facilities. Each risk scenario is determined by several causes, and it has some effects on people and 
structures as analyzed in Table 2-15. 
 
Table 2-15. Possible risk scenarios (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016) 
Risk scenarios Possible causes Effects 
 
 
Partial or total physical collapse 
of health facilities 
 
a) Structural and non-structural 
damage caused by the earthquake 
and the soil conditions 
b) Fires or explosions after an 
earthquake 
c) Seismic aftershocks 
a) Injured and dead inside the 
facilities 
b) Damage and loss of material and 
goods (medical supplies and 
equipment) 
c) Interruption of critical services 
d) Increase of the attention demand 
of other facilities 
 
 
Functional collapse of the health 
facilities 
a) Disruption of water supply, 
energy and medical gases 
b) Lack of medical supplies 
c) Absence of employees 
d) Lack of response and 
emergency plans 
e) Excessive demand of patients 
attention 
 
 
a) Interruption of critical services 
b) Missed patient attention 
c) Increase of the attention demand 
from other facilities 
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 Risk scenarios Possible causes Effects 
  
 
 
Isolation of health facilities 
a) Streets and communication 
routes damaged 
b) Disruption of communication 
lines (radio and telephone) 
c) Lack of recourses for debris 
removal 
d) Absence of means of transport 
a) Limited attention of victims 
b) Limited staff turnover 
c) Interruption of food and medicine 
supplies 
d) Interruption of critical services 
e) Lack of support from other 
structures 
g) Missed patient attention 
  
 
Looting of health facilities 
a) Lack of security in the 
neighborhood of the structures 
b) Loss of internal security of the 
plant 
c) Collapse of the walls and 
structure protections 
a) Access of unauthorized people to 
the health facilities 
b) Subtraction of goods, materials, 
medicine and food 
c) Aggression to the medical staff or 
patients 
d) Limitation of emergency attention 
 
2.3.2 Emergency organization 
 
2.3.2.1 Overview 
 
Peru is a country divided administratively into 24 departments and two provinces under special 
regulations3 (the constitutionals provinces of Callao and Lima Metropolitan). Each region in turn is made 
up of provinces and each province is divided into districts. As regards to the disasters, the Peruvian 
government created in 2011 an institutional system called “National Management System of Disaster Risk 
(Sistema Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres, SINAGERD)4, whit the goal to identify, to reduce 
and to avoid the risks caused by danger effects of possible disasters. Currently the SINAGERD has 
activated the national instrument called “National Plan for the Disaster Risk Management 2014-2021” 
(SINAGERD et al, 2014), which regulates the management in case of disaster, it valid for the whole 
national territory. In Table 2-16 is shown the composition of the national system of the disasters risk 
management and their decision-making roles. 
Peru has a decentralized health care system administered by 5 entities: the Ministry of Health (MINSA), 
which provides health services for 60% of the population; EsSalud, which provides medical care for 30% 
of the population; and the Armed Forces (FFAA), National Police (PNP), and the private sector together 
provide medical services to the remaining 10% (WHO, 2018). 
 
MINSA has the mission to protect the personal dignity, promoting the public health, preventing disease 
and ensuring comprehensive health care for all the inhabitants of the country (MINSA, 2018). In addition, 
it proposes and leads the health policy guidelines in consultation with all the other public and social 
 
 
 
3 Detailed information are available at: https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organización_territorial_del_Perú 
4 Ley Nacional N° 29664. Ley que crea el Sistema Nacional de Gestion del Riesgo de Desastres (SINAGERD). PE. 
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sectors. The Ministry of health has ranked the health facilities in eight categories of complexity and three  
level of attention as illustrated in Table 2-17 (MINSA, 2011). The complexity is the degree of differentiation 
and development of the health services according to the specializations and the modernization of the 
resources and the equipment possessed by a health system. The attention level indicates the capacity and 
effectiveness of a health facility to respond to the needs of medical care of the population.. 
 
Table 2-16. National disaster risk management system by (SINAGERD et al, 2014) 
 
Decision-making role National Council of Disaster Risk Management 
Coordinator role 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers through the Secretary of disaster risk 
management (SGRD) 
 Strategic Planning National Center (CEPLAN) 
Technical role 
National Evaluation Center for the prevention and reduction of the disaster risks 
(CENEPRED) 
 National Institute of Civil Protection (INDECI) 
 Area sectors (social sectors, health institutions and so on) 
Performer role Regional governments 
 Municipalities, provinces and districts 
Financial role Financial disaster risk management strategies 
Promoter role Population, private sectors, ONGs, volunteers, universities, Red Cross 
 
The first level of medical attention includes about 70% of the attention demand. In the first level are 
collocated the health problems with low complexity, thus they require a low level of attention. The main 
activities that take place in the first level of attention are first diagnosis and treatments of the most 
frequent medical cases. 
 
Table 2-17. Classification of the health facilities (MINSA, 2011) 
 
Level of 
attention 
Level of 
complexity 
Category of the health facilities 
 1° level I - 1 Health Post 
1° level of 
attention 
2° level I – 2 Health post with Doctor 
3° level I – 3 Health Center without hospitalization 
 4° level I – 4 Health Center with hospitalization 
2° level of 
attention 
5° level II – 1 Hospital I 
6° level II – 2 Hospital II 
3° level of 
attention 
7° level III – 1 Hospital III 
8° level III – 2 Specialized institute 
 
The second level of medical attention holds about 20% of the total health care demand and includes the 
intermediate medical cases. The third level of attention detains the 10% of the total hospital demand. The 
cases treated in the third level have a high complexity, and for these reasons, it offers a high medical 
specialization. In the case study, only hospitals with second and third level of attention were considered as 
first option for medical attention and hospitalization in the contingency plan. The remaining facilities were 
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considered as support facilities. 
 
2.3.2.2 Territorial organization of the health sector 
In order to respond to an emergency and ensure the care of peoples in the aftermath of an earthquake, 
the area involved in the plan (Figure 2-1) were divided into functional sectors as shown in Figure 2-10. 
The division was made considering the major roads, bridges and natural obstacles such as mountains and 
rivers (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016). Nine functional sectors were individuated, and among them, sectors  
five and six were subdivided in four and three subsectors respectively (Figure 2-10). 
 
Figure 2-10. Territorial organization of the health sector response (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016) 
 
2.3.2.3 Coordination actors 
 
In case of an emergency, the coordination of the health sector response is assigned to the Ministry of 
Health. All the other institutions and actors have to follow the instructions given by MINSA. The 
institutions responsible of the response are as follow: 
 
 Ministry of Health; 
 Social security (Seguro Social de Salud del Perú, EsSalud); 
 The Health Department of the Armed Forces and National Police (FFAA and PNP); 
 The Management Institute of Health Service (Instituto de Gestión de Servicios de Salud, IGSS); 
 Head Square of the Disaster Risk Management and National Defense of Health (Dirección 
General de Gestión de Riesgo de Desastres y Defensa Nacional en Salud, DIGERD) 
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 Private health sector (clinics); 
 Regional Health Directorate of the Regional Governments of Lima and Callao (DIRESA Lima 
and DIRESA Callao); 
 General Direction of Medicines and Supplies (Dirección General de Medicamentos Insumos y 
Drogas, DIGEMID); 
 National Center about the Strategic Health Resources (Centro National de Abastecimiento de 
Recursos Estratégicos en Salud, CENARES); 
 Ministry of International Relations; 
 Local System of Health (SILOS); 
 Urgent Mobile Attention System (SAMU); 
 Emergency Assisted Transport System (STAE); 
 Coordination Center for Responding to Urgencies, Emergencies and Disasters (CRUE); 
 Information Cell and Medical Coordination of the Emergency Medical Technicians (CICOM); 
 Health cluster, an integrated platform of national and international organizations under the 
leadership of MINSA and PAHO with the aim to assess the situation of the alert and determine 
the necessary humanitarian assistance and the mobilization of international aid. 
 Other organizations. 
The responsible groups among the aforementioned entities are as follow: 
 coordination platform of the health sector (CPHS). It is led by MINSA and integrated by 
representatives of the health institutions. The scope of the platform is to assess the emergency 
situation, the efficiency of the response procedures and the alternative response actions. It is 
composed by representatives of IGSS, EsSalud, FFAA, PNP, private sector, municipalities and 
other organizations. 
 working group for the disaster risk management (Grupo de Trabajo para la Gestión del Riesgo de 
Desastres; GTGRD). The group was established by SINAGERD law (Congreso de la Republica, 
2011), and it has the task to manage the emergency response in case of a disaster. It is constituted 
by the chief leaders of an institution or a hospital. For the analyzed contingency plan, the 
institutions that participate to the response with the GTGRD are: MINSA, IGSS, EsSalud, FFAA 
and PNP and hospitals. 
 Emergency Operations Center (Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia, COE). It is a group that 
supports the GTGRD in making decisions by sharing and managing information and data among 
the health facilities and the institutions. The institutions that participate to the response with the 
COE are: MINSA, IGSS, EsSalud, FFAA and PNP, DIGERD and hospitals. In di contingency 
planning an additional COE is composed by representative of each health institutions afore 
mentioned and it is called “Health-COE”. 
 operative groups. They are internal groups of the hospitals and they have the task to take care of 
patients managing and coordinating the administrative and logistic activities, and the information 
necessary for an adequate response of the healthcare structures. 
 hospital health brigades. They are internal groups of the health facilities, and they are responsible 
to manage internal and external accidents in the facilities, for example fires, the escape of gas and 
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so on. Additional tasks of the group are the evaluation of damages and the rescue of people and if 
necessary medical attention to the victims. 
 
2.3.3 Specific procedures against the seismic event 
 
2.3.3.1 Alert 
The main objective of the alert procedure is to declare the red alert after the impact of an earthquake. In 
Table 2-18 are shown the main steps, the activities and the executors of the procedure. 
The procedure is applied to all the health institutions involved in the contingency plan under the 
direction of MINSA. The Ministry of health has the responsibility to declare the red alert within 4 hours 
after the occurrence of a seismic event. After the red alert declaration, all the public and private health 
organizations with their own establishments are responsible for the implementation of the actions 
corresponding to the red alert5. 
 
Table 2-18. Description of the alert procedure (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016) 
Steps Activities Executor 
 
 
1. Alert 
 
1.1 Assess the situation and the effects of the earthquake 
1.2 Red alert declaration including all the territorial sectors, the health 
facilities and any other departments if necessary 
MINSA, 
DIGERD and 
COEs of 
hospitals and 
health 
institutions 
 
 
 
 
2. Leadership 
2.1 Activation of the sectorial contingency plan in case of strong 
earthquake in Lima and Callao 
2.2 Activation of the call chain among the heads of the health sector 
institutions 
2.3 Convening of the Health Sector Coordination Platform 
2.4 Entry authorization to the key staff from other health 
organizations in the MINSA facilities, if it is necessary to ensure the 
continuity of the emergency response 
2.5 Entry authorization to the key staff in any health organizations, if 
it is necessary to ensure the continuity of emergency response 
 
 
MINSA, 
DIGERD and 
COEs of 
hospitals and 
health 
institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The action to follow in case of red allert are provided by Resolución Ministerial Nº 517-2004/MINSA que 
aprueba la Directiva Nº 036-2004-OGDN/MINSA-V.01: Declaratoria de Alertas en Situaciones de Emergencias y 
Desastres. 
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 Steps Activities Executor  
  
 
 
 
3. Information 
management 
3.1 The Emergency Operations Centers (COEs) centralize the 
information to the working groups (GTGRD) in order to make 
decisions about the emergency 
3.2 Damage assessment and analysis of sectorial needs 
3.3 Verification of the functioning of the communication system 
among the health organizations 
3.4 Coordination among the sub-health-sectors, INDECI, health 
cluster and others organizations 
3.5 Report compilation about the emergency situation. The first 
report within 24 hours following the impact of an earthquake and then 
with periodicity of at least 24 hours 
 
 
MINSA, 
DIGERD and 
COEs of 
hospitals and 
health 
institutions 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
4. Response 
operations 
4.1 Activation of the operational continuity plan of each institution 
involved in the emergency 
4.2 Activation of operative groups and the health brigades in the 
health facilities 
4.3 Implementation of the damage building assessment and the 
eventual evacuation decision 
4.4 Implementation of control procedures for accidents 
4.5 Transfer of human and material resources to support the injured 
attention 
4.6 Suspension of non-essential services and programs in the health 
facilities 
4.7 Transfer of medicament stocks to ensure the attention in the 
health establishments 
4.8 Coordination with the electricity and water companies to ensure 
supplies among the health facilities 
 
 
MINSA, 
EsSalud, 
FFAA, PNP, 
DIRESA 
Lima, 
DIRESA 
Callao, private 
sector, SILOS 
and others 
organizations 
 
 
2.3.3.2 Coordination 
The coordination action should ensure an efficient emergency response though the participation and the 
cooperation of national and international institutions. The procedure is applied to all the health 
institutions involved in the contingency plan: MINSA, EsSalud, FFAA, PNP, DIRESA Lima, DIRESA 
Callao, Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry and international cooperation (health cluster). 
The different responsibilities of the involved entities are as follow: 
 MINSA directs the mechanism of inter sectorial and inter-governmental coordination on health 
issues; 
 the health organizations, the ministries, the regional and local governments should participate to 
the coordination meetings convened by the Ministry of Health; 
 the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are responsible about the international 
aid and the acceptance of good donations and Emergency Medical Teams (EMT); 
 the Ministry of Health in cooperation whit the health cluster (Pan American Health Organization) 
coordinate the international aid that will arrive in the country to support the emergency response. 
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Table 2-19 Description of the coordination procedure (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016) 
Steps Activities Executor 
 
 
 
 
1. Information 
management 
1.1 Activation of the COEs between the institutions and hospitals in 
the first 12 hours after the earthquake impact. An appropriate control 
room for the coordination of the information is installed under the 
control of MINSA 
1.2 Within the first 24 hours, the health brigades of the health 
institutions analyze the preliminary situation about damages and needs 
1.3 Regular updating of the control room in relation to the situation 
and the emergency response 
1.4 Preparation of the emergency reports. The first report is produced 
within 24 hours after the impact of an earthquake and a subsequent 
report every 24 hours 
 
 
 
COEs, 
DIGERD,MINSA 
and CPHS 
 
 
2. Sectorial 
coordination 
meetings at 
various 
government 
levels 
2.1 In the first 24 hours after the impact of an earthquake, the 
coordination platform meets to assess the emergency situation and to 
make decisions. All the decisions are taken under the direction of 
MINSA 
2.2 Preparation of the action plan according to the emergency 
declaration 
2.3 MINSA, DIRESA Callao, DIRESA Lima and municipalities meet 
within the first 48 emergency hours to share the status of the situation, 
the response and the discrepancies 
2.4 Succession of meetings every 24 hours by the coordination 
platform in order to evaluate the response and identify the needs 
 
 
 
Coordination 
platform and 
MINSA 
 
3. Coordination 
meetings with 
international 
cooperation 
3.1 Meeting within 48 hours after the earthquake impact to assess the 
state of the situation and determine the extent of humanitarian 
assistance. The meetings will take place in the main office of MINSA 
3.2 Continuous monitoring of the emergency state and ongoing 
meetings (every 24 or 48 hours) to assess the emergency response and to 
identify any humanitarian aid 
 
 
MINSA and 
Health cluster 
 
 
 
 
4. Call for 
national and 
international 
aid. 
4.1 MINSA in partnership with the coordination platform prepares 
the chain calls for the aid with emphasis on the Emergency Medical 
Teams (EMTs), medicines and others medical humanitarian aid 
4.2 Control of the medicines list that will be required to the national 
and international organizations 
4.3 Diffusion of the medicines list among the institutions and delivery 
it to the Minister of External Relations 
4.4 Implementation of logistics management system to control the 
received international aid using computer systems as SAMU and 
Logistics Support System (LSS). 
4.5 Implementation of the CICOM for the mobilization of the 
national and internationals EMTs. Activation of national volunteers 
register (organizations and people) mobilized for the emergency 
response 
 
MINSA 
DIGEMID/CEN 
ARES 
 
MINSA’s 
GTGRD and COEs 
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 Steps Activities Executor  
 
5. Demand of 
humanitarian 
aid 
5.1 Revision of international aid offered by foreign governments, 
international agencies and organizations 
5.4 Communication to the Foreign Ministry and INDECI about the 
acceptance or not of the aid6 
 
MINSA 
 
 
2.3.3.3 Mobilization 
The objective of this procedure is to establish the actions that must be implement by the health sector 
and the private actors to facilitate the timely response to the emergency (Table 2-20). 
The responsibilities for the implementation of the procedure are as follows: 
 MINSA decides on the transfer of human resources, goods, materials and vehicles, in order to 
ensure the operational continuity of health facilities during the emergency; 
 public and non-public health organizations should make available to the Ministry of Health, 
human resources, goods and materials if it is necessary. The national transfer of resources is 
activated according to the national standards7; 
 the Ministry of Health makes an inventory of the transferred resources to the public and private 
health organizations for the emergency response. 
 
Table 2-20. Description of the mobilization procedure (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016) 
 
Steps Activities Executor 
 
 
 
1. Mobilization of 
human resources 
1.1 In case of daytime earthquake, all the staff working in healthcare 
facilities (especially technical and professional staff8 of critical areas9), have 
to continue working in the facility until the next turn 
1.2 In case of night seismic event, all the healthcare workers (doctors, 
nurses, rescues etc.) have to take service at the hospital closer to his home 
considering the location according to the HSCP 
1.3 In case of collapse or evacuation of a health facility, the staff will 
operate in the EMTs or hospitals and clinics named as main alternative in 
  the HSCP  
 
MINSA, 
EsSalud, 
FFAA, PNP, 
DIRESA 
Lima, 
DIRESA 
Callao, private 
sector, SILOS 
and others 
organizations 
2. Mobilization of 
biomedical 
equipment and 
2.1 Recovery of biomedical equipment and furniture in the evacuated 
structures after the earthquake 
2.2 The recovered equipment will be used in the functional EMTs, 
 
6 Detailed information about the acceptance of international aid are provided by Resolución Ministerial N° 0292-2013- 
PCM que aprueba la Directiva Nº 001-2013-PCM/SINAGERD para la Asistencia Humanitaria Internacional ante desastres de 
gran magnitud. 
7 Decreto Supremo N⁰ 005-2006-DE/SG que aprueba el Reglamento de la Ley de Movilización Nacional N⁰ 28101, PE. 
8 Medical specialists, nurses, obstetrics, technologists and nursing technicians. 
9 Emergency surgical centre, obstetric unit, intensive and intermediate care unit, burn unit, neonatology unit, laboratory, 
diagnostic imaging, blood bank, haemodialysis and sterilization centre. 
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Steps Activities Executor 
furniture functional hospitals and clinics  
 
3. Mobilization of 
medicines and 
vaccines 
3.1 Recovery of medical supplies and vaccines in the evacuated structures 
due to serious damages 
3.2 The recovered medicines and vaccines will be insured in temporary 
premises that provide appropriate conditions of storage 
3.3 A portion of the collected goods is used for the medical cares in the 
EMTs or hospitals with priority 
4. Mobilization of 
ambulances and 
transport 
vehicles 
 
4.1 Ambulances are concentrated in the advanced medical centers 
(AMCs10) and hospitals in order to translate victims 
COEs, 
SAMU, 
CRUE, STAE 
 
2.3.3.4 Response 
This procedure includes the set of actions and activities, which must be implemented before and after a 
seismic event to assist victims and minimize potential damages. 
Response procedures included in this plan are as follow: 
1. implementation of the Advanced Medical Centers (AMCs); 
2. Pre-Hospital Care. Medical procedures applied before arrival to hospitals; 
3. Hospital Care. Medical procedures applied in hospitals; 
4. coordination of the Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs); 
5. public health interventions. 
 
2.3.3.5 Operation of the Advanced Medical Center 
Purpose of the procedure is to set the response actions and care of victims in the AMCs, ensuring a 
coordinated and timely response. The focus is putted on the first 72 hours of the emergency. The 
procedure is applied to all the health facilities categorized as I-3 and I-4 (Table 2-17) included in the 
HSCP. 
The actors responsible of the procedures are as follow: 
 the Ministry of Health is responsible for monitoring the response actions carried out by 
health facilities; 
 the advanced medical centers are responsible for the coordination of medical care to 
victims within the assigned areas; 
 
 
 
10 Advanced medical centers are medical centers installed or present (health facilities with first level of medical 
attention, see Table 2-17) near the accidents in order to stabilize the wounded flow at hospitals. It needs at least a 
medical key staff, a triage stand and an ambulance. 
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 public and private institutions have to coordinate with the AMCs the medical attention of 
victims. Health institutions have to facilitate human and material resources to the AMCs 
in order to ensure adequate cares. 
 
Table 2-21 Description of the advanced medical centers’ procedures (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016) 
Steps Activities Executor 
 
 
1. Leadership 
1.1 Activation of the response plan (or emergency plan) for the AMC 
1.2 Activation of the call chains 
1.3 Coordination between hospitals, clinics and advanced medical centers 
1.4 Centralization of resources and ambulances to improve the medical 
attention of victims 
 
AMC 
Director 
 
 
2. Information 
management 
2.1 Communication and actualization whit the COE-MINSA 
2.2 Assessment of the damages and needs 
2.3 Ensure in the areas assigned the communication between health 
facilities and the AMCs 
2.4 Update the victim registers 
2.5 Preparation of the reports about the state of the emergency 
 
 
AMC 
Director 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Medical 
operations 
Night earthquake 
3.1 AMC actives triage SHORT11 in the stand area 
3.2 AMC actives the coordination to transport victims from the AMC to 
hospitals or clinics designed as first option in the contingency plan 
3.3 AMC evacuates victims classified with red tag to the health facilities 
3.4 AMC takes care of wounded with yellow code and if necessary, they 
are moved to hospitals 
3.5 AMC takes care of injured classified with green code 
Daytime earthquake 
3.6 Activation of the triage SHORT in the stand area 
3.7 Coordination to move injured with red tag from AMC to hospitals 
3.8 Transportation of the red and the serious yellow code injured to 
hospitals or clinics designated as first option in the HSCP 
3.9 Care of victims with green code 
3.10 Appropriate disposal of victims classified with black code 
3.11 Updating the registers of attended or dead people 
AMC and 
EMT-112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AMC and 
health 
facilities 
 
2.3.3.6 Pre-hospital medical attention 
The scope of the pre-hospital medical attention is to sets the actions for an efficient evacuation of the 
injured from the AMCs to the health facilities designed as first option in the contingency plan. All the 
action, the activities and the executors of the procedure are reported in Table 2-22. 
 
 
11 SHORT is a method of triage based on four classification codes of the injured from to the (green, yellow, red and black,  
from the less serious to the most serious). 
12 EMT type one is an a medical staff that provide outpatient medical attention to 50/100 people for day (MINSA, 
EsSalud, 2016). 
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The authorities responsible of the pre-hospital medical attention are as follow: 
 MINSA through SAMU, EsSalud, CRUE and STAE, are responsible of the coordination and 
transportation of wounded among health facilities (hospitals and clinics) and AMCs; 
 the AMCs and the health facilities (hospitals and clinics) have to coordinate in advance any 
patient transportation. 
 
Table 2-22 Description of the pre-hospital attention procedure (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016) 
Steps Activities Executor 
 
 
 
1. Coordination 
1.1 Activation of the emergency procedures 
1.2 Coordination with the MINSA and EsSalud COEs 
1.3 Communication among AMCs and health facilities (hospitals and 
clinics) to know the available ambulances 
1.4 Establish permanent communication among SAMU, CRUE and other 
operators 
1.5 Communication with hospitals and clinics to establish the availability 
of beds, operating theaters and critical services 
 
SAMU, 
IGSS, 
MINSA, 
CRUE and 
EsSalud 
 
2. Ambulances 
2.1 Coordination of ambulances for the evacuation of victims 
2.2 Evacuation of victims from AMC and hospitals 
2.3 Request of ambulance support from other health organizations 
SAMU, 
IGSS, STAE 
and EsSalud 
 
 
3. Victims 
evacuation 
4.1 Coordination with SAMU and CRUE about the reference of victims at 
other health facilities 
4.2 Coordination among the AMCs and health facilities about the 
evacuation of victims 
4.3 Utilization of inverted classification plaques for the registration of 
victims (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016) 
AMC and 
Health 
Facilities 
SAMU, 
MINSA, 
CRUE, and 
EsSalud 
 
2.3.3.7 Hospital attention 
The objective of this item is to provide the actions that have to be implemented in the hospitals, clinics 
and medical institutes for caring wounded in case of emergency caused by the impact of earthquake. A 
complete explication of the steps, the activities and the executors is given in Table 2-23. 
The procedure is applied under the responsibility of the authorities as follow: 
 MINSA, EsSalud, DIRESA Callao, DIRESA Lima FFAA and PNP are responsible for 
monitoring the response actions carried out by health facilities as part of the emergency response; 
 hospitals, clinics, health institutes and medical support services are responsible to implement their 
response plans (or emergency plans) and the provision of resources, in order to ensure timely and 
adequate care to the victims according to their capabilities; 
 hospitals, clinics and health institutes are responsible for the transfer of the victims from its 
facilities to other health facilities, if required. 
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Table 2-23 Description of the health attention procedures (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016) 
Steps Activities Executor 
 
1. Alert 
1.1 Assessment of the emergency situation and the effects of the 
earthquake on the healthcare facility 
1.2 Declaration of red alert in the health facility 
Guard chief or 
Hospital 
Director 
2. Leadership 2.1 Activation of the response or emergency plan 
2.2 Chain of emergency calls 
2.3 Convening of the disaster risk management group of the structure 
(GTGRD) 
2.4 Suspension of the planned activities and non-emergency ones 
2.5 Stress the presence of the guard posts and the entire key staff of 
critical services 
2.6 Entry authorization of external key staff to the facility in order to 
improve the response 
2.7 In necessary approbation of the hospital evacuation 
 
 
Guard chief or 
Hospital 
Director 
3. Information 
management 
3.1 Activation of the emergency operations center (COE) 
3.2 The health brigades assess damages and needs 
3.3 Verification of the communication system operation 
3.4 Coordination among nearby health facilities and the control room 
3.5 Actualization of rescued victim registers 
3.6 Preparation of reports about the state of the emergency including 
damages and analysis of resources necessary for caring people 
 
Technical 
Secretary of 
GTGRD or 
Operations 
Coordinator 
4. Medical 
operations 
4.1 Implementation of the medical procedure victims’ attention 
4.2 Activation of triage (MANCHESTER13 method for medical staff 
and hospitalization, while SHORT method for no medical staff and pre- 
hospitalization) 
4.3 Disposition of freeing a minimum percentage of emergency beds 
(20%) 
4.4 Implementation of measures to increase the number of beds and 
area for the medical attention of victims 
4.5 Coordination about the victim references 
 
 
Emergency 
chief or Guard 
Chief 
5. Operational 
continuity 
5.1 Activation of the health brigades in the facilities 
5.2 Implementation of the building assessment process (damage and 
needs) 
5.3 Activation of the evacuation plan of the structure 
5.4 Implementation of the fire control procedures 
5.5 Making available equipped ambulances and key staff for 24/48 
hours 
5.6 Ensure medical supplies, water, food and combustible 
 
 
Administratio 
n Chief or 
operations 
coordinator 
 
 
 
 
13 MANCHESTR is triage method that allows classifying injured according to 5 color levels from to not urgent 
(blue) to urgent (red) 
57 
Chapter 2: Health sector contingency plan in case of earthquakes for Lima’s hospitals 
 
 
 
2.3.3.8 Coordination of the Emergency Medical Technicians 
The scope of this procedure is to establish general guidelines for the coordination and registration of 
national and international Emergency Medical Technicians to support the recovery and to strength the 
health services (MINSA, EsSalud, 2016). A list of the activities and the responsible actors of the  
procedure is shown in Table 2-24. 
The actors responsible of the procedure are as follow: 
 MINSA, in collaboration with the CICOM and the health-COEs are responsible for the 
registration and coordination of the EMTs; 
 the health organizations require the EMTs through CICOM and health-COEs; 
 MINSA inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and INDECI about the international requests of 
EMTs. MINSA indicates which types of EMTs are required and that can enter in the country; 
 
Table 2-24. Description of the coordination of Emergency Medical Technician (MINSA & 
EsSalud, 2016) 
Steps Activities Executor 
 
 
1. Activation 
1.1 CICOM constitution within 12 hours after the impact of an 
earthquake with a minimum of two experts 
1.2 Diagnostic of the emergency scenario and assessment of the 
EMTs necessary for the response 
1.3 Activation of national EMTs 
 
CICOM and 
health-COEs 
 
 
2. Coordination 
2.1 Publication of the EMTs necessary for the response within the 
first 24 hours in the aftermath of an earthquake 
2.2 Reception and registration of international offered EMTs 
2.3 Verification and validation of the information recorded about the 
international EMTs 
2.4 Acceptance and access permission redaction of the international 
EMTs in the country 
 
MINSA and 
Ministry ff 
International 
Relations 
 
3. Information 
management 
3.1 Establishment of the system for the information collection 
3.2 Information analysis about the medical care needed 
3.3 Preparation of reports and maps of the deployed EMTs 
3.4 Reports actualization about the activity and the medical attention 
of the EMTs 
 
CICOM and 
Health-COEs 
 
 
4. Deployment 
4.1 Mobilization of national EMTs considering the location according 
to the HSCP 
4.2 Allocation of places where to place international EMTs according 
to the HSCP 
4.3 Arrival, installation and start of operation of the EMTs in the 
assigned places 
4.4 Development of an end-of-service of EMTs 
 
 
CICOM and 
Health-COEs 
5. Supervision 
5.1 Supervision and maintenance of the EMTs 
5.2 Field visit to EMTs 
CICOM and 
Health-COEs 
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2.3.3.9 Operational continuity 
The operational continuity procedure takes into account the set of actions that have to be implemented 
or developed to ensure the continuity of operations among the healthcare facilities especially hospitals and 
health centers classified as I-4 and I-3. Additional aspects such as supplies, transportation and personnel 
management are taken into account in the operational continuity section (Table 2-25). 
The procedure is applied under the responsibility of the authorities as follow: 
 it is responsibility of healthcare organizations to implement the Operational Continuity Plans 
(OCP); 
 MINSA, DIRESA Callao, DIRESA Lima and EsSalud are responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of the OCP. 
 
Table 2-25 Description of the operational continuity procedure (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016) 
Steps Activities Executor 
1. Damages 
evaluation and 
needs analysis 
1.1 Activation of the evaluation groups in the health facilities 
1.2 Damage assessment in the health facilities 
GTGRD 
of each 
hospital 
 
2. Decision making 
2.1 take decision about the evacuation of structures if affected by physical 
damages 
2.2 Protection of staff at work 
2.3 Activation of the business continuity plan 
Health 
Facility 
Director 
 
 
3. Alternative sites 
3.1 Immediate adaptation of areas established as expansion areas 
3.2 Distribution of instrumentation and important furniture from the 
inoperative structures to operative ones 
3.3 Implementation of protective measures (security and so on) for 
alternative areas 
 
GTGRD 
of each 
hospital 
 
 
4. Staff 
4.1 Convening of essential staff for emergency response 
4.2 Distribution of essential staff inside the hospital for the emergency 
response 
4.3 Organization of the work shifts for key staff 
4.4 Distribution of key staff among the inoperative hospitals to the 
operative ones 
 
GTGRD 
of each 
hospital 
 
5. Strategic 
resources 
5.1 Assessment of essential resources and medicines useful for the 
emergency response 
5.2 Inventory of the medicines and the required essential resources 
5.3 Ensure resources for the medical attention through the mobilization 
from the health institution’s warehouses to the health facilities 
 
GTGRD 
of each 
hospital 
 
2.3.3.10 Interventions of public health 
The scope of this item is to set the actions to reduce the effects caused by the impact of an earthquake 
on the public health of the affected population, reducing the occurrence and spread of diseases and health 
problems. 
The responsibilities of the involved actors are as follow: 
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 health organizations are responsible for public health interventions; 
 it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health overseeing the implementation of public health 
interventions. 
 
Table 2-26. Description of the interventions of public health procedure (MINSA & EsSalud, 
2016) 
Steps Activities Executor 
1. Damage 
assessment and 
needs analysis 
1.1 Complementary damages assessment and needs analysis focused 
mainly on the supervision of illnesses, environmental and mental health 
1.2 Analysis and processing of information 
1.3 Emission of EDAN14 reports 
 
GTGRD 
 
 
2. Epidemiological 
vigilance 
2.1 Implementation of post disaster epidemiological vigilance in 
communities, refreshments, pots and other selected locals 
2.2 Determination of the potential epidemic risks 
2.3 Strengthening of supervision in the health facility network 
2.4 Strengthening of laboratories in the public health 
2.5 Installation of the Health -COE decisions room 
2.6 Preparation of periodic reports 
 
 
GTGRD 
 
 
 
3. Water and 
sanitation 
supervision 
3.1 Supervision on the quality of hotels, communities and health 
facilities 
3.2 Monitoring of waste, solid and uncluttered residues 
3.3 Implementation of procedures for solid waste in the health 
facilities 
3.4 Monitoring of storage conditions, handling and preparation of 
food in the markets and soup kitchens 
3.5 Analysis of integrated information with epidemiological and 
clinical data 
3.6 Preparation of periodic reports 
 
 
 
 
GTGRD 
4. Hotels 
4.1 Implementation of supervision in hotels 
4.2 Care of patients in the hotels in case it is necessary 
GTGRD 
 
 
5. Mental health 
5.1 Evaluation of psychosocial problems in the affected communities 
5.2 Design of intervention plans 
5.3 Staff mobilization for mental health 
5.4 Strengthening of the first level of psychosocial attention 
5.5 Intervention on patients with high complexity medical attention 
 
 
GTGRD 
 
6. Sexual and 
reproductive health 
6.1 Ensure the operation of sexual and reproductive health programs 
in the health establishments 
6.2 Formulation of reports about chaos and violence cases in hotels 
and communities 
 
GTGRD 
 
7. Health practices 
7.1 Needs assessment and improvements of the healthy safe practices 
in the affected communities 
7.2 Coordination among local governments, basics social 
 
GTGRD 
 
14 Damage and needs reports according to the OPS/PAHO 2010 (Evaluación de daños y análisis de necesidades de 
salud en situaciones de desastre) 
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Steps Activities Executor 
 organizations and other sectors. 
7.3 Project and dissemination of materials for the affected 
communities 
 
 
 
8. Social 
communication 
8.1 Designation of spokesperson 
8.2 Selection of communication strategies 
8.3 Dissemination and processing of key messages for the 
communication to communities 
8.4 Dissemination of statements to the press 
8.5 Monitoring and evaluation of communication strategies results 
 
 
GTGRD 
 
2.3.4 Response test and validation of the contingency plan 
 
2.3.4.1 Generalities 
In order to adopt the contingency plan, a test about the effectiveness of the plan was carried out. The 
scope of the test was to check if the plan met the objectives for which it was developed. It seeks to 
validate the responsibilities and the actions to be implemented for the alert, the coordination, the 
response, the resource mobilization and the operational continuity procedures of the health organizations 
responsible of the emergency response. The test was developed according to the guideline provided by 
OPS (OPS, 2010). The most appropriate tools to evaluate the effectiveness of a plan are the simulation 
and the simulacrum. The simulation represents the design and the theoretical development of the 
simulation model, while the simulacrum is the practical exercise of the simulation (OPS, 2010). In the next 
sections the methodological characteristics of the simulation and the simulacrum, and the tested case  
study are presented in briefly. 
 
2.3.4.2 Simulation and simulacrum framework 
Simulation and simulacrum are developed and acted by experts and led by a coordinator. The 
organizational structure of both activities is divided for levels (tree scheme) as illustrated in Figure 2-11. At 
the first level there is the coordinator that can be a single person or a group of experts. The coordinator 
has the function to approve the hypothesis and all the activities of the test. The director has to manage the 
internal and the external actions, and the financial budget of the simulation and the simulacrum. At the 
second level there are the logistical and the administration aspects. They have the focus to ensure the 
availability of facilities, equipment, materials and economic resources, transportation vehicles, participants, 
simulators, evaluators, observers, relationship with other partners. It is obvious that all test scenarios have 
to be done in absolute security. The next level of the tree scheme in Figure 2-11 concerns the task control, 
the technical design, the logistics and the evaluation work areas. The task control area has the goal to 
check the other work groups, the functional details and the test methodology. The verification of the 
resources, the certainty that all the participants have understood all the information, the timeline of the 
test, are also activities that the control area has to check. The technical design concerns the development 
of the guideline of the exercise to do. It allows determining all the logistical aspects of the test. At last, the 
evaluation task aims to verify if the decisions taken into account during the previous steps are congruent 
with the obtained results. The evaluation usually is carried out with the participation of evaluators and 
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observers by using forms and report evaluations. 
 
Figure 2-11 Organizational structure for a simulacrum (OPS, 2010) 
 
2.3.4.3 Case study experience 
The test of the contingency plan was carried out in October 2016 and it involved the Lima city areas 
(OPS & OMS, 2016). The MINSA and EsSalud in collaboration with the Peruvian Pan-American Health 
Organization were the coordinator and the technical designer of the activities. A group of experts among 
the health institutions has collaborated to the control and logistic tasks. The simulation and the 
simulacrum had the main objective to assess the effectiveness of the above described contingency plan for 
the health sector against an earthquake in Lima area. The specifics goals were: verify the procedures for 
the medical attention of victims, evaluate the ability to use tools and resources useful for the response, 
qualify the communication and the coordination of actions in real time and observe the effectiveness 
response of key staff, health facilities and institutions (Figure 2-12). The simulation part took 30 days  
while the simulacrum was carried out in five hours. The simulacrum consisted in two parts, the first one 
dedicated to the activities carried out by the health facilities, and the second part dedicated to the activities 
of MINSA’s and EsSalud’s COEs (Health-COE)to manage the emergency. The first two hours of the 
simulacrum were dedicated to the medical attention of fake injured by the hospitals, and three hours were 
taken by the Health-COE to manage the data obtained from the first step and to simulate the emergency 
response for 36 hours in the aftermath of the red alert. The simulacrum involved a total of 364 peoples as 
illustrated in Table 2-27, and 14 health facilities (seven hospitals and seven advanced medical centers). 
The major chronological activities of the simulacrum were as follow: 
 initial meeting among the coordinators; 
 distribution of resources, fake injuries, evaluators, observers among the health facilities; 
 red alert declaration; 
 start of the simulacrum. All the facilities and the COEs get ready for the emergency. A control 
rooms was installed in order to coordinate the response by the COEs; 
 arrival of the fake injured to the health facilities; 
 reports about the attention of victims and the transfer of patients from AMC to hospitals; 
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 management of internal accidents such us fires, damage to the structures, evacuations and thefts; 
 reports about the emergency conditions in the health facilities and consecutive request for aid; 
 sending of information to the Health-COE and declaration of the end of the simulacrum for the 
health facilities; 
 Health-COE continues to manage the emergency (the task is to simulate 36 hours in emergency 
conditions). The Health-COE has received all the reports and followed the field situations. 
Information such as number of injured, number of deaths, autonomy of essential resources such 
as water, power electricity and medicines, food, damages to the structures and so on are collected. 
 according to the emergency situations a distribution of resources and EMTs was planned; 
 distribution of national resources; 
 if necessary, call for international aid; 
 acceptance and distribution of international aid; 
 communication to the public information about the emergency situation; 
 end of the second part of the simulacrum; 
 final evaluation of the simulacrum among the observers and the evaluators. 
Table 2-27. Number of people involved for the simulacrum 
N° of 
people 
Task 
14 Coordinators (one for each health facility) 
28 Evaluators (two for each health facility) 
28 Observers (two for each health facility) 
28 Health brigades (two for each health 
facility) 
 
245 
Injured actors (eighteen for each hospital, 
fifteen for each PMA and fourteen pare 
family members of the victims 
3 Fake journalist 
2 COE coordinators (one for MINSA and 
another for EsSalud) 
4 COE evaluators (two for each COE) 
4 COE observers (two for each COE) 
  4  COE brigades (two for each COE)  
From the test some aspects were pointed out. It was the first test at metropolitan scale, and it was the 
first time for all the health facilities to test their response plans together. In general, the simulacrum and 
the response were positively evaluated. The evacuation of people from the health facilities was correctly 
carried out. As expected, a general delay during the activities caused by the traffic conditions was 
observed. 
As regards to the singular hospitals some weaknesses were observed. There were cases in which some 
standard operational procedures were not respected, for example few nurses did not wear latex gloves 
during the medical attention of the patients. The management of corpses was found to be poor or 
overshadowed. During the fire simulation some employers have encountered difficulties to manage fire 
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extinguishers. The traffic congestions created problems to the patient transfers among the involved health 
facilities in the simulacrum. Only one hospital possessed a non-compliant expansion area, because the 
passage of motor vehicles was observed. A couple of health facilities got confused with the arrival of the 
injured during the simulacrum. Three dogs disturbed the emergency activities in one hospital. 
For what concerns the activities of the MINSA’s and EsSalud’s COEs it was highlight the importance of 
this kind of activities among them. It was the first time that the COEs worked together. In general, they 
carried out positively the activities but some weaknesses were identified. A better identification of needs 
and resources in the first hours of the emergency could have been carried out. Once identified the needs 
and the resources an improved representation of the data could have be achieved. Furthermore, by better 
graphing the data and using the maps correctly (Figure 2-12), an improved management of the operative 
health facilities and the distribution of resources such as EMTs could have been obtained. 
A          B  
Figure 2-12. Main activities carried out by key staff during the simulacrum. A. Doctors and 
medical key staff at the triage stand. B. Health-COE managing the simulated emergency 
response 
  
Seismic performance of hospitals at different scales 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 IMPROVED SEISMIC RESPONSE MODELS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Peru is one of the high seismic risk countries in the world with a long history of destructive earthquakes 
(Dorbath, Cisternas, & Dorbath, 1990; Tavera H. , 2014). The major cause of this phenomenon is due to 
the subduction process between the Nazca and the South American plates. The list of the past 
earthquakes shows that events greater than 8.5 Mw could occur with devastating consequences (INDECI, 
2009). According to Centre for Studies and Prevention of Disasters (PREDES; Lima, Peru), a big 
earthquake in front of coastal Peruvian areas around Lima is expected to occur and with tsunami’s 
consequences that could flood some coastal areas (PREDES, 2012; Adriano, Mas, Koshimura, & Estrada, 
2014). 
As shown in the past, strong earthquakes and tsunamis mean physical damages, people injured, deaths 
and socio-economic losses (Daniell, Khazai, Wenzel, & Vervaeck, 2012). Physical damages (as partial or 
total collapse of civil structures, schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, lifeline facilities, etc.) are the cause of 
many injured and fatalities (Kazama & Noda, 2012; Saatcioglu, Ghobarah, & Nistor, 2005), especially in 
crowded places such as Lima, where there are almost 10 million people. As reported by PREDES (2012), 
316029 houses could be affected, 779338 people may be injured and a range from 2481 to 64515 would 
require some form or surgical treatment in case of a seismic scenario based on an 8.0Mw earthquake. 
According to the predictions, there would be many injuries, especially traumas (fractures, dislocations and 
soft tissue injuries), caused likely by mechanical effects and multi-organ damage which require intensive 
treatment and surgery (Phalkey, R., Reinhardt, J.D. & Marks, M., 2011; Bulut, et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
specialized treatments such as hemodialysis, blood transfusions and specialized cares are required 
(Bambarén, C., Uyen, A. & Rodriguez, M., 2017). The aforementioned predictions are consequence of the 
vulnerability of Lima’s buildings; in fact they are built informally, with poor materials and without 
following seismic codes (Blondet, Dueñas, Loaiza, & Flores, 2004, August). 
The most destructive earthquakes documented in the Peruvian history were the October 28th (1746) 
Lima’s quake, the May 31st (1970) Ancash’s quake, the June 23rd (2001) Arequipa’s quake and the August 
15th (2007) Pisco’s quake. In the first one, almost all the areas in Lima and Callao cities were destroyed, 
and the consequent tsunami killed almost 5000 inhabitants (Rios & Zavala, 2008, October). The second 
quake killed 67000 people, where about 40000 were killed under the debris of their own adobe houses 
(Rios & Zavala, 2008, October). Furthermore, the third quake killed 83 people, 2812 were injured, 37576 
homes were damaged and 22 052 were destroyed, leaving 219420 people homeless. Recovery cost was 
calculated to $500 million (MINSA, 2005). In the last one, 596 people died, 1 293 were injured, 434 614 
suffered damage and almost 75756 houses were affected. The total cost of reconstruction was calculated 
to $461 million (OPS/OMS, 2010). 
In case of seismic disaster, the health sector plays an important role in providing medical care to the 
injured and preventing potential outbreaks. Health facilities not only must be able to resist an earthquake 
but they must also be functional after the disaster given their strategic role. It means that they have to be 
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safe hospitals where all the three components of a hospital system, structural, non-structural and 
organizational should be fully operational after the impact (WHO, 2000; Lupoi, Franchin, Lupoi, Pinto, & 
Calvi, 2008). Past earthquakes have shown that functionality is strictly related to the behavior of non- 
structural elements and to the existence of backup of resources such as power, water and medical gases 
(Yavari, Chang, & Elwood, 2010; Kirsch, et al., 2010). 
After the 2001 Arequipa quake, 8 hospitals, 81 health centers and 155 health posts required 
rehabilitation or reconstruction interventions. In particular 3 important hospitals in Arequipa city, the only 
hospitals in Moquegua and Tacna cities suffered moderate structural damages and, because of that, limited 
medical service was provided (MINSA, 2005). On 27th June 2001, in the affected areas 3377 people were 
attended of which 356 (10.6%) presented serious injuries, 102 (3.1%) required hospitalization and 12 
(0.4%) needed a surgery. The four major cases treated were acute respiratory infections, diarrhea, 
conjunctivitis, trauma and wounds (MINSA, 2005). After the 2007 Pisco earthquake, a total number of 
249 health facilities were analyzed by Pan-American Health Organization (OPS) in the affected regions 
(Ica, Lima, Huancavelica, Ayacucho) and data reported that 14 (5.6%) health facilities were destroyed and 
112 (44.9%) were affected. Internal patients from collapsed hospitals were evacuated and patient 
attentions were limited or not provided (OPS/OMS, 2010). 
A study on 40 health facilities in the areas of Pisco, Cañete, Chincha and Ica showed that after the 
Pisco’s quake, 4 (10%) hospitals were destroyed and 20 (60%) hospitals suffered structural damages. After 
the quake, 31 (77.5%) facilities provided service 48 hours after the event and 9 (22.5%) showed not very 
good response capacity (Chapin, Daniels, Elias, & Aspilcueta, 2009). A study on a sample of 672 
households affected by Pisco’s quake showed that a family member in 38% of the sample sought medical 
care within 2 weeks after the earthquake. Family members with chronic illness were reported 
approximately in 30% of the households which needed routine care (Daniels, Chapin, Aspilcueta, & 
Doocy, 2009). 
According to the past earthquake experiences, Lima’s hospitals could show some forms of malfunctions 
or damages in case of impact of a strong earthquake, thus the challenge of the second part of the research 
is to investigate if the hospitals in Lima metropolitan area are able to give medical attention in case of an 
emergency. Based on that, the two main objectives of the second part are to evaluate the seismic response 
capacity and the hospital treatment capacity of Lima’s metropolitan hospitals in case of seismic event 
impact. The first goal was conceived as the combination of the buildings performance and the available 
essential resources (AER) like water, electricity, medical gasses and medicines, number of beds and 
operating theatres, and available ambulances in order to assess the Basic Seismic Response Capacity 
(BSRC). The second goal aims to assess the capacity of the hospital to treat surgically people (it called 
“Hospital Treatment Capacity”; HTC) taking into account aspects like available operating theatres,  
medical training of key staff (surgeons, nurses and rescues) and organizational level of the health facility 
(presence of emergency plans and similar). 
 
3.2 BASIC SEISMIC RESPONSE CAPACITY OF HOSPITALS 
 
3.2.1 Methodology 
Data by Probabilistic Seismic Risk Analysis (PSRA) carried out by Pontifical Catholic University of 
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Peru’s researchers using a Comprehensive Approach to Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CAPRA), and the 
software CAPRA-GIS 2.0, have been used to calculate the damage level of 41 Lima’s hospitals with their 
737 pavilions. The study was focused on the operational level, thus an occasional earthquake scenario has 
been taken into account as defined in Table 3-1. Since the study was focused on the operational level,  
only essential hospital pavilions (344) in which are housed activities considered essential for caring victims 
in case of a seismic emergency (emergency, surgery, obstetrical center, intensive and intermediate care  
unit, burn center, neonatology unit, laboratories, diagnostic imaging, blood bank, hemodialysis, 
sterilization center, power, water and medicinal gases stocks), were taken into account (MINSA & 
EsSalud, 2016). Subsequently, performance level of each essential pavilions and hospital, were evaluated in 
order to define the functional hospitals (FOs) in the aftermath of a seismic event. If a health facility 
presented all the essential hospital pavilions with a damage level less than 10% a functional hospital (FO) 
has been declared. Finally, assuming a sufficient medical stuff performance, FOs were combined with their 
AER in order to evaluate the BSRC of 41 Lima’s hospitals to continue working in self-sufficient manner 
after the occurrence of an occasional seismic event. 
Functional Hospitals 
Functional hospitals have been evaluated by using damage levels of the hospital pavilions obtained by 
PSRA (Santa-Cruz, Palomino, Liguori, Vona, & Tamayo, 2017). The PSRA has allowed analyzing the 
seismic hazard, the exposure and the vulnerability of the 41 studied Lima’s hospitals with their 737 
pavilions. 
The hazard module defined the frequency and the seismic intensity (acceleration) in each site where the 
hospitals are located by defining seismic scenarios. In the study, the characteristics of the seismic scenario 
useful to assess the performance of the hospital buildings and setting the hazard module, have been 
defined following the Italian Ministry of Health’s and the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
indications, given the lack of Peruvian regulations on existing buildings (Ministero della Salute Italiana, 
2002) (FEMA-273, 1997). According to the indications, existing hospitals have to be operative at last for a 
seismic event with a mean return period of 72 years (Table 3-1). 
According to the probability of exceedance and the mean return period of the seismic event (Table 3-1), 
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) has been carried out utilizing seismic data and sources 
according to Geophysical Institute of Peru (IGP, Lima, Peru) (Tavera, et al., 2017, January). By IGP’s data, 
it was possible to model a seismic event according to the characteristic presented in Table 3-1. Specific  
site effects of different Lima’s soil types have been taken into account in the PSHA, in order to consider 
amplification effects of the seismic accelerations due to the different soil characteristics. Amplification 
effects were defined using the micro zonation study carried out by National Institute of Civil Defense 
(INDECI, Lima, Peru) (INDECI, 2009). In the case study, constant factors of seismic amplification were 
taken in account. Four types of soil (S1, S2, S3, S4) were defined following (INDECI, 2009), and for the 
first two types, the amplification intensity factors were 1.0 and 1.2, while for the last two ones 1.4. An 
example of the results obtained by PSHA, in terms of Uniform Hazard Spectrum, is shown in Figure 3-1. 
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Table 3-1. Occasional seismic event characteristics and hospitals building performance 
according Italian Ministry of Health and FEMA 273 
Probability of 
exceedance of the 
seismic event 
Mean return 
period of the 
seismic event 
(years) 
Building 
performance 
level 
 
Damage 
state 
Percentage of damage 
(damaged 
value/replacement value) 
50%/50 year 72 
Immediate 
Occupancy 
Light 1% - 10% 
Via exposition module, it was possible to collect hospitals information by failed visits made by one of 
the authors and ordered in a shape format file (Marulanda, Carreño, Cardona, Ordaz, & Barbat, 2013). 
Hospitals, Lima’s districts, geographic localizations (geo-referenced coordinates), number of pavilions for 
each hospitals, model hospital building types (Table 3-2), date of hospital buildings constructions (Figure 
3-6), building uses and soil types have been collected during the field visits. Vulnerability module has 
allowed quantifying the damage caused to each hospital pavilion in function of the seismic intensities 
inducted by the seismic event models in the hazard module. For each model building type (Table 3-2) a 
vulnerability curve has been created following the methodology proposed by (Marulanda, Carreño, 
Cardona, Ordaz, & Barbat, 2013) and (Miranda, 1996) except for the unreinforced masonry typology for 
which the curves proposed by (Tarque, Crowley, Pinho, & Varum, 2012) have been used. 
 
Figure 3-1. Uniform Hazard Spectrum on rigid soil obtained for an occasional seismic event in 
Lima’s center 
The curves are defined as the relationship between hazard intensity (spectral acceleration in this case) 
and the Mean Damage Ratio (MDR), which is defined as the ratio of the expected repair cost to the 
economic value of the structure. The uncertainty of the relationship has been taken into account defining 
standard deviation and using probability distribution by Applied Technology Council (ATC) (ATC-13, 
1985). For each pavilion, a fragility curve has been created in function of the structural typology, the year 
of construction, the number of levels and the structural irregularity (Table 3-2). Typical used fragility 
curves in the study are shown in Figure 3-2. 
Finally, for the analyzed seismic scenario, structural damage for each hospital pavilion has been 
estimated by vulnerability curves using Equation 1: 
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ESL j,i   V j I  Pri, j I 
I 
 
 
Equation 1 
where, ESLj,i is the expected scenario loss in the building j due to the occurrence of scenario i; Vj is the 
vulnerability function of building j, and Pri,j (I) is the probability that the intensity is I at location j in a 
scenario i. 
 
Table 3-2. Model building types defined for the case study 
 
Structural typology 
Abbreviati 
on 
Year of 
construction 
Number 
of levels 
Structural 
irregularity 
     Reinforced concrete frames  PORT  POST/PRE 
POST/PRE 
POST/PRE 
POST/PRE 
POST/PRE 
POST/PRE 
  
     Reinforced concrete frames/walls  DUAL  B-M-A IP/IA 
     Reinforced masonry  MC      
     Unreinforced masonry  MH       1  IP  
     Precast building  PREF       1  IP  
Industrial buildings NI 1 IP 
POST=Designed after 1997 Peruvian seismic code 
PRE=Designed before the 1997 Peruvian seismic code 
B=Low rise (1-3 levels) 
M=Medium rise (4-7 levels) 
A= High Rise (>8 levels) 
IP=Structural irregularity in plant 
IA=Structural irregularity in elevation 
   
From building damages and their performance levels according Table 3-1, FOs have been identified for 
the investigated seismic scenario. In specific, in the study only the essential pavilions (344), in which are 
practiced important activities and services considered essential for caring the victims in case of a seismic 
emergency, have been taken into account to evaluate the FOs. If a health facility presented all the essential 
pavilions with a damage level less than 10%, a FO has been defined. 
Figure 3-2. Typical fragility curves for the major structural typologies 
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Response capacity of the hospitals 
In order to evaluate the BSRC, data about the autonomies of AER were collected in September 2016 by 
authors during the development of the Health Contingency Plan of Lima and Callao hospitals 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1aOdcJIdeqg). Data were collected following OPS indications 
about the hours of essential resource that could be available in case of an earthquake emergency (WHO, 
2015). Results were collected in an electronic sheet form and organized for hospitals. 
Combining FOs with their autonomies in hours of AER it was possible to evaluate the BSRC. If the 
hospital possessed all the three essential resources at least for 72h, 48h, 24h and 12h a hospital capable to 
work in a self-sufficient manner for 72h, 48h, 24h and 12h has been declared. Of course, only the hospitals 
capable to continue working for 72h in case of impact of an occasional earthquake could be classified as 
safe hospitals (WHO, 2015). 
 
3.2.2 Findings 
Probable functional hospitals 
A total of 41 hospitals and 737 pavilions have been evaluated by the authors in Lima city. From the 737 
pavilions, 344 (46.7%) have been classified as essentials in case of a seismic emergency as shown in Figure 
3-3. 
Figure 3-3. Functional hospitals in case of an occasional earthquake 
Looking in general to the 344 essential hospital buildings, a damage level less than 10%, for an 
occasional seismic event was obtained by 121 (35.2%) essential buildings (Figure 3-3). Taking into account 
the 41 hospitals, only 7 (17.1%) of them have been considered FOs, because they showed the performance 
level in seismic emergency conditions as indicated in Table 3-1 and illustrated in Figure 3-3. 
Available resources 
The results of the entire sample of hospitals and their relative available essential resources are shown in 
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Figure 3-4. Taking into account only the autonomy condition for which the hospital could be able to 
operate in self-sufficient manner in case of an emergency, the hospital distribution autonomies for 120h, 
72h, 48h, 24h and 12h are respectively 1 (2.4%), 10 (24.4%), 10 (24.4%), 10 (24.4%), 10 (24.4%) (Figure 
3-4). 
Figure 3-4. Available essential resource autonomies in case of an earthquake 
Response capacity of the hospitals 
BSRC of the hospitals in case of an occasional earthquake have been analyzed for the investigated 
seismic scenario (Table 3-1). By the entire sample of hospitals (41 health facilities), only 7 (17.1%) have 
resulted FOs for an occasional earthquake (Figure 3-5). 
Figure 3-5. Basic Seismic Capacity Response of the hospitals in case of an occasional 
earthquake 
Among the latter, the hospital capacity to operate in self-sufficient manner was 72h for 3 (7.3%) 
hospitals, 24h for 3 (7.3%) hospitals and 12h for 1 (2.4%) hospital. 
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3.2.3 Results discussion 
By BSRC of the Hospitals, only 7 hospitals (17.1%) resulted to be able to continue working in a self- 
sufficient manner in case of a seismic emergency and among them only 3 could be considered safe 
hospitals (full autonomy for 72h). 
The results shown a low performance of the health facilities, certainly connected to the vulnerability and 
antiquity of the hospitals buildings. In effect, Figure 3-3 highlights the high presence of vulnerable 
structures. For sure, the year of construction of the hospital pavilions is an important aspect that 
influences the hospitals’ performance, because it is directly related to the seismic building code utilized to 
design the facilities. The first Peruvian seismic code was established in 1970 after the Huaraz’s quake. That 
code was updated in 1977 but the most important improvement was done in 1997, when it was modified 
the hospital important factor (index that amplifies the seismic actions) from 1.3 to 1.5. Other 
improvements were done in 2003, when seismic forces were amplified by a factor of 1.25, and in 2016 
whenever seismic zones were updated. So far, it is possible to say that only hospitals built after the 1997 
code could show an acceptable structural performance. Taking into account all the construction years of 
the buildings (Figure 3-6), it was possible to see that only 8 hospitals (19.5%) present buildings built after 
the 1997 year, so they were able to shown an acceptable structural performance. The data proves the 
possible high level of vulnerability and low performance of the health system studied. 
 
 
Figure 3-6. Year of construction of the essential hospital pavilions 
Looking the results, it is clear that the majority of the hospitals could not be able to provide medical 
service in case of a seismic event. Taking into account models developed to assess the expected number of 
injured in Lima, approximately 686105 injured are expected in case of an earthquake, of which a number 
of injured between 4666 and 121303 could need inpatient care (Bambarén, C., Uyen, A. & Rodriguez, M., 
2017). Based on the model and comparing the results obtained by BSRC, it is possible to say that only 
17.1% of 4666 (798 injured) or the 17.1% of 121303 (20743 injured) could be admitted at the hospitals. 
Looking at Lima scenario, several hospitals vulnerability studies have been done. The first important  
one was done in 1997 by European Community, Ministry of Health and Pan-American Health 
Organization, in which 13 Peruvian hospitals have been evaluated (Morales & Sato, 2008). At that time, 
only 6 hospitals were analyzed in Lima and 4 of them showed structural, non-structural and organizational 
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vulnerability, and low essential resource capacities. The study could be considered not representative for 
Lima because only 6 hospitals cannot represent the entire hospital scenario. 
A subsequently vulnerability evaluation about Peruvian hospitals was conducted in 2010 by 
Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI, Milan, Italy) (INDECI & PNUD, 2010). The assessment showed 
that on a sample of 23 hospitals, only 9 (39.1%) possessed a good expected level of medical attention 
performance. The vulnerability evaluation was based on a micro trepidation analysis taken on the hospital 
pavilions. The work studied a large amount of hospitals and pavilions, but it didn’t present specifics 
building performance objective and seismic hazard. 
Based on the observed deficiencies, a study to research BSRC has been proposed by the authors. The 
developed approach used to evaluate the BSRC is based on the PSRA, a methodology widely used around 
the world to evaluate seismic risk at large scale (national territories or cities) and to assess important 
infrastructure like essential facilities, transportation, electric power and water systems. 
For example, similar application was made in Italy in order to assess the seismic risk of the Italian 
hospitals, in which study, the performance level of the facilities was evaluated by fragility curves (Nuti, 
Santini, & Vanzi, 1999). Furthermore, new interesting studies based on fragility curve were done in US to 
evaluate the resilience of hospital systems and how to improve it (MCEER, 2009). 
It is clear that study based on both fragility or vulnerability curves are useful to evaluate infrastructure at 
large and small scale. In effect, this kind of studies is useful to understand the seismic risk of hospitals, to 
analyze preparedness, resilience and their relative improvements. For sure, results obtained by this kind of 
analyses are useful for decision makers to develop contingency, emergency, preparedness and retrofitting 
plans; these last ones are very important for developing countries like Peru. 
At the moment, vulnerability curves were obtained following Miranda (1996) and based on FEMA 
model (FEMA-366, 2008), except for the structural type in adobe where Peruvian fragility curves 
proposed by Tarque et al. (2012) were used; therefore, improvements and studies in this field  are 
necessary in order to realize future studies utilizing Peruvian data. Furthermore, 41 hospitals have been 
assessed in the work but more new hospitals are present in Lima and they were not considered in the 
study because they are in building process or just completed, then updating could be possible. 
 
3.3 MEDICAL TREATMENT CAPACITY OF HOSPITALS IN CASE OF 
EARTHQUAKES 
 
3.3.1 Description of the case study 
Lima is situated on the western South American margin where subduction of the Nazca oceanic plate 
takes place (Ramos, 2010). Lima itself is built upon alluvial fan deposits from the Rimac and Chillon 
Rivers dating back most likely from the Paelogene to the Quaternary (Macharé, Sebrier, Huaman, & 
Mercier, 1986; le Roux, Tavares-Correa, & Alayza, 2000; Viveen & Shlunegger, 2018). The all-alluvial fan 
deposits consist of clast-supported conglomerates with coarse gravels of volcanic, igneous and 
metamorphic origin in a matrix of sand (le Roux, Tavares-Correa, & Alayza, 2000), that form up to 70-m- 
high coastal cliffs near the Pacific Ocean. The distal parts of the fan in the north (Callao) as well as the 
south (Barranco and Chorillos districts) are made up of fine-grained sediments such as sands, silts and 
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clays (le Roux, Tavares-Correa, & Alayza, 2000). The alluvial fan deposits reach thicknesses of up to 600m 
and are well-cemented (Arce, 1984). In some districts such as Chorillos remnants of late Jurrasic 
sandstones and clay stones are found. Landwards the alluvial fan gradually gives way to the Coastal 
Cordillera which is made up of intrusive rocks such as granites (Aleman, Benavides, & Leon, 2006). Based 
on these lithologies, a total of four soil types (according to civil engineering standards) and three constant 
seismic amplification coefficients were considered (Figure 3-7). Soil characteristics were as follow: a) rigid 
soil (S1) with amplification factor 1.0, b) medium rigid soil (S2) with amplification factor 1.2 and c) soft 
soil (S3 and S4) with amplification factor 1.4 (Figure 3-7). 
Figure 3-7. Map of the analyzed hospitals in the Lima Metropolitan area (Santa-Cruz, 
Palomino, Liguori, Vona, & Tamayo, 2017). The major hospitals are represented by circular 
points. The red patches indicate the different types of soil. Grey lines indicate district boundaries 
The Lima Metropolitan area is composed of 49 urban districts (Figure 2-8). The Peruvian health system 
is composed of a public sector (Ministry of Health), a semi-public one (social security) and a private sector 
(clinics). A database of 41 hospitals and 737 pavilions (Santa-Cruz, Palomino, Liguori, Vona, & Tamayo, 
2017) belonging to the public and semi-public sectors built before 2012 was used. Among the investigated 
hospitals six structural typologies such us concrete moment frame (C1), concrete shear walls (C2), steel 
light frame (S3), reinforced masonry (RM2), unreinforced masonry (URM) and mobile homes (MH), were 
identified according to the structural typologies provided by HAZUS (HAZUS MR4, 2003). Three ranges 
of stories were used to define the height of the structures: low-rise (L) from one to three stories, mid-rise 
(M) from four to seven stories and high-rise (H) in case of more than eight stories. Following the 
indications provided by HAZUS (HAZUS MR4, 2003) and the Peruvian history of seismic codes, hospital 
pavilions were classified according their seismic design level as PRE-code if they were built before 1970, 
low code (LC) between 1971 and 1977, moderate code (MC) between 1978 and 1997, and high code (HC) 
after 1997. This seismic design level classification was done according to the release of the first Peruvian 
seismic code and its continuous improvements. The most important data of the hospital systems for our 
study is shown in Figure 3-7 (Liguori, et al., In Press). 
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Table 3-3. Number of essential hospital pavilions, operating theatres and supply autonomy 
Hospital 
code 
Total 
pavilions 
Essential 
pavilions 
N° of 
operating 
theatres 
Maximum hours of 
power, water, gases and 
medicines autonomy 
1 34 13 7 72 
2 32 9 5 12 
3 38 9 5 48 
4 30 11 13 48 
5 47 14 10 24 
6 3 2 2 48 
7 6 4 3 48 
8 3 1 5 12 
9 48 17 8 24 
10 37 14 6 48 
11 41 3 0 48 
12 18 6 2 72 
13 6 2 3 12 
14 31 6 0 48 
15 16 6 3 12 
16 11 5 3 72 
17 5 2 2 12 
18 14 2 1 12 
19 19 7 2 24 
20 13 7 6 72 
21 32 10 10 48 
22 16 1 21 24 
23 31 10 21 48 
24 4 1 6 12 
25 13 4 6 72 
26 7 2 2 72 
27 13 4 2 120 
28 1 1 3 12 
29 1 1 4 24 
30 6 5 2 24 
31 5 1 2 24 
32 10 3 0 24 
33 3 1 4 12 
34 4 2 2 24 
35 28 9 12 72 
36 17 4 9 72 
37 10 2 0 12 
38 32 10 2 72 
39 10 2 0 48 
40 23 8 3 24 
41 19 4 9 72 
TOT. 737 225 206 / 
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3.3.2 Methodology 
The performance of the hospitals after a seismic event was assessed via the Hospital Treatment Capacity 
index (HTC). A complete expression for HTC is given by Lupoi et al. (2008) and adapted for the current 
case study as follows: 
 
HTC      
 1   2 
 k , 
tm 
 
Equation 2 
where,  (0.0-1) is the factor that accounts for the efficiency of the emergency plan (organizational 
component, OC);  (0.0-1) is the factor which accounts for the preparation of the medical staff in case of 
an emergency (human component, HC);  is the number of hospital operating theatres (OT); and tm is the 
mean duration time of a surgical operation measured in hours. The coefficient  represents the most 
important factor which assesses the survival rate (no damage level) of the physical component (PC) of a 
hospital system (structural and non-structural elements of a building). The component k considers the 
hours of autonomous functioning of the hospital in terms of supply goods such as electricity, water, 
medical gases and medicines. 
 
3.3.2.1 Health sector 
According to the Equation 2, and taking into account the analyzed hospital facilities, the  
aforementioned variables were combined as illustrated Figure 3-8. The investigated health system was 
schematized by five levels. 
 
 
Figure 3-8. Health sector model arranged for the case study 
The first level represents the health sector, which is composed of the 41 hospitals. Each hospital (Hi) is 
made up by organizational (), human () physical ( and 2) and backup (k) components. In addition, 
every physical component (PC) of the hospital is divided by its essential pavilions (EP), where essential 
activities, supplies and equipment are housed. Those include surgery (S), emergency care (E), a laboratory 
(L), diagnostic imaging (D), a pharmacy (P), an intensive care unit (I), a blood bank (B) and critical 
emergency components (power generator, water tank, medical gas and medicine stocks) (EC). At last, 
there are the structural (STR), the non-structural drift sensitive (NSTRDrift) and the non-structural 
acceleration sensitive (NSTRAcc.) components of each essential pavilion. 
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3.3.2.2 Assessment of the hospital treatment capacity variables 
Performance objectives of the hospital buildings 
Since the model analyses existing hospitals, basic performance objectives for existing buildings (BPOEs) 
provided by ASCE/SEI 41-13 (ASCE/SEI 41-13, 2014) were considered in the analysis. In this way 
seismic demand, structural and non-structural building performances were defined. The assessment of the 
number of injured that could receive surgical treatments in the aftermath of an earthquake took into 
account a seismic event with a return period of 225 years (seismic demand) as dictated by the BPOE´s 
(ASCE/SEI 41-13, 2014). 
Factors  , tm,  and k 
Factors    and tm were evaluated by expert judgment during the redaction of the contingency plan of 
the health sector in case of earthquakes in Lima (MINSA & EsSalud, 2016). A value of 0.8 was assigned to 
 and  (=0.8 and =0.8), while a time of two hours was established as a mean duration time (tm=2h) of 
a surgery. The supposed values are realistic because each hospital has an emergency response plan, 
emergency operation centers and staff trained for emergency situations. These actions are the result of a 
widespread safe hospital campaign promoted by the Pan America Health Organization over the last 20 
years (MINSA, 2017). Parameter  assessed the number of operating theatres for each hospital. Factor k 
assessed the number of hours of backup of essential resources: 12, 24, 48, 76, and 120 hours were 
considered for our case study. These numbers are based on the recommendations provided by the World 
Health Organization, which stating that a hospital is considered safe only with at least 72 hours of 
autonomy and that the major wave of wounded is concentrated in the first 24 hours after an earthquake 
(WHO, 2015). 
Factor 
The variable , which assesses the seismic no damage probability of the physical component of each 
hospital, was conceived probabilistically using building damage functions (fragility curves). Given the lack 
of structural and non-structural performance data on Peruvian building structures and the large number of 
hospital pavilions considered in our study, fragility curves provided by HAZUS (HAZUS MR4, 2003) 
were used. A fragility curve is a lognormal damage function of a building type (Figure 3-9), which 
describes the probability (0.0-1.0) of being or exceeding a damaged states given a peak building response 
(spectral displacement or acceleration, Sd see Figure 3-9). The peak building response, also called 
performance point for a given building, is the intersection among the capacity and the demand spectra. It 
is calculated by using a non-linear static analysis procedure named Capacity Spectrum Method, which 
provides a graphical representation (acceleration-displacement response spectrum, ADRS) of the expected 
building seismic performance point (ATC-40, 1996). The capacity spectrum is the capacity curve of a 
building transformed from shear force vs. roof displacement state (V vs. d) into a spectral acceleration vs. 
spectral displacement state (Sa vs. Sd). The demand spectrum represents the earthquake ground motion in 
the capacity spectrum method (ATC-40, 1996).  was assessed as the lowest damage probability of no 
exceeding a given damage state among all the physical components of a hospital considering the 
simultaneous operation of the emergency pavilions with their physical components (structural and non- 
structural) in emergency arrangement. For each health facility, factor  was assessed as follows: 
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 2  min1  Pi, j ds Sd , 
 
 
Equation 3 
 
where the subtraction indicates the probability of non-exceeding a building damage state ds given a peak 
building response (Sd); while Pi,j[ds|Sd] is the probability of the essential pavilion i, and component j, of 
being in a damage state ds given a performance point Sd (Figure 3-9). 
 
Figure 3-9. Damage and no damage probability represented by a hypothetical fragility curve, 
thereby assuming a given hypothetical spectral displacement Sd 
For structural and non-structural drift sensitive components, given a spectral displacement at the 
performance point Sd, the probability of being in a damage state ds, was assessed as follows: 
 
P   ds S     
   1 
ln
  Sd  
, 
i, j d  
 
 
S 

 ds  d , ds 
 
Equation 4 
where Sd,ds is the median value of spectral displacement at which the building reaches the threshold of 
the damage state ds; ds is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of the spectral displacement of 
the damage state ds;  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and Sd is the spectral 
displacement at the performance point. The probability of being in a given damage state ds for the non- 
structural acceleration sensitive component was calculated by replacing the spectral acceleration at 
performance point Sa, to Sd in Equation 4. To be coherent with the adopted BPOE (immediate occupancy) 
for health facilities and the assessment of the  factor, slight damage fragility curves were taken into 
account for the analyzed essential pavilions. 
The main steps to assess the physical damage factor 2 for a single hospital and a given return period (Tr) 
of the earthquake can be summarized as follow: 
• assess the performance point of each hospital building via a capacity spectrum method. In order 
to simplify the calculation, Methodology C at first point of interaction provided by ATC-40 
(ATC-40, 1996) was used. Methodology C is a graphical method to determine the performance 
point by using the intersections of three lines (ATC-40, 1996) named L1, L2 and L3 respectively. 
At the beginning, the uniform hazard spectrum (UHS), which represents the seismic spectral 
acceleration in function of the building structural period and the seismic return period (Tr), was 
Chapter 3: Improved seismic response models 
79 
 
 
 
determined (Figure 3-10). Then, the UHS was transformed in a 5%-damped demand spectrum. 
Considering the effective damping value of the structures (eff, ranking from 5% to 40%), the 
effective damping spectrum in ADRS, was calculated (ATC-40, 1996). After, the bilinear capacity 
spectrum in the ADRS plane was drawn (Figure 3-11). The latter is composed by the yield 
capacity point (Ay, Dy) and the ultimate capacity point (Au, Du). Finally, the performance point 
using Methodology C was assessed. First of all, line one (L1) is drawn following the elastic period 
of the analyzed structure. Then, line two (L2) starts from the zero point to the intersection of the 
capacity spectrum and the 5% damped demand spectrum. Then, line three (L3) is drawn from the 
intersection of L2 with the effective damping spectrum and the intersection of the L1 with the 
5% damped spectrum demand. The intersection of L3 and the capacity curve is the named 
performance point. 
 
Figure 3-10. Uniforms Hazard Spectrum (UHS) for Lima city for a return period of 225 years 
 
 
Figure 3-11. Performance point evaluation following HAZUS (HAZUS MR4, 2003) and 
Methodology C provided by ATC-40 (ATC-40, 1996). Structural typology RM2, low rise, Pre- 
code, S2 soil and Tr=100 years 
• calculate for each structural and non-structural hospital pavilion component the probability of 
being in a slight damage state using Equation 4 and the performance point coordinates (Sa or Sd). 
Coordinate Sd was used to assess the structural and non-structural drift-sensitive damage 
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probability while coordinate Sa was used for the non-structural acceleration-sensitive probability; 
• isolate the first probable damage factor that causes the failure of the physical component 
(P[ds|Sd]PC) of the hospital system; 
• finally, assess the  factor of the physical component of the hospital system via Equation 3. 
3.3.3 Findings 
 
3.3.3.1 HTC for one hospital 
The results of the HTC index assessment of the hospital H1 for a seismic demand with Tr=225 years  
and 72 hours after the aftermath of a seismic event is presented in (Table 3-4 and Table 3-5). 
 
Table 3-4. Essential hospital pavilions, building model type characteristics, capacity curve 
parameters and performance point coordinates assessed for hospital H1 
 
Building characteristics 
  
Capacity spectrum parameters 
Performance 
point 
Tr=225 
years 
N°of 
EP 
EP 
activities 
Building 
type 
Soil 
type 
eff 
(%) 
Dy 
(mm) 
Du 
(mm) 
Ay 
(g) 
Au 
(g) 
Sa 
(g) 
Sd 
(mm) 
1 S C1_L_PRE S2 14% 2.5 44.7 0.062 0.19 0.18 42.5 
2 E, I C2_M_MC S2 9% 19.8 263.7 0.250 0.63 0.27 34.1 
3 E C2_M_MC S2 9% 19.8 263.7 0.250 0.63 0.27 34.1 
4 E C2_L_HC S2 9% 18.3 365.5 0.600 1.50 0.60 17.9 
5 P RM2_L_HC S2 9% 24.4 389.6 0.800 1.60 0.49 14.5 
6 EC C1_L_PRE S2 14% 2.5 44.7 0.062 0.19 0.18 42.5 
7 D C1_L_PRE S2 14% 2.5 44.7 0.062 0.19 0.18 42.5 
8 D C1_L_HC S2 9% 15.0 357.6 0.375 1.12 0.40 23.9 
9 B RM2_L_PRE S2 15% 4.1 48.8 0.133 0.27 0.23 36.1 
10 S C1_L_HC S2 9% 15.0 357.6 0.375 1.12 0.40 23.9 
11 EC RM2_L_PRE S2 15% 4.1 48.8 0.133 0.27 0.23 36.1 
12 L RM2_L_LC S2 16% 6.1 73.2 0.200 0.40 0.27 29.6 
13 P C1_L_PRE S2 14% 2.5 44.7 0.062 0.19 0.18 42.5 
EP = essential pavilion see section 2.3 
eff = effective damping 
Dy = yield capacity displacement 
Du = ultimate capacity displacement 
Ay = yield capacity acceleration 
Au = yield ultimate acceleration 
 Sa = spectral acceleration coordinate at performance 
point 
Sd = spectral displacement coordinate at performance 
point 
From the 34 pavilions of the hospital H1, only 13 were considered EP (Table 3-4). All the eight 
identified building types (C1_L_PRE, C2_M_MC, C2_L_HC, RM2_L_HC, C1_L_PRE, C1_L_HC, 
RM2_L_PRE, RM2_L_LC) were built on soil type S2. Only four essential pavilions present an adequate 
structural typology (high code, HC), while the remaining pavilions present medium or low-quality 
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structural typologies (medium code, low code and pre-code). An effective damping from 9% to 16% was 
found. Performance points in spectral displacement coordinates (Sd) ranked from 14.5 mm to 42.5 mm for 
a return period of 225 years were found. Following the presented methodology a survival rate of 19.5% of 
the physical components (2) and a consequently hospital treatment capacity of 31 people was found 
(Table 3-5). 
 
Table 3-5. HTC assessment for the hospital with code 1 (H1). The table shows the damage 
factor Pi,j[ds|Sd] for each essential hospital pavilion i, and component j, the survival rate of the 
physical component of the hospital (), and all the HTC factors, (   and tm). All the data are 
referred to a Tr=225 years and 72h of autonomy. 
 
 
H1 
 
EP 
STR 
Pi,j 
[ds|Sd] 
NSTR 
Pi,j 
[ds|Sd] 
NSTR 
Pi,j 
[ds|Sa] 
2) 
min(1-Pi,j [ds|Sd]) 
1) 
OT 
 

 

 
tm 
 
HTC72h 
1 S 80.5% 79.6% 43.8%       
2 E, I 43.8% 35.6% 30.6%       
3 E 43.8% 35.6% 30.6%       
4 E 36.0% 48.7% 66.4%       
5 P 24.5% 6.2% 54.6%       
6 EM 80.5% 79.6% 43.8%       
7 D 80.5% 79.6% 43.8% 19.5% 7 0.8 0.8 2 31 
8 D 39.6% 63.7% 42.8%    
9 B 78.4% 71.9% 58.1%    
10 S 39.6% 63.7% 42.8%    
11 EM 78.4% 71.9% 58.1%    
12 L 60.8% 69.6% 44.3%    
13 P 80.5% 79.6% 43.8%    
EP = essential pavilion 
STR = structural component 
NSTR = non-structural component 
2 = physical component survival rate 
  operating theatres 
  = organizational component coefficient 
 = human component coefficient 
tm = mean duration time of a surgical treatment 
HTC72h = hospital treatment capacity at 72 hours 
  
 
3.3.3.2 HTC for the analyzed health sector 
 
From the 737 hospital pavilions, 225 (30%) were considered essential pavilions (Table 3-3). A number of 
206 operating theatres were calculated as available and only five hospitals, out of the 41, did not have 
available operating rooms in case of an emergency (Table 3-3). From all the 41 investigated health 
facilities, only 11 hospitals are able to provide supplies for up to 72h and only one lasted 120h (Table 3-3). 
An overview of the distribution of the essential resources in Lima metropolitan, according to the total 
population per district, is shown in Figure 3-12. The health facilities are concentrated in the central area of 
Lima, which has a medium population density and are nearly absent in the suburban areas, where a high 
population density exists. The discrepancy between the center and the suburbs is also noted in the backup 
of essential resources. Only ten hospitals present 12, 24, 48 and 72 hours of autonomy respectively, for a 
total number of 40 hospitals and only one hospital has 120 hours of backup. But, the hospitals with 
sufficient autonomy to cope with an emergency during at least 72 hours (WHO, 2015) are located in the 
center, where also good soil conditions are found (Figure 3-7). 
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A map is shown in Figure 3-12 B that illustrates the seismic no damage level () of the physical 
components (PC) of the hospitals for the analyzed seismic scenario. The results show the variability not 
only of the seismic damage level among the analyzed hospitals, but also between the different districts. 
 
For a seismic scenario with a return period of 225 years, 39 hospitals (95%) have a chance to be 
significantly damaged (Figure 3-12 B). These percentages are inacceptable for a hospital infrastructural 
system. 
A  
B  
Figure 3-12. Maps of the obtained results. A) Backup of essential resources (electric power, 
water, medical gasses and medicines) according to the population per district. B) Survival level of 
the physical components of the hospitals for a seismic event with 225 years of return period 
 
Table 3-6 summarizes the HTC assessment for all the hospitals. The table shows, for the analyzed 
seismic return period (225 years), the HTC index for 12, 24, 48, 72 and 120 hours as a function of the 
backup of essential resources (electric power, water, medical gasses and medicines). Taking into account  
all the HTC provided by the hospitals, 203, 337, 462, 362 and 19 injured are still able to receive surgical 
treatments after 12, 24, 48, 72 and 120 hours respectively (Table 3-6). 
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Table 3-6. Hospital capacity treatment values, considering damages for seismic events with 
Tr=100 and Tr=225 years and for 24, 48, 72 and 120 hours of autonomy 
 
 
  Tr=225 years  
Hospital 
code 
12h 24h 48h 72h 120h 
1 5 10 21 31 / 
2 3 / / / / 
3 5 10 19 / / 
4 10 19 38 / / 
5 9 19 / / / 
6 3 7 14 / / 
7 3 6 12 / / 
8 7 / / / / 
9 6 11 / / / 
10 6 11 23 / / 
11 / / / / / 
12 1 3 6 9 / 
13 5 / / / / 
14 / / / / / 
15 1 / / / / 
16 6 13 26 38 / 
17 2 / / / / 
18 1 / / / / 
19 1 2 / / / 
20 4 9 18 27 / 
21 8 16 32 / / 
22 17 35 / / / 
23 20 41 82 / / 
24 4 / / / / 
25 8 17 33 50 / 
26 4 9 17 26 / 
27 2 4 8 11 19 
28 5 / / / / 
29 7 14 / / / 
30 3 6 / / / 
31 4 8 / / / 
32 / / / / / 
33 7 / / / / 
34 2 4 / / / 
35 5 10 21 31 / 
36 10 20 39 59 / 
37 / / / / / 
38 2 3 6 9 / 
39 / / / / / 
40 4 8 / / / 
41 12 24 47 71 / 
  TOT.  203  337  462  362  19  
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3.4 RESULTS DISCUSSION 
According to the demand for hospital care (Bambarén, C., Uyen, A. & Rodriguez, M., 2017), a minimum 
of 2481, an average of 33499 and a maximum of 64515 people would require surgical treatments in the 
aftermath of a seismic event (Table 3-7). Comparing the demand for hospital care and the calculated 
hospital treatment capacity in the first 24h of emergency (the most critical range of attention), the results 
show a HTC of 203. That capacity could meet from 0.7% to 19.5% of the demand during the first 24 
hours of an emergency. After 48h, a total number of 337 people could receive surgical treatments which 
means from 0.8% to 20.1% of the hospital treatment demand. After 72h, a total of 462 people could be 
treated, which covers a demand ranging from 0.9% to 24.4% (Table 3-7). 
According to the Table 3-7, if no damage is considered in the HTC assessment, a total number of 7416 
people could be treated surgically by the hospitals in case of an emergency of 72 hours. That number 
could completely cover the demand in case of a minimum number of injured (2481), but it is insufficient 
in case of the maximum demand (64515). According to these comparisons, the health sector treatment 
capacity, considering the damage levels among the hospital components, is not efficient enough to cover 
the demand. This highlights the need of extra aid and the implementation of measures to improve the 
seismic performance and preparedness of the investigated hospital buildings. 
 
Table 3-7. Comparison between demand for hospital care (Bambarén, C., Uyen, A. & 
Rodriguez, M., 2017) and the hospital treatment capacity 
 
 Time Minimum Average Maximum 
Demand for 
hospital care 
according to 
the arrival 
time 
Within 24h 1042 14069 27096 
Between 24-48h 1612 21774 41935 
Between 48-72h 1910 25794 49677 
Total 2481 33499 64515 
HTC for a 
Tr=225 years 
At 24h 203 203 203 
At 48h 337 337 337 
At 72h 462 462 462 
HTC for a 
Tr=225 years / 
Demand for 
hospital care 
At 24h 19.5% 1.4% 0.7% 
At 48h 20.1% 1.5% 0.8% 
At 72h 24.4% 1.8% 0.9% 
HTC with 
no damage 
At 24h 2472 2472 2472 
At 48h 4944 4944 4944 
At 72h 7416 7416 7416 
HTC with 
no damage / 
Demand for 
hospital care 
At 24h 237% 17.5% 9% 
At 48h 300% 22.7% 11.8% 
At 72h 388% 28.7% 14.9% 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 HIGH RISE HOSPITAL BUILDING FRAGILITY CURVES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As described in section 3.4, Peruvian fragility curves are indispensable in order to build an actualized 
database useful for future applications about seismic risk assessment. Given that, the third part of the 
thesis research presents the development of fragility curves for a high rise infilled reinforced concrete 
frame hospital building. A comparison among the obtained fragility curves with those given by HAZUS 
database is also provided. 
The curves are developed according to a capacity spectrum approach for seismic fragility assessment 
including record-to-record variability, it named FRACAS (Rossetto, et al., 2016). The approach combines 
the capacity and the demand spectra in order to assess several performance points. Then, the relationship 
between the probability that an investigated structure will reach or exceed a predefined damage limit states 
for a given intensity measure (IM) is assessed. The capacity spectrum is derived from the capacity curve 
carried out through a pushover analysis (PO) on the investigated structure; while the seismic demand is 
assessed scaling several spectra derived from past earthquake acceleration time-histories. Once the 
performance points are assessed, engineering demand parameters (EDPs) are calculated in function of the 
intensity measure. Analyzing statistically the obtained EDPs (for example the maximum inter-story drifts), 
in function of the damage limit states, allows assessing the fragility curves. 
The case study concerns about a high rise hospital pavilion of the national hospital named “Edgardo 
Rebagliati Martin” located in the central area of Lima metropolitan. The pavilion was built in 1958 with an 
infilled reinforced concrete frame structure. It is considered one of the most important health facilities in 
the city given is surgery and bed capacity of about 1600 and 21 operating theatres. The general view of the 
analyzed hospital pavilion is provided in Figure 4-1. 
 
 
Figure 4-1. General view of the analyzed hospital building 
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4.2 CAPACITY SPECTRUM APPROACH FOR SEISMIC FRAGILITY 
ASSESSMENT 
Fragility curves represent the relationship between the ground motion intensity measure and the 
probability that a specified structure will reach or exceed a predefined damage limit state, for example 
slight (SD), moderate (MD), extensive (ED) or complete (CD). The fragility relationship can be defined as 
follows: 
PDS  dsi IM  Equation 5 
where, DS is the damage state of the evaluated structure, dsi is the predefined damage limit state and IM 
is a scalar ground motion factor that represents the potential seismic damage with respect to the specific 
analyzed structure. In summary, a fragility curve is built thought a statistical model that relates the building 
damage data at different levels of IM. In case of analytical fragility curves, structural seismic response data 
are first achieved thought structural analysis considering seismic excitation with increasing intensities. The 
obtained response data are expressed in terms of engineering demand parameters (for example maximum 
inter-story drift or top drift), which are compared to properly calibrated thresholds that corresponds a 
given damage limit state or performance level of the analyzed component (structural, nonstructural or 
systems). Past studies (D’Ayala, et al., 2014) proposed several methods to generate fragility functions using 
simplified structural model (single degree of freedom), different analysis approach (static or dynamic 
analysis) or different assessment method (empirical or numerical). 
FRACAS (Rossetto, et al., 2016) is a procedure that generates fragility curves using the modified 
capacity spectrum method developed by Rosetto & Elnashai (2005). The procedures was assembled in a 
free software tool which allows to derive fragility curves analyzing a specific or a population of structures 
subjected to a number of different earthquake signals. According that, FRACAS is able to take into 
account not only the variability of structural characteristics but also the variability of the seismic imputes, 
thus the associated uncertainties. The methodology (Rossetto, et al., 2016) is based on the following steps: 
1. generate the mathematical model to represent the investigated structure or a population of 
buildings. For example, it can be created stochastically (Silva, Crowley, Pinho, & Varum, 
2014) or selecting representative buildings (D’Ayala, et al., 2014); 
2. analyze the model generated in the first step through static pushover (PO) analysis or static 
adaptive PO analysis and assess the capacity curve of the MDOF system; 
3. transform the achieved capacity curve into a capacity spectrum according to the ADRS 
method. In that method, an idealized curve setting the shape of the curve (bilinear or 
trilinear), the yielding and the ultimate points is calculated (Figure 4-2 A). 
4. discretize the idealized curve into a number of analysis points (APs) that represents different 
inelastic singular degree of freedoms SDOFs with their elastic stiffness, ductility and post- 
elastic properties shown by the capacity curve up to the considered AP (Figure 4-2 B). 
5. assess for each AP and for a given earthquake record (scaled or not at a certain IM level), the 
inelastic seismic demand through the analysis of the SDOF system associated at the 
considered AP. The earthquake record is applied to the analyzed SDOF system and the 
Newmark-beta time-integration method for linear acceleration is used to solve the dynamic 
nonlinear equilibrium equation for the evaluation of the SDOF response. In this way, the 
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inelastic dynamic analysis only needs to be carried out on an SDOF system under the applied 
accelerograms at each AP, increasing the rapidity of the assessment. 
6. calculate the performance point (PP) by the intersection of the demand and the capacity 
spectra in the ADRS space. The demand spectrum is composed by its elastic and inelastic 
part as illustrated in Figure 4-2 C and D. 
7. derivation of the defined EDP from the calculated PP in step 6. The different IM associated 
with the PP and the EDP is also stored. 
8. Repeat step 5-7 if several capacity curves or analyzed structures are analyzed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B 
 
 
 
 
C 
 
 
 
 
D 
 
Figure 4-2. Main steps of the performance point (PP) derivation according to the FRACAS 
methodology (Rossetto, et al., 2016). A) Fitting of the idealized curve with the obtained one from 
the PO analysis. B) Setting of the analysis points (AP). C) Representation of the elastic demand 
and the capacity spectra. D) Determination of the PP considering the elastic and the inelastic 
demand spectrum 
The tool is composed by three modules: demand, capacity and fragility. The first module (demand) sets 
all the aspects about the accelerograms, the second module (capacity) permits to define the capacity curves 
parameters, the story masses, the inter-story height and the damage scale for the limit states, while the 
third module (fragility) allows to sets the options related to the derivation method of the fragility functions 
(EPICenter, 2017). 
 
4.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDY 
The case study concerns of a high rise hospital pavilion built with an infilled reinforcement concert 
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frame structure. The building has a width of 94.9m, a length of 26.55m and a height of 60.45m. The 
pavilion is composed by a basement, 16 floors (including a mezzanine) where are located hospital 
activities, and a penthouse. In the basement are housed support services, for example, kitchen and laundry 
services, stores of food and medicines, the building maintenance office, the water sterilization system, and 
the tailoring service. The ground level is used for the patient admission, while in the mezzanine is installed 
part of the air conditioning system. From the 4th to the 15th floors are housed the hospitalization, the 
neonatology and the surgery services. In the 16th floor are distributed the lifeline installations, whereas in 
the last floor of the building is housed the hotel service for the medical staff. At last, in the penthouse two 
water tanks of about 75m3 respectively and the engines of the lift systems are installed. 
 
 
Figure 4-3. Longitudinal view of the analyzed structure 
 
4.4 NONLINEAR STATIC ANALYSIS AND SEISMIC PERFORMANCE 
ASSESSMENT 
The nonlinear static analysis is one of the nonlinear procedures used to analyze the response of civil 
structures. It is largely used in the research and profession field to assess the seismic performance of the 
structures given its no expenses execution time and its moderate level of complexity. The nonlinear static 
analysis consists of three main steps. Assign concentrated or diffuse plastic hinges to the structural 
elements modeled though a finite element model (FEM). Then, gravity load are applied to the analyzed 
structure. Finally, the structure is pushed laterally (Figure 4-4) according to a defined direction and a lateral 
load shape. The most standardized PO lateral load distributions can be found in all the international 
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seismic code designs (FEMA 356, 2000 or Eurocode 8, 2004) and they can be summarized as follow: 
1. vertical distribution according to the accelerations proportional to the fundamental mode shape; 
2. vertical distribution proportional to the shape of the fundamental mode in the direction under 
consideration; 
3. vertical distribution proportional to the story shear distribution calculated combining the building 
modes from the response spectrum analysis. The modal combination has to consider a total 
number of modes useful to reach at least 90% of the total building mass. This distribution is used 
when the period of the fundamental mode exceeds 1.0 second. The vertical shape of the lateral 
forces () is assessed as follows: 
 
Ni 
          m   S (i ) 
2
 
i ij j a 
i 1 
Equation 6 
 
where, Γi is the modal participation factor of the mode i, ij is the modal shape of the mode i at 
floor j, mj is the mass of the floor j, and Sa is the elastic spectral acceleration assessed at the period 
value of the mode i; 
4. uniform distribution consisting of lateral forces at each level proportional to the mass of each 
level; 
5. Adaptive force distribution that change shape when the structure is displaced. The load 
distribution is updated from the original one according to the new proprieties of the cracked or 
yielded structure. 
Pushing laterally the structure allows to determine the capacity curve (or pushover curve) of the 
investigated structure (Figure 4-4). The capacity curve represents the relationship between the base shear, 
Vb, and the lateral displacement, d, of a control point usually defined at the roof of the structure. 
Nowadays, nonlinear static analysis is implemented in most of the commercial finite element software. 
 
d Vb 
 
 
 
 
d 
Vb 
 
Figure 4-4. Pushover and capacity curve concepts. Vb represents the base shear while, d, refers 
to the displacement of the control node 
Once the capacity curve is obtained, the performance point or target displacement of the structure can 
be assessed according to any proven performance assessment method. The common methods provided  
by the bibliography are: the capacity spectrum method (ATC-40, 1996), the displacement coefficient 
method (FEMA-273, 1997), and the N2 method (Fajfar, 2000). For the case study, the nonlinear static 
analysis, and the assessment of the structural performance was carried out according to the Eurocode 
(Eurocode 8, 2004), which refers to the N2 method for the performance point assessment. The N2 
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method can be summarized as follow: 
 bilinearization of the capacity curve as illustrated in Figure 4-5, where F*y, d*y, d*m are the yielding 
force, the yielding and the ultimate displacements of the SDOF system respectively. They are 
obtained scaling forces (Fbi) and displacements (dni) of the capacity curve of the MDOF by the 
modal participation factor ( ) as illustrated from Equation 7 to Equation 9. The ultimate point 
(d*m) is fixed at the maximum force point (F*y) shown by the capacity curve (Figure 4-5). Then a 
principle of equivalence among area 1 and 2, moving d*y, is used to draw the bilinearization. 
F *  
Fb
 

force of the SDOF system 
 
Equation 7 
d *  
dn
 

displacement of the SDOF system 
 
Equation 8 
   
m*  Fi
  mii   
Fi      i 2  2  
 m j    
 
modal participation factor 
 
 
Equation 9 
m*   mii  Fi mass of the SDOF system 
 
Equation 10 
 
Figure 4-5. Capacity curve bilinearization (Eurocode 8, 2004). Red curve represents the 
bilinearized curve while the black one represents the capacity curve achieved through the 
nonlinear static analysis 
 assessment of the target displacement of the equivalent SDOF system. It is calculated in function 
of the fundamental period of the equivalent SDOF system (T*). The elastic target displacement of 
a structure with period (T*) is calculated according to Equation 11. 
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Equation 11 
m*  d 
*
 
T*   2 
y
 
F 
* 
y 
 
Equation 12 
where Se(T*) is the spectral acceleration at period T* in the elastic spectrum (Equation 12). Three 
cases are provided by the Eurocode to assess the target displacement (d*t) of an equivalent 
SDOF: 
a. if T*<Tc and F*y/m* ≥ Se(T*), the response of the structure is elastic and d*t=d*et; 
b. if T*<Tc and F*y/m* < Se(T*), the response of the building is nonlinear and the target 
displacement is calculated using Equation 13 and Equation 14. 
 
d  
d * 
1  q  1 Tc   d 
* et     *
 
  t u et 
qu     T * 
Equation 13 
q     
Se T * m* 
u
F * y 
 
Equation 14 
c. if T*≥Tc, thus d*t=d*et. 
 assessment of the target displacement of the MDOF system corresponding to the displacement of 
the control node in the pushover analysis. It is calculated multiplying the target displacement of 
the SDOF system d*et with the modal participation factor . 
For civil structures, in case of deformable structures to the horizontal loads or for high rise buildings, it 
can be useful to take into account in the mathematical model the geometric nonlinearity effects (or P-Δ 
effects) of the building (Figure 4-6). They are assessed performing P-Δ analysis which evaluates the 
additional shear forces and bending moments in columns because of the deformed shape of the structure 
when pushed by lateral forces (H). The additional moments applied to the columns will be equal to the 
load acting on the columns (P) times the horizontal displacement (Δ). 
 
 
Figure 4-6. P-Δ effect concept on a column 
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4.5 FINITE ELEMENT MODEL 
 
4.5.1 Elements 
A finite element model (FEM) was created using MidasGen software (MIDAS/Gen, 2017) to simulate 
the investigated hospital pavilion. A total number of 5110 elements were created to represent the 
geometry of the structure. Sections were created according to the design details carried out in 1957 by a 
North American engineering company. Some original beam details are shown in Figure 4-7. 
 
 
Figure 4-7. Cross-section of the principal beam element 
In the FEM, beam elements were used to model beams and columns, while truss elements were used to 
model infill walls. Beam element is a two nodes three-dimensional element. Its formulation is founded on 
the Timoshenko beam theory taking into account the stiffness effects of tension/compression, shear, 
bending and torsional deformations (Figure 4-8). A truss element is a two-node, uniaxial tension- 
compression three-dimensional line element. The element is generally used to model space trussed or 
diagonal braces. The element undergoes axial deformation only (Figure 4-8). 
A       B 
Figure 4-8. Representation of the degree of freedoms of the used elements. A) Beam element 
schematization. B) Truss element configuration 
A general view of the developed FEM model is shown in Figure 4-9. Since the objective of the research 
is to analyze the global seismic behavior of the investigated structure, the mezzanine and the penthouse 
were simplified in the FEM. 
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Figure 4-9. Overview of the FEM model 
 
4.5.2 Plastic hinges proprieties 
Three types of concentrated plastic hinges were used in the FEM. The first one was used for the flexural 
behavior of the beams, the second one was used for the shear component of beams and columns and the 
third one was adopted to simulate the compression and bending moments in columns (Figure 4-10). 
 
A      B C 
Figure 4-10. Types of the concentrated hinges used in the FEM. A) Moment hinge for beams. 
B) Shear hinge for beams and columns. C) Axial-bending interaction diagram. Pmax(c) is the yield 
axial force in compression, MU0 is the ultimate moment without axial forces, and MU,max is the 
maximum ultimate moment 
The flexural hinge in beams is defined in terms of resistant moment (M) and rotation (θ). The shape is 
elastic perfectly plastic with a residual moment strength. The resistant moment and the rotations useful to 
assess the hinge proprieties in beam elements were assessed according to the European code (Eurocode 8, 
2004) and the main formulations are as follow: 
Seismic performance of hospitals at different scales 
94 
 
 
M y     As2   f y    (d  d2 )  K '   b  d 2   fc 
 
Equation 15 
      
 Lv   V   z  
 0.0013  

1  1.5  
h   
 0.13    
db   f y 
y y   y 
3  LV     fc 
 
Equation 16 
0.225 0.35  f yw 
      
1  
0.016  (0.3  )
 max(0.01; ' ) 
 f 
  LV     
 
  sx  
1.25 
u 
 
 c    25 v fc 100  d 
el  max(0.01;   h 
 
Equation 17 
where, My is the bending moment strength calculated according to an internal force equilibrium equation 
of the concrete section; while, θy and θu are the yield and the ultimate rotations respectively. Coefficients fc 
and fy are the material proprieties assessed according to Table 4-2. A full description of the remaining 
coefficients can be found in the equations A.10b and A.1 of the European code (Eurocode 8, 2004). 
The shear hinge in beams and columns is characterized by a brittle behavior with an interruption of the 
shear strength as shown in Figure 4-10. The shear deformation of the plastic hinge is defined according to 
the Timoshenko theory, while the maximum shear strength is assessed as follow: 
 
V  
Asw 
 z  f  cot 
Rd , s y 
s 
Equation 18 
V  
cw    bw    z   1     fc  Rd , max 
(cot   tan  ) 
 
Equation 19 
VRd, c    Crd , c    k(100  1    fc )1 / 3    k1    cp   bw   d Equation 20 
Vy    max min VRd ,s ;VRd,max  );VRd,c  Equation 21 
where, VRd,s and VRd,max are the shear strength and the maximum shear strength of the reinforcement 
steel bars, while VRc,d is the concrete shear strength, and finally Vy is the final shear strength used to define 
the hinge propriety. Complete explication of the factors can be found in equation 6.2a and 6.2.b in the 
Eurocode (Eurocode 2, 2004). The used shear hinge does not consider the decrease in shear strength due 
to the hinge deterioration caused by plastic and rotational effects that could appear during the building 
oscillation response. To consider such effects the approach provided in section A.3.3 in the Eurocode 8 
(Eurocode 8, 2005) or the flexural-shear interaction displacement-based beam-column elements provided 
by OpenSees platform (PEER, 2006), are suggested for future applications. 
Axial-moment hinge was defined according to an interaction diagram as shown in Figure 4-10. The 
diagram is assessed combining axial forces and bi-axial bending moments that can cause failure of a given 
column section. Since the scope of this section is to show the main characteristics of the used hinges and 
not to focus the attention on how the axial-moment interaction is assessed, detailed information about the 
axial-moment assessment can be found in MidasGen manual (MidasGen, 2015) or in bibliography; since 
the concept of the axial moment interaction is the same around the world. 
 
4.5.3 Materials 
Following the structural design, the previous tests carried out on the analyzed structure (MINSA, 1997) 
and the Peruvian masonry design code (NORMA E.070, 2006), five types of materials were used to model 
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the investigated pavilion. Three types of concretes, a steel material for the reinforcing bars and a masonry 
material for the infill walls were used to model the structure. A concrete Grade 5000 was used in the first 
three floors, while a concrete Grade 4000 was used to model three floors more, then a concrete Grade 
3000 was used in the remaining floors, and at last, a masonry material was used to model the infill panels 
(Figure 4-11). 
A  B C  D 
Figure 4-11. Representation of the materials used in the FEM. A) Concrete Grade 5000. B) 
Concrete Grade 4000. C) Concrete Grade 3000. D) Infill masonry material 
For the finite element model, material proprieties according to the structural design and past field test 
(MINSA, 1997) were used in the eigenvalue analysis, while reduced material characteristics according to 
the European standard (Eurocode 8, 2005) were used to perform the pushover analyses. The European 
code (Eurocode 8, 2005) defines two types of material strengths to assess the hinge proprieties useful to 
simulate the element strength or deformation as in the section 4.5.2. The first one is used to assess ductile 
mechanisms in terms of deformation (for example rotational capacity of a section), while the second one 
refers to the brittle mechanisms evaluated in terms of strength. For ductile mechanism, the material 
propriety is assessed starting from an average material strength (fcm) reduced by a confidence factor (CF), 
while for brittle mechanisms, it is calculated from an average material characteristic (fcm) reduced by the 
confidence factor and a partial safety coefficient () (Table 4-1). 
Table 4-1. Reduced material proprieties useful to assess ductile or brittle mechanics for hinges 
according to the European code (Eurocode 8, 2005) 
Material strength for 
ductile mechanisms 
Material strength for 
brittle mechanisms 
f   
fcm 
d 
CF 
f  
fcm 
d 
CF  
Three values of confidence factors and two partial safety coefficients are provided by the European 
code: 
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 CF=1,0, if structural details and exhaustive laboratory and field tests on materials, sections and 
elements are available; 
 CF=1.2, if structural details and material characteristics are partially known; 
 CF=1.35, if the structure presents not exhaustive structural details and material proprieties 
proved by laboratory and field tests; 
 1.5 for concrete material and 1.15 for steel material. 
Given the limitation of the software to set different material proprieties to assess different mechanisms in 
an element, only the reduction formulation provided for brittle mechanism (Table 4-1) was used to assess 
the hinge proprieties in the FEM. The final material strength values used to assess the hinge proprieties 
are shown in (Table 4-2). Since the case study possess all the structural details, and the material proprieties 
were proved with few past field tests (MINSA, 1997), a confidence factor of one (CF=1.0) was supposed. 
According to the confidence factor value, the design material proprieties assumed as median values were 
only divided by the partial safety coefficients (1.5 for the concrete and 1.15 for the steel) as shown in 
Table 4-2. Infill masonry material proprieties were supposed not reduced because the additional resistance 
and stiffness provided by the two external layers of mortar were not considerate. 
 
Table 4-2. Characteristics of the material used in the nonlinear static analysis 
 
Design material proprieties (1957) 
Reduced material 
proprieties 
Label 
Elastic module 
(MPa) 
Strength 
(MPa) 
Strength 
(MPa) 
Grade 3000 E= 21750 fc’ =20.60 fc =13.70 
Grade 4000 E=25000 fc’ =25.50 fc =17.00 
Grade 5000 E= 28000 fc’ =34.30 fc =22.88 
Steel S235 E= 210000 fc’ =274.60 fy =238.75 
Infill masonry E= 3520 fm’ =6.40 fm =6.40 
 
4.5.4 Infill wall models 
The analyzed structure presents considerable masonry infill walls which were modeled in the FEM. It is 
known that infill walls can modify the response of the structures under seismic actions (Kakalersis & 
Karayannis, 2008), therefore an accurate approach should be chosen to take into account the infill 
elements in the mathematical modeling. Several approaches have been developed to model the infill 
panels, for example Schuller et al. (1994) reported a tests experience, identifying and describing some 
observed rupture mechanisms. Saneinejad & Hobbs (1995) provided an analysis method and design 
approach for steel frame structures to lateral loads that interact with infill walls. Buonopane & White 
(1999) tested a concrete frame infilled structure analyzing its seismic behavior. To analyze the case study, 
two approaches to model the infill panels were used. The first approach (labeled PI) using the indications 
provided by the Peruvian masonry design code (NORMA E.070, 2006); while, the second one (labeled 
P&F) was elaborated according to the model developed by Panagiotakos & Fardis (1996). Infill walls may 
be modeled with a single diagonal compression strut (FEMA-273, 1997). For global building behavior  
they can be modeled concentrically across the diagonal of the frame, while to account for the forces 
imposed on columns and beams by the infill, they should be placed eccentrically (Figure 4-12). 
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Figure 4-12. Modeling of infill walls (FEMA-273, 1997) 
In the case study diagonal elements were modeled concentrically for a faster structural modeling and 
because the purpose of the research is to investigate the global seismic behavior of the hospital pavilion. 
For the eigenvalue analysis a unique diagonal element with the equivalent section was taken into account, 
while, for the nonlinear static analysis two diagonal truss elements with only compression axial behavior 
were modeled. 
 
Infill wall model according to the Peruvian masonry design code 
According to the Peruvian masonry design code (NORMA E.070, 2006), infill walls have to be modeled 
using a diagonal equivalent compression element or with an approach that considers the interaction 
between the frame and the infill wall. The infill panel can be modeled trough an equivalent diagonal truss 
element with an elastic-plastic behavior as illustrated in Figure 4-13. The elastic point is set to a drift ratio 
of 1.25‰, while the ultimate point is established to a drift ratio of 5 ‰ (Figure 4-13). 
 
Figure 4-13. Force-drift relationship of the infill wall according to the Peruvian code (NORMA 
E.070, 2006) 
The maximum infill wall resistance (R) is assessed as the minimum among three failure mechanisms: a) 
corner crashing due to the diagonal compression; b) diagonal cracking due to the diagonal traction; c) 
horizontal shear cracking due to the horizontal sliding (Figure 4-14). 
Seismic performance of hospitals at different scales 
98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A                                           
B 
 
C 
 
Figure 4-14. Failure mechanisms of the infill walls described by the Peruvian masonry design 
code (NORMA E.070, 2006). A) Corner crashing. B) Diagonal cracks. C) Horizontal shear cracks 
The formulations to assess the ultimate resistance of a single infill wall are as follow: 
 
Rc  0.12  fm  d  t ; corner crashing resistance; Equation 22 
Rt  0.85 fm  d  t ; diagonal cracking resistance; Equation 23 
R   
fs   t  d 
;
 
s 
1  0.4  h / l 
 
horizontal shear cracking resistance; 
 
Equation 24 
R  minRc ; Rt ; Rs  ; ultimate resistance of the infill wall; Equation 25 
where, fm is the compression strength characteristic of the masonry; fs, is the shear strength of the 
masonry (fixed value of 0.4Mpa); l, h, t, and d, are respectively the length, the width, the height and the 
diagonal length of the panel. The geometric data useful to assess the behavior of the panel are assessed 
according to the geometric configuration of the frames provided in Figure 4-12, with the length section of 
the equivalent strut (bw) calculated as the quarter of the diagonal length (d/4). A total of 18 infill wall types 
were used in the FEM model according to the structural details of the building and the geometric 
characteristics shown in Table 4-3. The force-displacement (fnl-d) relationships, assessed according to the 
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geometric proprieties of the infill walls and the aforementioned equations (from Equation 22 to Equation 
25), are shown in Figure 4-16. Additionally to the nonlinear force-displacement behavior of the panels, in 
Figure 4-16 was added the elastic behavior of the analyzed infill walls. The elastic force-displacement (fel-d) 
relationship was assed using the elastic force and stiffness of the truss element according to the Equation 
26 and Equation 27, assuming a displacement of 0.01m. 
 
fel  kel  u Equation 26 
k  
E  A 
el 
L 
 
Equation 27 
As known, modal characteristic of a structure are assessed using eigenvalue analysis, which assembles 
the elastic stiffness of the elements (Equation 27 for truss elements). If the elastic stiffness (kel) is not 
congruent with the elastic one of the nonlinear model (Figure 4-13), incorrect values of some modal 
properties such as periods and modal shapes of the investigated structure could be found. 
 
Infill walls according to the Panagiotakos and Fardis (1996) approach 
The force-displacement function that describes the model developed by Panagiotakos & Fardis (1996) is 
a trilinear degrading function with residual resistance as shown in Figure 4-15. 
 
 
Figure 4-15. Force-displacement relationship of an infill wall according to Panagiotakos & 
Fardis (1996) approach 
The model is characterized by nine variables (Figure 4-15) assessed as follow: 
 
R1  Gw  tw  lw hw initial stiffness Equation 28 
Fy  fws  tw  lw cracking force Equation 29 
Dy  Fy R1  fws  hw Gw cracking displacement Equation 30 
R2  Ew  tw  bw / d , post-cracking stiffness Equation 31 
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Fm  1.3  Fy 
 
post-cracking force 
 
Equation 32 
Dm  Dy  (Fm  Fy ) R2  0.3  fws  lw Ew  bw post-cracking displacement Equation 33 
R3    R1 post-peck stiffness Equation 34 
Du  Dm  (Fm  Fu ) R3  (1.2  fws  hw )   Gw post-peck displacement Equation 35 
Fu  0.1  Fy ultimate force Equation 36 
bw    0.175  (  hw )0.4       h2   l 2 
w w diagonal equivalent length Equation 37 
  4    
Ew   tw   sin(2 ) 
4  Ec   I p   hw 
 
Equation 38 
 
where, Gw, Ew and fws are respectively, the shear module of the masonry according to the diagonal 
compression test, the elastic module of the masonry according to the diagonal compression test, and the 
shear strength of the masonry according to the diagonal compression test. Continuing with the 
coefficients, tw, lw and hw are the thickness, the length and the height of the wall; while, θ, is the angle of the 
considered panel. Detailed information about the coefficients can be found in the work done by 
Panagiotakos & Fardis (1996). The infill wall proprieties calculated according the axial components are as 
follow: 
 
Ny  Fy  1  
hw 
 fws  tw  lw  1  
hw 
, 
lw lw 
Equation 39 
 y  Dy cos   ( fws  hw ) Gw  cos ) Equation 40 
Nm  Fm  1  
hw 
 1.3  fws  tw  lw  1  
hw
 
lw lw 
Equation 41 
m   y  (Dm  Dy ) cos   (0.3  fws  lw ) (Ew  bw  cos ) Equation 42 
Nu   Fu     1   
hw      
 0.1  fws  tw  lw    1  
hw
 
lw lw 
Equation 43 
u  m  (Du  Dm ) cos  (1.2  fws  hw ) (  Gw  cos ) Equation 44 
The force-displacement relationships of the infill panels assessed using the formulas from Equation 39 
to Equation 44 and geometric data illustrated in Table 4-3 are shown in Figure 4-16. As per the Peruvian 
infill walls, additionally to the nonlinear behavior, in Figure 4-16 was added the elastic behavior of the 
analyzed infill walls using the elastic stiffness of the element according to the Equation 26 and Equation 
27 and assuming a displacement of 0.01m. 
Infill wall proprieties 
A total of 18 types of infill panels, supposed built with horizontal bricks, and without considering 
openings, were assumed in the FEM according to the architectural details and the geometric properties of 
the frames (Figure 4-12). The main geometric data, such as length, height, angle, thickness, dialog length 
of the frames and the infill panels are shown in Table 4-3. Since a big number of columns and beam 
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sections are present in the frames, a unique reduction factor of 0.9 was used to assess the effective length 
(l) and height (h) of the panels illustrated in Figure 4-12. 
 
Table 4-3. Geometric characteristics of the modeled infill walls 
 
Infill 
n° 
  Frame   
Reduction 
factor 
   Infill   
L 
(m) 
H 
(m) 
Θ 
(rad) 
l 
(m) 
h 
(m) 
t 
(m) 
d 
(m) 
1 6.5 4.5 0.61  5.85 4.05 0.15 7.12 
2 6.5 5.7 0.72  5.85 5.13 0.15 7.78 
3 6.5 3.1 0.45  5.85 2.79 0.15 6.48 
4 6.5 3.6 0.51  5.85 3.24 0.15 6.69 
5 4.7 4.5 0.76  4.23 4.05 0.15 5.86 
6 4.7 5.7 0.88  4.23 5.13 0.15 6.65 
7 4.7 3.1 0.58  4.23 2.79 0.15 5.07 
8 4.7 3.6 0.65  4.23 3.24 0.15 5.33 
9 6.5 3.1 0.45 
0.90 
5.85 2.79 0.15 6.48 
10 4.7 3.1 0.58 4.23 2.79 0.15 5.07 
11 7.3 4.5 0.55  6.57 4.05 0.20 7.72 
12 7.3 5.7 0.66  6.57 5.13 0.15 8.34 
13 7.3 3.6 0.46  6.57 3.24 0.15 7.33 
14 7.3 3.6 0.46  6.57 3.24 0.20 7.33 
15 7.3 3.1 0.40  6.57 2.79 0.15 7.14 
16 7.3 3.1 0.40  6.57 2.79 0.20 7.14 
17 6.5 3.6 0.51  5.85 3.24 0.15 6.69 
18 4.7 3.6 0.65  4.23 3.24 0.15 5.33 
Taking into account the geometric properties shown in Table 4-3, the linear and the nonlinear 
relationships, of the analyzed infill wall panels, are illustrated in Figure 4-16. 
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Figure 4-16. Force-displacement diagrams of the infill walls. Black diagrams represent the 
panels according to the Peruvian masonry code (NORMA E.070, 2006), while grey graphics 
illustrate the infill panels according to the Panagiotakos & Fardis (1996) model. For the Peruvian 
infill walls (PI) the type of ultimate resistance according to Equation 25 is also provided 
 
4.5.5 Actions 
 
4.5.5.1 Static vertical loads and masses 
Dead loads were applied to the FEM according to the materials (Table 4-2) and the element 
distributions in the structure (Figure 4-11). Three types of floor slabs were applied to the building as 
illustrated in Table 4-4. The first one was defined for the typical floor, the second one applied for the 
mechanical room and the penthouse, while the third one set for the roof. Since the building presents 
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abundant thick beams, a reduction factor for the floor dead loads, was applied. The reduction factor was 
assessed as illustrated in Figure 4-17. 
 
 
Figure 4-17. Representation of the floor load factor reduction. It is represented the rates among 
the internal and the external area taking into account the beam dimensions 
Given the variability of the beam elements and the floor areas, the biggest redaction factor of 0.7 (the 
conservative value) was selected as representative for the reduction of the dead floor loads. Applying the 
reduction factor, the mass of the structure was optimized, which, on the contrary, would have resulted 
overestimated given the contemporary overlap of dead floor loads and the weight of the beam elements. 
Live loads were applied according to the Peruvian seismic code (NORMA E.020, 2006). Three values of 
loads are provided for the hospitals in function of the building uses as illustrated in Table 4-5. 
 
Table 4-4. Dead loads applied to the building. 
 
Typical floor Technical floor Roof floor penthouse 
 Dead Load 
(kN/m2) 
 Dead Load 
(kN/m2) 
 Dead Load 
(kN/m2) 
Slab 5.0 ∙ 0.7 Slab 5.0 ∙ 0.7 Slab 2.5 
Finishes 1.0 ∙ 0.7 Finishes 1.0 ∙ 0.7 Finishes 1.0 
Partitions 1.0 ─ ─ ─ ─ 
Tot. 5.2 Tot. 4.2 Tot. 3.5 
 
Table 4-5. Live loads applied to the building. 
Use 
Live load 
(kN/m2) 
1) Hospitalization (LL1) 2.0 
2) Operating rooms, laboratories and service areas (LL2) 3.0 
3) Corridors (LL3) 4.0 
4) Roof live load (LL4) 1.0 
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A typical distribution of the applied live loads is given in Figure 4-18. 
 
 
Figure 4-18. Typical floor loads applied to the structure 
 
Furthermore, in the penthouse are installed two water tanks which are the core of the the gravity water 
system of the hospital. The tanks have a capacity of 75000l (750kN) each, and they are 70% filled. The 
first one (Figure 4-19 A) is dedicated to the potable water, while the second one (Figure 4-19 B) is used as 
service water. Each tank is installed on two beams with length of 3.25m. To schematize the weight of the 
tanks, four beam linear loads equal to 81kN (750 kN*0.7/2/3.25m) were applied to the elements as shown 
in Figure 4-20. 
A  B  
Figure 4-19. Tanks located in the pent house for the gravity plumbing. A) Potable water tank. 
B) Service water tank 
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Figure 4-20. Transversal and longitudinal view of the tank loads applied to the pent house 
Static vertical loads were converted in masses according to the mass factors provided by the Peruvian 
seismic code (NORMA E.060, 2016) as shown in Table 4-6. For essential structures, dead loads are 
converted in mass totally, while the live loads for typical floors are transformed in mass multiplying them 
by a factor of 0.5, and at last, the live loads for roofs are converted with a factor of 0.25 (Table 4-6). 
 
Table 4-6. Mass factors according the Peruvian seismic code (NORMA E.060, 2016) 
  Load case  Scale factor  
Dead loads 1.00 
Live load type 1 (LL1) 0.50 
Live load type 2 (LL2) 0.50 
Live load type 3 (LL3) 0.50 
  Live load type 4 (LL4)  0.25  
 
4.5.5.2 Earthquake signals 
Seven compatible spectra accelerograms were used to develop the fragility curvevs. In order to get the 
spectrum compatibility, in the first instance, the presentation of the elastic Peruvian spectrum in terms of 
pseudo acceleration is provided. The elastic spectrum or design spectrum is derived according to the 
Equation 45 of the Peruvian seismic code (NORMA E.030, 2016). 
 
S  
Z  U  C  S 
 g
 
a 
R 
 
Equation 45 
where Z is the basic acceleration expected in each Peruvian seismic zone; U is the use factor of the 
analyzed building; C is the seismic amplification factor according to the soil type; S is the variable that 
takes into account the soil type; R concerns the reduction factor of the seismic forces due to the structural 
ductility; and g is the gravity acceleration. Peru is divided in four seismic areas: zone one (Z1, with 0.1g of 
PGA), zone two (Z2; with a PGA of 0.25g), zone three (Z3; with 0.35g of PGA), and zone four (Z4; with a 
PGA of 0.45g). The investigated structure is located in zone four (Z4) with a PGA of 0.45g. Four types of 
building classes (A, for essential buildings; B, for important structures; C, for common buildings; and D 
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for temporary structures) and three use factors (1.5 for essential buildings, 1.3 for important structures  
and 1 for common buildings) are provided by the Peruvian seismic code (NORMA E.030, 2016). Since 
the case study analyzes a hospital pavilion (essential building; A), a use factor (U) of 1.5 was taken into 
account in the design spectrum derivation. The seismic amplification factor (C) is function of the 
fundamental period of the structure (T), the constant velocity period (TP) and the constant displacement 
period (TL). The variation of the seismic amplification factor is illustrated from Equation 46 to Equation 
48. 
 
T  TP C  2.5 Equation 46 
T    T   T C   2.5  
 TP   

 
P L  
 T  
 
Equation 47 
T   T C   2.5  
 TP    TL   

L  
 T 2 
 
Equation 48 
Four types of soils (S0, rock soil; S1, hard soil; S2, medium soil; S3, soft soil) and 16 soil factors in 
function of the seismic zones (Z4, Z3, Z2, Z1) are provided by the Peruvian code (NORMA E.030, 2016). 
The analyzed hospital building is built on a hard soil (S1 with soil factor equal to one). According to the 
soil factor, a TP of 0.4s and a TL of 2.5s is provided by the seismic standard. At last, the reduction factor of 
the seismic forces (R) is calculated multiplying the basic reduction coefficient (R0), and the factors that 
take into account the irregularities of the structure in plant (Ip) and in elevation (Ia). Since the objective is 
to obtain the elastic spectrum, R was assigned equal to one. The resulting elastic spectrum is shown in 
Figure 4-21. The first step to obtain the spectrum compatibility of the used accelerograms was to scale the 
natural accelerograms to the PGA (0.45g for the Peruvian case) using SeismoSignal software 
(SEiSMOSOFT, 2018); while the second steps was to much the scaled signals with the Peruvian design 
spectrum using SismoMatch software (SEiSMOSOFT, 2018). The results of the spectrum compatibility 
are shown in Figure 4-21. 
Figure 4-21. Spectrum compatibility graphitization. A) Elastic spectrum according to the 
Peruvian code (NORMA E.030, 2016). The spectrum refers to a 5% of damping and a return 
period of 2475 years. B) Graphitization of the spectrum compatibility of the seven past Peruvian 
accelerograms 
Seismic performance of hospitals at different scales 
10
8 
 
 
 
The seven obtained spectra compatible accelerograms refers to past Peruvian earthquakes, and they are 
are illustrated in Figure 4-22. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-22. Acceleration time-histories. The signals refer to the East-West component 
 
 
4.6 ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
4.6.1 Eigenvalue analysis 
The focus of this section is to present the results of the modal analysis carried out to investigate the 
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seismic response of the investigated hospital pavilion. In order to analyze the seismic response of the 
structure, four nonlinear static analyses and three modal analyses were carried out to investigate the 
seismic response of the structure as shown in Table 4-7. Since differences among the stiffness assessed 
with the nonlinear force-displacement relationship and those calculated with the elastic relationships were 
found, the elastic stiffness of the truss elements, in the modal analyses with infill walls, were modified 
according to the nonlinear ones (Figure 4-16). 
 
Table 4-7. Types of PO analysis carried out to evaluate the seismic response of the case study 
 
Criteria of the PO analyses Labels of the 
PO analyses 
Labels of the 
modal analysis 
Pushover analysis considering the reinforced concrete 
frame, plastic moment hinges to beams and columns, 
and plastic axial-moments hinges to the columns 
 
PO-M 
 
PO analysis taking into account the reinforced concrete 
structure, plastic moment and shear hinges to beams and 
columns, and plastic axial-moments hinges to the 
columns 
 
MA1 
PO-M-V  
Pushover analysis considering the concrete frame, the 
infill walls according to the Peruvian infill wall model, 
the bending moment and shear hinges in the beams and 
column elements, and axial-moments plastic hinges in 
the columns. Modal analysis modifying the elastic 
stiffness (kel) propriety of the truss elements according to 
the nonlinear one 
 
 
PO-M-V-PI 
 
 
MA2 
PO analysis on the reinforced concrete structure with 
Panagiotakos & Fardis infill wall model, applying plastic 
moment and shear hinges to beams and columns, and 
plastic axial-moments hinges to the columns. Modal 
analysis modifying the elastic stiffness (kel) propriety of 
the truss elements according to the nonlinear one 
 
 
PO-M-V-P&FI 
 
 
MA3 
Two PO analyses were carried out without considering infill walls and two others modeling infill walls. 
The first two ones had the goal to assess the structural behavior with and without shear hinges, while the 
reaming analysis had the objective to evaluate the seismic building performance taking into account two 
different infill wall models. As regards to the modals analysis, the first one (MA1) concerns the structure 
without considering infill panels, the second one (MA2) considers the infill walls according the Peruvian 
masonry design code (NORMA E.070, 2006), while the last one (MA3) takes into account the infill panels 
according to Panagiotakos & Fardis (1996). 
Carrying out the eigenvalue analysis, the most important modal structural characteristics such as 
vibrational modal periods and modal participant masses of the structure, were obtained. For a global 
understanding, the first six modal shapes of the structure obtained carrying out the MA3 are shown in 
Figure 4-23. Observing Figure 4-23, the first mode of the structure is translational in Y direction (the 
weaker side of the structure), the second one is rotational in Z direction, while the third one is  
translational in X direction. The second mode of the structure is rotational, which highlights a torsional 
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behavior of the structure, which is not favorable for buildings in seismic zone; anyway, the pavilion does 
not present coupled modes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D E F 
G H  
Figure 4-23. Modal shape results according to the MA3 analysis. Figure A, B, C, D, E and F 
represent the first six structural modes respectively 
Complete results of the carried out modal analysis labeled in Table 4-7 are shown in Table 4-8. The table 
shows the characteristics of the first eight modes, which are sufficient to reach the 90% of participation 
mass in X and Y direction respectively. Without considering infill walls (MA1), the first mode 
(translational in Y direction) has a period of 1.89s and 74.10% of translational mass, the second one 
(rotational in Z direction) has a period of 1.74s and a 71.82% of rotational mass, while the third mode 
(translational in X direction) possess a period of 1.66s and a translational mass of 78.19%. Considering the 
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infill panels (MA2) according to the Peruvian code (section 4.5.4), the first mode (translational in Y 
direction) has a period of 1.63s and 74.74% of translational mass, the second one (rotational in Z 
direction) has a period of 1.48s and a 73.62% of rotational mass, while the third mode (translational in X 
direction) possess a period of 1.43s and a translational mass of 81.40%. At last, taking into account the 
infill walls according to the Panagiotakos & Fardis (1996) approach, the first mode (translational in Y 
direction) has a period of 1.36s and 75.10% of translational mass, the second one (rotational in Z 
direction) has a period of 1.23s and a 74.02% of rotational mass, while the third mode possess a period of 
1.10s and a translational mass of 82.44%. From the results, it is evident the period differences among the 
X and Y direction, it due to the different stiffness shown by the structure. That data was also observed in 
field past modal test (MINSA, 1997), confirming the phenomena. 
Analyzing Table 4-8 it is evident that the fundamental period of the structure is greater than one second, 
for that reasons a multimodal load pattern, as described in section 4.4, was used to perform the PO 
analyses. For the case study the multimodal load pattern was carried out only assuming translational story 
shear components among the main modes in X and Y respectively. Rotational modes and moment 
components (Chopra, 2011) were not considered in the current study but they can be investigated in 
future research. The assumption was made because the high percentage of translational mass present for 
the fundamental mode in X and Y direction, and the presence of decoupled modes. 
 
Table 4-8. Modal results of the first eight modes 
 
MA1   MA2   MA3  
Mode 
T 
(s) 
X 
(%) 
Y 
(%) 
Z 
(%) 
T 
(s) 
X 
(%) 
Y 
(%) 
Z 
(%) 
T 
(s) 
X 
(%) 
Y 
(%) 
Z 
(%) 
1 1.89 0.00 74.10 0.04 1.63 0.02 74.74 0.26 1.36 0.02 75.10 0.25 
2 1.74 1.68 0.04 71.82 1.48 0.15 0.31 73.62 1.23 0.09 0.29 74.02 
3 1.66 78.19 0.00 1.51 1.43 81.40 0.02 0.14 1.10 82.44 0.02 0.09 
4 0.62 0.00 12.73 0.03 0.54 0.00 13.92 0.26 0.43 0.00 14.09 0.26 
5 0.58 3.12 0.03 9.22 0.50 10.25 0.00 0.06 0.40 9.73 0.00 0.17 
6 0.57 7.83 0.01 3.67 0.49 0.05 0.24 14.58 0.39 0.12 0.24 14.65 
7 0.35 0.00 4.88 0.01 0.31 0.00 4.00 0.14 0.24 0.00 3.78 0.15 
8 0.33 1.41 0.01 2.93 0.29 2.73 0.00 0.00 0.23 2.42 0.00 0.01 
   ∑    ∑    ∑  
  92.23 91.8 89.23  94.6 93.23 89.06  94.82 93.52 89.6 
Four variables are necessary to assess the load pattern according to Equation 6: the eigenvectors (ij),  
the floor masses (mi), the modal participation factors (Γi) and the spectral accelerations (Sa,i). For 
demonstrations purposes, the assessment of the PO load pattern for the MA3 modal analysis is illustrated 
successively. 
The first three modes in Y (mode 1, 4 and 7) and X (mode 3, 5 and 8) directions were taken into 
account for the multimodal assessment. Three modes for both directions were considered sufficient for 
the modal combination because they reach a sufficient percentage of participation mass (90%). The 
considered modal shapes are illustrated in Figure 4-24, while the modal participation factors, assessed 
according section 4.4, are shown in Table 4-9 and Table 4-10. In Table 4-9 the floor masses of the 
structure are illustrated too. 
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Table 4-9. Masses and normalized eigenvectors. Modes are normalized to the top value 
 
 
Eigenvectors 
 
Floor 
Load 
Mass 
(kN/g) 
Structure 
Mass 
(kN/g) 
Sum 
Mass 
(kN/g) 
     
17 923.28 245.51 1168.78 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
16 798.97 993.18 1792.15 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.98 0.89 0.95 
15 1593.05 1355.26 2948.31 0.96 0.97 0.76 0.82 0.46 0.59 
14 1481.65 1109.66 2591.31 0.92 0.94 0.57 0.65 0.09 0.22 
13 1696.34 1173.86 2870.20 0.87 0.88 0.26 0.31 -0.42 -0.45 
12 1746.73 1201.99 2948.71 0.80 0.83 0.00 0.05 -0.67 -0.80 
11 1605.65 1231.01 2836.66 0.74 0.79 -0.22 -0.13 -0.72 -0.88 
10 1656.03 1270.27 2926.30 0.67 0.73 -0.41 -0.31 -0.64 -0.81 
9 1605.65 1299.95 2905.59 0.60 0.68 -0.57 -0.45 -0.45 -0.61 
8 1565.33 1312.75 2878.08 0.53 0.62 -0.70 -0.58 -0.19 -0.33 
7 1514.95 1304.42 2819.37 0.46 0.56 -0.77 -0.67 0.09 0.00 
6 1567.77 1322.52 2890.29 0.39 0.49 -0.80 -0.72 0.36 0.33 
5 1484.72 1344.00 2828.71 0.32 0.43 -0.78 -0.73 0.56 0.59 
4 1535.10 1353.80 2888.90 0.26 0.38 -0.71 -0.71 0.68 0.75 
3 1519.83 1393.29 2913.12 0.20 0.32 -0.61 -0.66 0.69 0.81 
2 1635.87 1833.58 3469.45 0.13 0.25 -0.46 -0.54 0.58 0.74 
1 1777.32 2017.89 3795.21 0.04 0.08 -0.15 -0.17 0.21 0.26 
0 0 386.84 386.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 ∑=25708.24 ∑=22149.76 ∑=47857.99       
The modal participation factors were assessed according to the annex B of the European code 
(Eurocode 8, 2004) as shown in Equation 9; while he spectral accelerations where selected in the Peruvian 
elastic spectrum (Figure 3-10) in function of the modal periods (Table 4-8). The obtained modal 
participation factors are illustrated in Table 4-10. 
A   B   
Figure 4-24. Modal shapes of mode 1,3,4,5,7 and 8. A) Modes in X direction. B) Modes in Y 
direction 
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Table 4-10. Modal participation factor assessment 
 
Floor F1 F12/m F3 F32/m F4 F42/m F5 F52/m F7 F72/m F8 F82/m 
17 1169 1169 1169 1169 1169 1169 1169 1169 1169 1169 1169 1169 
16 1784 1777 1792 1792 1717 1646 1749 1706 1591 1412 1706 1625 
15 2822 2701 2867 2788 2236 1695 2411 1972 1347 616 1731 1016 
14 2391 2206 2448 2313 1479 844 1679 1087 243 23 563 122 
13 2488 2157 2540 2247 741 192 883 272 -1215 514 -1298 587 
12 2367 1899 2460 2051 0 0 155 8 -1977 1325 -2346 1867 
11 2094 1546 2235 1761 -615 133 -379 51 -2029 1452 -2491 2188 
10 1972 1329 2144 1571 -1207 498 -900 277 -1863 1186 -2366 1914 
9 1746 1049 1982 1352 -1659 947 -1318 597 -1306 587 -1781 1092 
8 1532 815 1791 1114 -2003 1394 -1666 965 -561 109 -951 314 
7 1295 595 1572 877 -2173 1675 -1883 1258 253 23 12 0 
6 1129 441 1425 703 -2300 1831 -2071 1484 1028 366 955 316 
5 911 293 1225 531 -2192 1699 -2061 1502 1579 881 1660 975 
4 744 192 1092 413 -2058 1467 -2047 1450 1958 1328 2173 1634 
3 575 114 940 303 -1772 1078 -1911 1253 2008 1383 2368 1926 
2 462 61 863 215 -1590 729 -1868 1006 2014 1169 2564 1895 
1 147 6 297 23 -569 85 -645 110 796 167 990 258 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 ∑F1 ∑F12/m ∑F3 ∑F32/m ∑F4 ∑F42/m ∑F5 ∑F52/m ∑F5 ∑F52/m ∑F5 ∑F52/m 
 25626 18349 28841 21222 -10796 17081 -8705 16167 5035 13709 4659 18897 
 Γ1  Γ3  Γ4  Γ5  Γ7  Γ8 
 1.40  1.36  -0.63 -0.54  0.37  0.25 
Once the modal participation factors and the spectral accelerations are assessed, the multimodal forces 
are calculated according to the Equation 6. The multimodal forces obtained for both directions of the case 
study are shown in Figure 4-25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B 
 
Figure 4-25. Graphitization of the multimodal forces used in the case study. A) Shape forces in 
Y direction. B) Shape forces in X direction 
 
4.6.2 Nonlinear static analysis 
The goal of this section is to present the results of the nonlinear static analyses labeled in Table 4-7, in 
order to investigate the seismic response of the analyzed hospital pavilion. Results are shown in terms of 
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capacity curve, which represents the plot of the base shear, against the lateral displacement of the control 
node, located at the roof of the structure. The capacity curves were obtained for the main directions of the 
structure, X and Y respectively, both referring to the multi degree of freedom (MDOF) system and 
including P-Δ effects. Multimodal forces were applied to the center of mass of the floors, the latter 
assumed rigid. 
The first two analyses started evaluating the response of the structure considering only the reinforced 
concrete frame, without considering the interaction between the infill panels and the concrete frames. The 
first one (P-M analysis) considers nonlinear bending hinges to the beams and nonlinear axial-moments 
hinges to the columns, while the second one additionally applies shear hinges to both elements. The 
capacity curves resulting from the first two analyses are shown in Figure 4-26. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B 
 
Figure 4-26. Comparison between PO curves obtained considering the reinforced concrete 
structure with and without shear hinges. A) Curves achieved in X direction. B) Curves obtained 
analyzing Y direction 
Taking into account the first two analyses shown in Figure 4-26, three aspects were discussed: 
 reduction in terms of base shear among the curves with (grey curves) and without (black 
curves) modeling nonlinear shear hinges; 
 limited ultimate displacement point of the capacity curve in X direction achieved with the P-M- 
V analysis (grey curve in Figure 4-26 A); 
 increment of the ultimate displacement point of the capacity curve in Y direction when shear 
hinges are applied to the structure. 
Analyzing the results obtained with the model PO-M (Figure 4-27), it is possible to observe that, in both 
directions, the structure develops a large number of moment plasticization along the whole height of the 
building before to collapse. Observing the figure (Figure 4-27 ctr and dx), it is possible to note the moment 
plasticization of the columns at the first floor, which are the cause of the the great displacement achieved 
by the structure. Continuing analyzing Figure 4-27 B and C (dx), it is possible to observe the failure 
mechanism of the structure. It is due to not only to the bending moment collapse of the beams in the 
central part of the structure, but also to the moment plasticization or collapses of the columns at the first 
floors. When shear hinges are applied to the elements (P-M-V model), beams and columns becomes  
brittle causing shear failures in the elements, and for that, a reduction in terms of base shear is registered 
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(Figure 4-28 and Figure 4-29; ctr and dx). Similar to the first aspect, the second one is related to the 
presence of shear hinges in the elements. Given that, shear failures in columns are observable in X 
direction (Figure 4-28 D, dx), which are the cause of the limited ultimate point of the structure in that 
direction. It is useful to remember that some column sections have the strong side along the Y direction 
(Figure 4-17), thus minor shear strength is possessed by the columns along X direction. 
 
Figure 4-27. Bending hinge damage evolution of the P-M analysis in X and Y direction. A) 
Analyzed points in the capacity curves. B) Damage hinges states in X direction; at the left (sx) it 
is illustrated the hinge at step 11 (displacement 0.105m), while at the center (ctr), it is represented 
the step 41 (displacement 0.390m), and at the right side (dx), it is shown the step 97 
(displacement 0.922m). C) Damage hinges states in Y direction. At the left, damage hinges states 
at step 8 (displacement 0.129m), while at the center, it is represented the step 31 (displacement 
0.490m), and at the right it is shown the step 56 (displacement 0.883m). 
At last, the third aspect is the results of the different response of the structure when they are modeled 
with or without shear hinges. Without considering shear hinges, large bending moment plasticization and 
collapses are detected in beams and columns. In beams, bending plasticization start in the first floors of 
the structures and then they spread along the whole height of the structure (Figure 4-27 C), while in 
columns are concentered in the first two floors (Figure 4-27 C dx). Collapses are observed in beam 
bending hinges in the central part of the structure and in few columns in the first two floors (Figure 4-27 
C dx). Applying shear hinges to the FEM, beam plasticization are less present in the first two floors of the 
structure (Figure 4-29 D sx), where instead, shear failures are trigged, causing a kind of soft story (Figure 
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4-29 D ctr), which allows the increment of the lateral displacement. Another aspect observable in Figure 4-
29 D dx, which contributes to the increment of the ultimate displacement point in Y direction, is the total 
moment plasticization of columns at the first floor, which is not appreciable in the P-M analysis (Figure 4-
27 C dx). 
 
Figure 4-28. Hinge damage evolutions for the P-M-V analysis in X direction. At left, it is 
illustrated the bending moment hinge damage state in beams and columns, at the center, it is 
represented the shear hinge damage state in beams, and at the right side, it is shown the shear 
damage hinge state in columns. A) Analyzed points in the capacity curves. B) Damage hinge 
states at step 13 with a displacement of 0.043m. C) Damage hinge states at step 19 for a 
displacement of 0.063m. D) Damage hinge states at step 37 with a displacement of 0.123m 
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Figure 4-29. Hinge damage evolution for the P-M-V analysis in Y direction. At left, it is shown 
the damage state of the bending hinges in beams and columns, at center, it is illustrated the 
damage state of the shear hinges in beams, and at the right, it is represented the damage state of 
the shear hinges in columns. A) Analyzed points in the capacity curves. B) Damage hinge states 
at step 4 with a displacement of 0.083m. C) Damage hinge states at step 29 for a displacement of 
0.583m. D) Damage hinge states at step 50 with a displacement of 1.003m. 
The subsequent analyses focused on the application of the infill walls to the structure. The first model 
was developed applying the Peruvian infill walls (P-M-V-PI analysis), while to the second one were applied 
infill walls according to Panagiotakos & Fardis approach (P-M-V-P&F analysis), both models described in 
detail in section 4.5.4. The resulted capacity curves are illustrated in Figure 4-30. In order to create a 
discussion, the aforementioned curves were also compared with those achieved without modeling infill 
walls but applying shear hinges to the elements (PO-M-V model). Taking into account the pushover curve 
A 
B 
C 
D 
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shown in Figure 4-30, three interesting aspects were analyzed and discussed: 
 the increment in terms of dissipative capacity of the structure when infill walls are applied to 
the FEM; 
 low ductility of the of the structure in X direction; 
 reduced ultimate displacement point, in Y direction, when the infill walls are modeled 
according to the Panagiotakos & Fardis’ approach (black curve in Figure 4-30 B). 
The first aspect is observable in Figure 4-30 A and B, where an increment in area under the curves 
achieved with the PO-M-V-PI and a PO-M-V-P&F analyses is evident. The increment of the area is due 
mainly to the energy dissipation offered by the infill panels when they are pushed, proving the functioning 
of the panel under the pushover load. Panagiotakos & Fardis’ model results more rigid than the Peruvian 
one, reflecting the force-displacement relationships assessed in section 4.5.4. Analyzing Figure 4-30, it is 
possible to see that the curves achieved in both directions have the knee of the curves situated at the same 
displacement, highlighting that for each direction the mechanism of yielding or collapse is the same. In X 
direction, the knee of the curve occurs at the shear collapse of columns, making the structure brittle and 
not ductile, while for the Y direction it starts with the plasticization of the columns at the first level. The 
last aspect, that can be extrapolated from Figure 4-30 B, it is the reduced ultimate displacement point 
reached by the structure in Y direction when the Panagiotakos & Fardis model is applied. Observing 
Figure 4-30 A, it is possible to note that the curve after the knee present a similar descending branch, 
while in Y direction (Figure 4-30-B), it is evident a reduction of the ultimate displacement point of the 
curve obtained with infill walls according to Panagiotakos & Fardis (1996). The reason of that 
phenomenon is associated to the different post pick behavior of the structure when modeled with the 
different infill wall models. When infill panels are modeled according to the Peruvian code, the collapse of 
the building is mainly due to the bending moment plasticization of the all columns at the first floor, and  
by few bending moment collapses in columns in the first two floors (Figure 4-32 D, sx). When infill panels 
are modeled according the Panagiotakos & Fardis (1996), the collapse of the structure arrives with the 
failure of most column moment hinges at the first floor (Figure 4-34 D, sx) and few column shear 
collapses at the same floor (Figure 4-34 D, ctr). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B 
Figure 4-30. Comparison between PO curves obtained modeling both infill wall models (PO-M- 
V-PI and a PO-M-V-P&F analyses) and those achieved without modeling infill panels, but taking 
into account shear hinges in the elements (PO-M-V analysis). A) PO curves in X direction. B) PO 
curves in Y direction 
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Figure 4-31. Performance of the hinges for the PO-X-M-V-PI analysis. In B, C, and D, it is 
shown the performance of the bending moment hinges in beams and columns (dx), the shear 
hinges in beams (ctr), and the shear hinges in columns (sx) respectively. A) Analyzed points in 
the capacity curves. B) Step 15 and displacement=0.047m. C) Step 24 and displacement=0.075m. 
D) Step 37 and displacement=0.116m. E) Performance of the axial infill wall hinges 
A 
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Figure 4-32. Performance of the hinges for the PO-Y-M-V-PI analysis. In B, C, and D, it is 
shown the performance of the bending moment hinges in beams and columns (dx), the shear 
hinges in beams (ctr), and the shear hinges in columns (sx) respectively. A) Analyzed points in 
the capacity curves. B) Step 9 and displacement=0.151m. C) Step 30 and displacement=0.496m. 
D) Step 63 and displacement=1.038m. E) Performance of the axial infill wall hinges 
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Figure 4-33. Performance of the hinges for the PO-X-M-V-P&F analysis. In B, C, and D, it is 
shown the performance of the bending hinges in beams and columns (dx), the shear hinges in 
beams (ctr), and the shear hinges in columns (sx) respectively. A) Analyzed points in the capacity 
curves. B) Step 13 and displacement=0.033m. C) Step 20 and displacement=0.100m. D) Step 35 
and displacement=0.180m. E) Performance in the axial infill wall hinges 
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Figure 4-34. Performance of the hinges for the PO-Y-M-V-P&F analysis. In B, C, and D, it is 
shown the performance of the bending hinges in beams and columns (dx), the shear hinges in 
beams (ctr), and the shear hinges in columns (sx) respectively. A) Analyzed points in the capacity 
curves. B) Step 10 and displacement=0.128m. C) Step 30 and displacement=0.378m. D) Step 54 
and displacement=0.678m. E) Performance in the axial infill wall hinges 
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4.6.3 Comparison of the obtained capacity spectra with the HAZUZ ones 
The resulted PO curves obtained with the infill wall models were bilinearized, transformed into capacity 
spectra (section 4.4) and compared to the capacity spectra provided by HAZUS’ database (HAZUS MR4, 
2003) for the same class of buildings, in order to create a discussion of the results. According to the 
HAZUS methodology, the analyzed structure can be classified as a PRE-code essential building because it 
is a hospital building designed without seismic details. HAZUS’ database provides PRE-code capacity 
spectra only for buildings; while for essential structures, it provides capacity spectra only for building 
designed with low seismic details. For those reasons, capacity spectra for four building typologies were 
analyzed: 
 capacity spectrum for concrete moment frame buildings designed without seismic code; 
 capacity spectrum for infilled concrete moment frame buildings designed without seismic code; 
 capacity spectrum for concrete moment frame essential buildings designed without seismic code; 
 capacity spectrum for infilled concrete moment frame essential buildings designed without 
seismic code, 
The proprieties useful to build the capacity spectra are provided in Table 4-11 and Table 4-12. 
 
Table 4-11. Building typologies selected for the comparison 
Building 
occupancy 
Model building type Height 
Design 
level 
Label 
Structural 
period (s) 
Building (B) Concrete moment frame High-rise Pre-code C1H-P 1.45 
Building (B) 
Concrete frame with unreinforced 
masonry infill walls 
High-rise Pre-code C3H-P 1.09 
Special building (SP) Concrete moment frame High-rise Low code C1H-L 1.45 
Special building (SP) 
Concrete frame with unreinforced 
masonry infill walls 
High-rise Low code C3H-L 1.09 
In HAZUS, the capacity spectrum is defined in terms of spectral accelerations (A) and to the spectral 
displacements (D). Two points are necessary to build it, the yield point (Ay and Dy) and the ultimate one 
(Au and Du) as shown in Table 4-12. 
 
Table 4-12. Pushover curves parameters, referring to the building typologies provided in Table 
4-11. 
 
 
Spectral values 
Label Dy (m) Ay (g) Du (m) Au (g) 
B-C1H-P 0.013 0.024 0.113 0.073 
B-C3H-P 0.019 0.63 0.103 0.143 
SB-C1H-L 0.019 0.037 0.170 0.110 
  SB-C3H-L  0.028  0.095  0.186  0.214  
The resulted HAZUS’ capacity spectra together with those achieved for the case study (PO-M-V-PI and 
PO-M-V-P&F analyses) are shown in Figure 4-35. Analyzing Figure 4-35, it is possible to observe that 
capacity spectra obtained with the PO-M-V-P&F analysis (red spectra) are much stiffer than those 
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obtained with the PO-M-V-PI analysis (blue spectra). The curves achieved with the PO-M-V-PI model 
(blue spectra) have an initial stiffness at most equal to those for frames structures (B-C1H-P and SB-C1H- 
L), while those achieved with the PO-M-V-P&F analysis (red spectra) have an initial stiffness ranging from 
those for frame structures (B-C1H-P and SB-C1H-L) to those for infilled frame structures (B-C3H-P and 
SB-C3H-L). The result is a signal which indicates that the PO-M-V-PI model could be not representative 
for the case study because of the low lateral stiffness offered by the infill panels. The low stiffness offered 
by those panels can be also proved comparing the fundamental modal periods of the structure (1.63s in Y 
direction and 1.44s in X direction) shown in Table 4-8, with those assessed in past field test (0.9s Y 
direction and 0.8s X direction) on the structure (MINSA, 1997; INDECI, 2011). Comparing the results, 
the achieved periods with the PO-M-V-PI are greater than those measured, showing once again the low 
stiffness offered by the model. The considerations are different for the results obtained with the PO-M-V- 
P&F model. In fact, although the model presents different capacity spectra in both directions (red curves), 
the stiffness of the structure can be considerate realistic. The fact is also proven by the modal periods 
assessed with the PO-M-V-P&F model (1.36s in Y direction and 1.1s in X direction), which are closer to 
those assessed in field (MINSA, 1997; INDECI, 2011). Continuing to analyze the red curves, it is 
observable that the knee of the curves, in terms of acceleration, it is located qualitatively in the same range 
of those obtained for infilled structures in HAZUS, while in terms of displacement the knee of the curve 
can be considerate compatible with those achieved in HAZUS for infilled structure in X direction but not 
for the Y direction. 
It is useful to remember that HAZUS’ spectra refers to a median values of a population of buildings, 
thus it is an approximation to compare directly the obtained capacity spectra for a single building with 
those provided by HAZUS for a population of buildings. Anyway, it represented a qualitatively way of 
comparing the obtained results even if approximated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B 
 
Figure 4-35. Comparison among capacity spectra. The line in shade of gray represents the 
capacity spectra provided by HAZUS, while the blue and the red spectra refer to those obtained 
with the PO-M-V-PI and PO-M-V-P&F analysis respectively. A) The comparison in X direction 
is shown. B) The comparison in Y direction is illustrated 
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4.6.4 Seismic performance assessment 
Analyzing all the aforementioned results it was concluded that the capacity curves with their relatives 
capacity spectra, obtained with the PO-M-V-P&F model, can be considerate representative for the case 
study. For those curves, the structural performance according to the Eurocode (Eurocode 8, 2005) as 
described in section 4.4 was assessed. The bilinearization and the target displacement assessment in both 
directions are shown in Table 4-13 and Figure 4-36. 
 
Table 4-13. Achieved values about the nonlinear performance assessment. Values rifer to the 
PO-M-V-PI analysis 
 
  X direction  Y direction  
Fby (kN) 45386 Fby (kN) 37485 
dny (m) 0.055 dny (m) 0.087 
dnu (m) 0.106 dnu (m) 0.153 
Tel_m (s) 1.1 Tel_m (s) 1.36 
Γ 1.36 Γ 1.4 
F* (kN) 
y 33372 F
* (kN) 
y 26775 
d* (m) 
y 0.040 d
* (m) 
y 0.062 
d* (m) 
u 0.0783 d
* (m) 
u 0.1090 
m* (kN/g) 28841 m* (kN/g) 25626 
T* (sec) 1.17 T* (sec) 1.54 
Se(T*) (g) 0.575 Se(T*) (g) 0.440 
d* (m) 
et 0.197 d
* (m) 
et 0.258 
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Figure 4-36. Assessment of the target displacement. A) Calculation in X direction. B) 
Assessment in Y direction 
Analyzing Figure 4-36, it is observable that both capacity spectra do not intersect the the demand 
spectrum, highlighting that the existing structure does not achieve the performance level required by the 
new seismic codes. According to the achievement, measures to improve the building performance are 
recommended. Nowadays several approaches are viable to retrofit a structure, though the seismic isolation 
is considerate the the most effective to guarantee the immediate operability of essential structures like 
hospitals, after the impact of earthquakes. 
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4.7 FRAGILITY CURVES DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.7.1 Fragility curve results 
Fragility curves were assessed using FRACAS tool (EPICenter, 2017) as illustrated in section 4.2. The 
main data useful to set the tool are: accelerograms, capacity curves, floor masses, inter-story height, 
damage limit states in in terms of drift ratio, derivation method of the fragility functions. Seven earthquake 
signals were used for the analysis as illustrated in detail in section 4.5.5.2. For the fragility analysis was 
deemed sufficient to scale the accelerograms from a minimum of 0.03 to a maximum of 0.9 with an 
increment step of 0.03. Floor masses and inter-story height were set according to Table 4-9 and Figure 4-3 
while the capacity curves refers to those achieved with the PO-M-V-P&F analysis. The damage limit states 
useful to assess the damage probability of each damage states (slight, moderate, extensive and complete) 
were identified analyzing the PO curves. The slight damage limit state (SD) was defined at the activation of 
the first moment plastic hinge in the structural elements, the moderate damage limit state (MD) was 
identified at the beginning of the soft story mechanism, the extensive damage limit state (ED) was set to 
the 75% of the ultimate displacement (dnu), while the complete damage limit state (CD) was defined at the 
90% of the ultimate displacement (dnu). The choice of setting the complete damage limit state at the 90%  
of the ultimate point was done because in this way it was possible to determine the collapse fragility 
function, which on the contrary would not have been determined, leaving the case study with only three 
fragility functions. Detailed characteristics of the set damage limit states, referred to the analyzed pushover 
curves, are provided in Table 4-14 and illustrated in Figure 4-37. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B 
 
Figure 4-37. Representation of the damage limit states in the pushover capacity curves achieved 
with the PO-M-V-P&F analysis and referring to a MDOF system. A) Individuation of the damage 
limit states in X direction. B) Individuation of the damage limit states in Y direction 
Both capacity curves, in X and Y directions, were analyzed with the FRACAS tool in order to create not 
only the variability in terms of acceleration provided by the earthquake signals, but also in terms of 
capacity. For the fragility curve assessment median values of the maximum inter-story drift rations (%), 
obtained in both directions, were used to define the damage limit states (Table 4-14). Finally, the least- 
squares regression over the cloud of IM-EPD points (Baker, 2007; EPICenter, 2017) was used as 
derivation method for the fragility curves. 
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Table 4-14. Damage limit states characteristics. Description and values of the maximum inter- 
story drift ratios 
 
 X  Y  Median 
values of the 
inter-story 
drift ratio (%) 
Damage 
limit state 
 
Description 
Maximum 
inter-story 
drift ratio (%) 
 
Description 
Maximum 
inter-story 
drift ratio (%) 
 
Slight 
Damage 
(SD) 
First moment 
plastic hinge in the 
structural elements. 
Step 9 in the 
pushover curves 
 
 
0.100 
First moment 
plastic hinge in the 
structural elements. 
Step 3 in the 
pushover curves 
 
 
0.107 
 
 
0.104 
 
Moderate 
Damage 
(MD) 
Beginning of the 
soft story 
mechanism in the 
building. Step 13 in 
the pushover 
curves 
 
 
0.170 
Beginning of the 
soft story 
mechanism in the 
building. Step 6 in 
the pushover 
curves 
 
 
0.200 
 
 
0.185 
 
Extensive 
damage 
(ED) 
Defined at the 75% 
of the ultimate 
displacement the 
capacity curve (step 
24 in the PO curve) 
 
 
0.380 
Defined at the 75% 
of the ultimate 
displacement the 
capacity curve (step 
9 in the PO curve) 
 
 
0.370 
 
 
0.375 
 
Complete 
damage 
(CD) 
Defined at the 90% 
of the ultimate 
displacement of the 
capacity curve (step 
28 in the PO curve) 
 
 
0.470 
Defined at the 90% 
of the ultimate 
displacement of the 
capacity curve (step 
11 in the PO curve 
 
 
0.510 
 
 
0.490 
The first result of the FRACAS analysis is the assessment of the performance points. The assessed PPs 
for the different scaled inelastic spectra are illustrated in Figure 4-38 A. Then, all the PPs were 
transformed in a cloud of points in the space IM-EDP as illustrated in Figure 4-38 B. Applying the least- 
squares regression (Baker, 2007) over the cloud of points, and taking into account the defined damage 
limits states in Table 4-14, the fragility curves for the analyzed hospital pavilion were achieved (dash- 
dotted lines in Figure 4-39). The obtained curves were compared with those provided by HAZUS for the 
concrete frame with unreinforced masonry infill wall buildings (B-C3H-P), it assumed compatible with the 
analyzed case study (Figure 4-39 B). On the whole, the obtained curves are different from those provided 
by HAZUS. Qualitatively, the discrepancy is minor for the slight and moderate curves, while it is 
substantial for the extensive and complete fragility curves. For slight, moderate and extensive curves, a 
similarity of values has been found for damage probability of 50% (Figure 4-39). Another noted aspect is 
that for probability from 0% to 50% the achieved curves possess exceeding probability less than those 
provided by HAZUS, while for values from 50% to 100% they are greater. At last, analyzing the fragility 
curve calculated for the complete damage limit states, it is possible to observe that the curves differ totally. 
The latter aspect definitely connected to the low displacement capacity of the structure. Modeling the 
shear hinges in the FEM model, early collapses appears in the beams and columns elements. The brittle 
behavior of the structure was expected, given the absence of seismic details in the structural elements. For 
what concerns the comparison, it is correct to put the attention on the fact that the obtained fragility 
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curves for the case study refers to a single building, while those provided by HAZUS relate to median 
values of a family of buildings. Furthermore, among the approaches, there are differences between the 
mathematical model, the hinge proprieties and the derivation method of the fragility curves, all aspects 
that influence the results. So in closing, the differences observed in Figure 4-39 suggest and justify the 
need to develop Peruvian fragility curves that better describe the behavior of Peruvian structures. 
 
A      B  
Figure 4-38. First results achieved with FRACAS analysis. A) Performance points 
representation. B) Cloud of points in the space IM-EDP 
 
A   
Figure 4-39. Comparison among fragility curves. Continuous lines represent the curves 
provided by HAZUS (structural type B-C3H-P). Curves achieved with the FRACAS tool 
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The thesis research starts illustrating the heath sector contingency plan developed for Lima  
Metropolitan area in case of a strong earthquake. Then, two exploratory models, that assess the seismic 
performance of hospitals at metropolitan scale in terms of seismic response capabilities and hospital 
treatment capacity, are presented. At last, the development of structural fragility curves for a high rise 
infilled reinforced concrete frame hospital building is described. 
Contingency plan 
The contingency plan was the first planning program in Lima city. It has been developed to improve the 
preparedness of the health facilities and the organization in case of an emergency in the aftermath of a 
seismic event. The plan involved most of the public and semipublic health facilities housed in the 
metropolitan area, with the goal to ensure a first emergency response in all the districts in the involved 
area. Of course, it is the beginning of a preparedness process for the health sector in Peru. The plan 
development and its consecutive simulacrum have left a positive impact among the participants. Hospitals 
and key staffs have responded positively to the whole plan development process. Since the objective of 
the contingency plan is to preserve the public health in case of an earthquake disaster, the plan has 
focused on the first attention of wounded in the health facilities among the public and semipublic 
institutions, but future updates can incorporate more private clinics. Three steps have characterized the 
contingency plan process, the set-up, the plan development, and the test of the plan. The set-up consists 
on the data collection, nomination of the work groups and the first arrangement of the activities to be  
developed. Among the plan development, the risk analysis, the capacity assessment, the response 
functions individuation and the operative procedure definitions, are the main topics to be analyzed. The 
most important step, in terms of seismic engineering, is the risk analysis assessment; in fact, it is the 
moment where the seismic hazard, the exposure and the vulnerabilities of the investigated area and 
facilities are carried out. The risk analysis and the vulnerability assessment can be achieved through 
qualitative or quantitative methodologies, this last ones more reliable and specific. For the presented 
contingency plan a qualitative approach was used. In future works that aspect can be certainly improved 
using quantitative methodologies for the assessment. 
The simulacrum had the goal to simulate the operational procedures of the headquarter, health facilities 
and medical staff. During the simulacrum delays, due to the traffic congestion presents in Lima have been 
registered. Operational procedures have not been fully respected by medical staff during the triage 
procedures and delays in communicating the state of the emergency by few hospitals to the headquarter 
have been also reported. The first aspect is due to a slight lack of skills among key medical staff, which can 
be improved with a continuous training of staff. About the second aspect, it is due to the absence of a 
single communications system among the public and semipublic hospitals, and the lack of redundant 
systems. Public and semipublic hospitals have different and separate management systems, which should 
be unified and centralized in order to ensure an effective response. A single rescue center with a common 
emergency telephone number, which manage all the ambulances, should be implemented. Furthermore, 
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since not all the hospitals are equipped with radio systems, equip them and unifying the type of radio is a 
crucial measure to be implemented as soon as possible by the health institutions. Headquarter consisted of 
representatives of the Ministry of Health (MINSA) and the semipublic institution (EsSalud) under the 
command of MINSA. It was the first time that two health institutions have collaborated together for a 
common goal. They had the task to declare the alert, receive data among the health facilities and the 
involved organizations, to make decisions, and to manage the emergency until its end. The tasks were 
carried out sufficiently but improvements can be made. An aspect that should be improved, by the 
representatives during the emergency, it is the assessment method of the essential resources among the 
health facilities and institutions. The maps illustrating the affected areas were not used enough, on the 
contrary they are the core of the emergency management because they help to make decision and to  
define priorities. A continuous dialogue and cooperation among the health institutions and the entire 
headquarter can lead an optimal assessment of the state of the emergency and a more efficient response, 
thus continuous training is suggested. 
Improved seismic response models 
In order to improve the assessment of the seismic performance of hospitals in case of seismic events, a 
first exploratory model capable to assess the basic seismic response capacity of 41 hospitals at 
metropolitan scale, has been developed. Structural damages, backup of power, water, gases and medicines, 
availability of radio equipment and owned ambulances were selected as the measures of the Basic Seismic 
Response Capability. Even considering the exploratory nature of the study a low response capability was 
found after the analysis. The low performance has been mainly associated to the building vulnerability of 
the existing hospitals. Thus, an improvement of the hospital preparedness starting from structural and 
nonstructural retrofitting plans on the existing hospitals should be considered by decision makers for the 
future. The presented methodology represents a way to assess the basic seismic response capability of the 
hospitals in case of earthquakes. It is evident how the interconnection of all the components is essential 
for its correct evaluation. Future research is necessary to improve the relationships among the 
components and how they can be used as measures of the seismic response capability. Furthermore, 
capabilities such as medical readiness, medical response coordination, continuity of health care service 
delivery and medical surge should be investigated. Finally, a study on a larger sample of hospitals can 
certainly help assessing an effective and more realistic response of the health sector in Lima metropolitan 
in the aftermath of an earthquake. 
With the scope to improve the seismic response assessment of the health facilities, a second exploratory 
model has been developed. The model assesses the number of injured that can receive surgical treatments 
by the hospitals, at metropolitan scale in the aftermath of a seismic event. The results show a low capacity 
of the hospitals to surgically treat casualties. The best health facilities are located in the central area of the 
metropolis, whereas they are absent in the suburbs. The main reasons of the low capacity are related to the 
high expected building damage levels and the insufficient autonomies of essential resources possessed by 
the investigated structures. It is evident that external resources such as private clinics or field hospitals are 
necessary in case of an immediate emergency. The high expected damage level among the existing health 
facilities can be mitigated implementing retrofitting measures on the existing structures. The investigated 
hospitals do not possess sufficient proper capacity to face an emergency situation. Even if the hospitals 
had not suffered any physical damage they would not have been operative due to an insufficient supply of 
essential resources. It is accepted that in case of a seismic event it is crucial for hospitals to count with 
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their own supplies. Ensuring a sufficient backup of essential resources is an important aspect that has to 
be taken into account by decision makers to improve the resilience of emergency-driven hospital 
performance. The results highlight that the investigated health facilities even without considering damage 
are only sufficient to cope the minimum expected treatment demand. It means that in case of average and 
maximum expected treatment demand, alternative measures have to be taken into account. For example, 
implementing field hospitals or applying preventive measures such as equipping existing hospitals with 
more operating rooms or building new hospitals. Since the study takes into account a sample of 41 
existing hospitals, future research is needed to investigate the response of a larger number of facilities, 
including for example private clinics. Network aspects should also be investigated. It is known that 
nowadays more and more hospital systems are responding to an emergency as a network. In this way, the 
response to the emergency is more efficient because essential resources and injured can be transferred 
among the hospital network, thereby increasing the hospital treatment capacity. The model has been 
developed to assess the current performance of the hospitals using the HTC index, but it can be easily 
adapted to assess hospital performance after applying seismic mitigation strategies to the health facilities. 
HTC aspects can be improved by implementing structural and non-structural retrofitting, training of the 
key staff, and improvements of emergency plans. All those aspects if considered as time depending, 
resilience aspects can be analyzed too. The presented study assessed the damage of hospital buildings 
using fragility curves provided by the HAZUS database, but future studies can implement updated fragility 
curves developed specifically for Peruvian structures. The developed model assessed the number of 
injured that can be surgically treated after a certain amount of time in function of the seismic damage of 
the essential hospital pavilions, the number of operating surgical rooms and the supplies possessed by the 
hospitals in the aftermath of a seismic event. However, no real availability of bed capacity of each hospital 
was taken into account. The organizational and human components were evaluated deterministically due 
to the lack of abundant data and the exploratory nature of the conducted research. Future studies could 
improve the assessment of the deterministic values or evaluate them probabilistically. The autonomy of 
essential resources was evaluated according to the stocks of each involved health facility, but new supplies 
can be obtained by external aid. Thus, an increase of the hospital treatment capacity can be registered, but 
not assessed in the present study. In future models the implementation of temporal field hospitals with 
new operating theatres and medical staff could also improve the model outcomes. 
High rise hospital building fragility curves development 
The last part of the thesis research focus on the fragility curve development of a high rise infilled 
reinforced concrete frame hospital pavilion. The curves are developed according to the capacity spectrum 
approach for seismic fragility assessment including record-to-record variability, it named “FRACAS”. The 
approach is a nonlinear static displacement-based procedure, which is simple to apply and less time- 
consuming respect to the full time-history analyses on finite element models. FRACAS has the advantage 
to take into account the record-to-record variability thanks to the use of various natural accelerograms  
that generate unsmoothed spectra as opposed to standardized design spectra. For high rise buildings, it  
has the disadvantage that higher mode effects have to be taken into account. Anyway, the incremental 
dynamic analysis for developing fragility curves remains the most reliable method, and for that, its 
application should be taken into account in future studies. Capacity spectrum method is used to assess 
several performance points by varying demand spectra obtained scaling a sufficient number of 
accelerograms. For the capacity spectrum method, capacity curves for the analyzed hospital pavilion were 
developed through pushover analysis carried out with a FEM. In the FEM, concentrated bending 
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moment, axial and shear hinges were considerate in columns, while concentrated moment and shear 
hinges were applied in the beam elements. The used shear hinges do not take into account degradation 
effects due to the flexural deformation caused during the oscillation of the building in case of seismic 
events. In the FEM, infill walls were modeled using only compression truss element drawn concentrically 
to the frames, thus not considering direct shear effects on the columns provided by the diagonal elements. 
The assumption was made because the main scope of the study is to capture the global behavior of the 
building, but eccentric diagonal element can be modeled in future research. 
FRACAS involves considering higher modes effects for high rise building like the case study. Higher 
mode effects have been considered pushing the structure according to a translational multimodal load 
pattern, but improved approach such us adaptive pushover analysis or other multimodal pushover 
analyses can be used for future studies. From the nonlinear static analysis results, the analyzed hospital 
building does not reach the seismic performance level provided by the modern seismic codes. Comparing 
the capacity spectra, obtained in both the analyzed directions, with the demand spectrum, an insufficient 
capacity was identified. That behavior has been also reflected in the assessed fragility curves. The low 
structural performance of the structure is associable to the absence of seismic structural details. The nodes 
of the structures are not confined with reinforced steel bars, anyway they were supposed rigid in the FEM. 
Furthermore, an insufficient shear steel rebar has been detected in the design details for beam and 
columns elements. Those details make the structure vulnerable and brittle to the seismic actions. For that 
reasons, measures to improve the seismic performance of the building should be taken into account. 
Nowadays, there are several methods to retrofit structures, but the seismic isolation or dissipative 
approaches are the most suitable for structures that have to be immediately operative after the impact of a 
seismic event. The nonlinear static analysis has been carried out taking into account two force- 
displacement relationships to model the nonlinear behavior of the infill panels, the first one according to 
the Peruvian masonry code and the second one according to the Panagiotakos & Fardis method. The 
second approach resulted much stiffer and realistic than the first one, and for that, it deemed 
representative of the case study. 
For the capacity spectra developed modeling infill walls according to the Panagiotakos & Fardis 
approach, fragility curves were developed using FRACAS tool. The obtained curves were then compared 
with those provided by HAZUS for the equivalent assumed structural typology. On the whole, the 
assessed curves differ from the HAZUS ones. Qualitatively, the difference is minor for the slight and 
moderate curves, while it is substantial for the extensive and complete fragility curves. It implies that using 
HAZUS fragility curves in probabilistic seismic risk analysis for Peruvian structures, limited errors can be 
expected for slight and moderate damage limit states, while relevant errors can be achieved considering 
extensive and complete curves. To conclude, the differences highlight that it is indispensable to develop 
actualized Peruvian fragility curves like those provided in the presented exploratory research in order to 
develop future reliable probabilistic seismic risk analysis or developing models that assess the performance 
of structures at large-scale. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Adriano, B., Mas, E., Koshimura, S., & Estrada, M. (2014). Scenario of Earthquake and Tsunami Damage 
Probability in Callao Region, Peru Using Tsunami Fragility Functions. Journal of Disaster Research. 9(6), 
968-975. 
Aleman, A., Benavides, V., & Leon, W. (2006). Guía de campo: escursión geologica "Estratigrafia, Sedimentología y 
Evaluación Tectónica del Área de Lima". Lima, Peru, MD: Sociedad Geológica del Perú, Serie: Guía de 
Campo N° 11, Segunda Edición. Available online, http://docplayer.es/66601813-Guia-de-cam. 
Arce, J. (1984). Estructura geoelectrica del subsuelo Rimac-Chillon. Boletin de la Sociedad Geológica del Perú. 
Volumen jubilar. LX Aniversario. 1(1984), 1-12. 
ASCE/SEI 41-13. (2014). Seismic Evaluation and Retrofit of Exixting Building. Reston, Virginia, US: American 
Society of Civil Engineers. 
ATC-13. (1985). Earthquake Damage Evaluation Data for California. Redwood City, California, US: Applied 
Technology Council. 
ATC-40. (1996). Seismic Evaluation and retrofit of Concrete Buildings, volume 1 (ATC-40). Redwood City, California, 
US: Applied Technology Council. 
Baker, J. (2007). Probabilistic structural response assessment using vector-valued intensity measures. 
Earthquake Engineering & Structural Dynamics. 36(13), 1861-1883. 
Bambarén, C., Uyen, A. & Rodriguez, M. (2017). Estimation of the Demand for Hospital Care After a 
Possible High-Magnitude Earthquake in the City of Lima, Peru. Prehospital and Disaster Medicine. 32(1), 
1-6. 
Blondet, M., Dueñas, M., Loaiza, C., & Flores, R. (2004, August). Seismic vulnerability of informal construccion 
dwellings in Lima, Peru: Preliminary diagnostic. Proceedings of the 13th World Conference on Earthquake 
Engineering. Vancouver, Canada. 
Bulut, M., Fedakar, R., Akkaose, S., Akgoz, S., Ozguc, H., & Tokyay, R. (2005). Medical experience of a 
university hospital in Turkey after the 1999 Marmara earthquake. Emerg Med J. 2005(22), 494-498. 
Buonopane, S. G., & White, R. N. (1999). Pseudodynamic testing of mansonry infille rc frame. Journal of 
Structural Engineering (ASCE). 125(6), 578-589. 
Chapin, E., Daniels, A., Elias, R., & Aspilcueta, D. (2009). Impact of the 2007 Ica Earthquake on Health 
Facilities and Health Service Provision in Southern Peru. Prehosp Disaster Med. 24(4), 326-332. 
Seismic performance of hospitals at different scales 
134 
 
 
 
Chopra, A. (2011). Dynamics of structures. Theory and applications to earthquake engineering. Forth edition. Boston, US: 
Pearson Education. 
Congreso de la Republica. (2011). Ley N° 29664. Ley que rea el sistema nacional de gestión del riesgo de desastres 
(SINAGERD). Lima, Peru. 
D’Ayala, D., Meslem, A., Vamvatsikos, D., Porter, K., Rossetto, T., Crowley, H., & Silva, V. (2014). Guidelines 
for analytical vulnerability assessment, vulnerability global component project. Pavia, Italia: GEM foundation. 
Daniell, J., Khazai, B., Wenzel, F., & Vervaeck, A. (2012). The worldwide economic impact of historic 
earthquakes. Proceedings of the 15th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering. Lisboa, Portugal. 
Daniels, A., Chapin, E., Aspilcueta, D., & Doocy, S. (2009). Access to Health Services and Care-seeking 
Behaviors After the 2007 Ica Earthquake in Peru. Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 3(2), 97-103. 
Dorbath, L., Cisternas, A., & Dorbath, C. (1990). Assesment of size of large and great historical earthquakes 
in Peru. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America. 80(4), 551-576. 
EPICenter. (2017). FRACAS. Interdisciplinary Center for Natural Hazard Resilience: London, UK. 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/epicentre/resources/software. 
Eurocode 2. (2004). Design of concrete structures - Part 1-1: General rules and rules for buildings. European Committee 
for standard. ICS 91.010.30; 91.08040. 
Eurocode 8. (2004). Design of structures for earthquake resistence. Part 1: General rules, seismic actions and rules for 
buildings. Europian committee for standardization. 
Eurocode 8. (2005). Design of structures for earthquake resistence. Part 3: Assessment and retrofitting of building. 
European committee for standardization. 
Fajfar, P. (2000). A Nonlinear Analysis Method for Performance Based Seismic Design . Earthquake spectra. 
9(3), 573-592. 
FEMA-273. (1997). NEHRP Guidelines for the Seismic Reabilitation of the buildings. Washington, DC: Federal 
Emergency Managment Agency. 
FEMA-366. (2008). HAZUS MH. Estimated Annualized Earthquake Losses for the United States. Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
HAZUS MR4. (2003). Multi-hazard Loss Estimation Methodology. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1aOdcJIdeqg. (n.d.). Published December 19, 2016. Accessed Jenuary 
30, 2017. 
IASC. (2007). Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistence. Geneva, CH: Inter-Agency 
Standing Commitee . 
IFCR. (2012). Contingency planning guide. Geneva, Switzerland: International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Bibliography 
135 
 
 
 
Crescent Societies . 
INDECI & PNUD. (2010). Proyecto INDECI-PNUD-ECHO “Preparación ante desastre sísmico y/o tsunami y 
recuperación temprana en Lima y Callao”. Lima, Perú: Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil, Programa de 
las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. 
INDECI. (2009). Diseño de escenario sobre el impacto de un sismo de gran magnitud en Lima Metropolitana y Callao. Lima, 
Perú: Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil. 
INDECI. (2011). Estudio SIRAD. Recursos de respuesta inmediata y de recuperación temprana ante la ocurencia de un sismo 
y/o tsunami en Lima Metropolitana y Callao. Lima, PE: Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil . 
Kakalersis, D. J., & Karayannis, G. G. (2008). Influence of masonry strength and openings on infilled RC 
frames under cyclic loading. Earthq. Eng. 12(2), 197-221. 
Kazama, M., & Noda, T. (2012). Damage statistics (Summary of the 2011 off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku 
Earthquake damage). Soils and Foundations. 52(5), 780–792. 
Kirsch, T., Mitrani-Reiser, J., Bissell, R., Sauer, L., Mahoney, M., Holmes, W., . . . de la Maza, F. (2010). 
Impact on Hospitals Functions Following the 2010 Chilean Earthquake. Disaster Medicine and Public 
Health Preparedness. 4(2), 122-128. 
le Roux, J. P., Tavares-Correa, C., & Alayza, F. (2000). Sedimentology of the Rimac-Chillon alluvial fan at 
Lima, Peru, as related to Plio-Pleistocene sea-level changes, glacial cycles and tectonics. Journal of South 
American Earth Sciences. 13(2000), 499-510. 
Liguori, N., Tarque, N., Bambarén, C., Santa-Cruz, S., Palomino, J., & Laterza, M. (In Press). Basic Seismic 
Response Capability of Hospitals in Lima, Peru. Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness. In  
press. 
Lupoi, G., Franchin, P., Lupoi, A., Pinto, P. E., & Calvi, G. M. (2008). Probalistc Seiemic Assessment for Hospitlas 
and Complex-Social Systems. Pavia, Italy: IUSS Press. 
Macharé, J., Sebrier, M., Huaman, D., & Mercier, J. L. (1986). Tectónica Cenozoica de la margen continental 
peruana. Bol. Soc. Geol. del Perú. 76, 45-77. 
Marulanda, M., Carreño, M., Cardona, O., Ordaz, M., & Barbat, A. (2013). Probabilistic earthquake risk 
assessment using CAPRA: application to the city of Barcelona, Spain. Nat Hazards. 69(1), 59-84. 
MCEER. (2009). Quantification of Disaster Resilience of Health Care Facilities. US: Multidisciplinary Center for 
Earthquake Engineering Research. 
MIDAS/Gen. (2017). Analysis Manual for MIDAS/Gen. 
http://admin.midasuser.com/UploadFiles2/76/Analysis_Reference1.pdf. 
MidasGen. (2015). RC Design as per EN 1992-1-1:2004. 
http://en.midasuser.com/training/tutorial_read.asp?idx=512&pg=1&so=&sort=&bid=6&nCat=&n 
Cat2=130&bType=&totCount=16. 
Seismic performance of hospitals at different scales 
136 
 
 
 
Ministero della Salute Italiana. (2002). Sicurezza sismica degli ospedali. Raccomandazioni per il miglioramento 
della sicurezza sismica e della funzionalità degli ospedali . 
http://www.salute.gov.it/imgs/C_17_pagineAree_324_listaFile_itemName_1_file.pdf. Accessed 
March 12, 2017. 
MINSA. (1997). Proyecto de la vunlerabilidad sísmica en hospitales del Perú. Hospital Nacional Edgardo Rebagliati Martins. 
Lima, Perú: Ministerio de Salud Peruano . 
MINSA. (2005). El Terremoto y Maremoto del Sur del Perú, 2001. Lecciones para el futuro. Lima, PE: Ministerio de 
Salud. Available online, http://bvpad.indeci.gob.pe/doc/pdf/esp/doc36/doc36-contenido.pdf. 
MINSA. (2011). Norma técnica de salud "Categoría de establecimientos del sector salud". Lima, Perú: Ministerio de 
Salud. 
MINSA. (2017). Politica Nacional: Hospitales Seguro Frente a los Desastres. Decreto Supremo N° 027-2017-SA. Lima, 
Perú: Ministerio de Salud Peruano. 
MINSA. (2018). Institucional. Misión y visión del MINSA. Lima, PE. Retrieved from Ministerio de Salud. 
MINSA, & EsSalud. (2016). Plan de Contigencia del Sector Salud ante un sismo de gran magnitud en Lima Metropolitana y 
en las Regiones de Callao y Lima. Lima, Perú: Ministerio de Salud y Seguro Social de Salud. 
MINSA, EsSalud. (2016). Implementación de la estretegia de los equipos médicos de emergencia (EMT) para la respuesta a 
desastres en el Perú. Lima, Perú: Ministero de Salud y Seguro Social del Perú . 
Miranda, E. (1996). Assessment of the seismic vulnerability of existing building. Proceedings in the 11th World Conference on 
Earthquake Engineering. Acapulco, Mexico. 
Morales, N., & Sato, J. (2008). Seismic vulnerability of the organizational and functional component of major 
hospitals. Rev Peru Med Exp Salud Publica. 25(2), 225-29. 
Munich Re Group. (2018). Natural Disaster. The year in figures. https://www.munichre.com/topics- 
online/en/2017/topics-geo/overview-natural-catastrophe-2016. 
NORMA E.020. (2006). Cargas. Lima, Perú: Ministerio de Vivienda. 
NORMA E.030. (2016). Diseño sismorresistente . Lima, Perú: Ministerio de Vivienda. 
NORMA E.060. (2016). Norma tecnica de edificación. E.060 Concreto armado. Lima, Perú: Ministerio de Vivienda. 
NORMA E.070. (2006). Albañilería. Lima, Perú: Ministerio de Vivienda. 
Nuti, C., Santini, S., & Vanzi, I. (1999). Seismic risk of the Italian hospitals. Available on line 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228747032_Seismic_risk_of_the_Italian_hospitals. 
Accessed February 20, 2017. Retrieved from Seismic risk of the italian hospitals. 
OPS  & OMS. (2016). www.paho.org. Retrieved from Noticias OPS/OMS Perú: 
http://www.paho.org/per/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3600:sector-salud- 
realizara-simulacro-de-respuesta-ante-un-gran-sismo-en-lima-y-callao&Itemid=900 
Bibliography 
137 
 
 
 
OPS. (2010). Guía para el desarrollo de simulaciones y simulacros de emergencias y desastres. Panamá: Organización 
Panamericana de la Salud. 
OPS, MINSA, & EsSalud. (2014). Planamiento hospitalario ante desastre. Guía para el diseño de planes. 
https://www.paho.org/per/index.php?option=com_docman&view=document&slug=planeamiento- 
hospitalario-ante-desastres-guia-para-el-diseno-de-planes&layout=default&alias=569-planeamiento- 
hospitalario-ante-desastres-guia-para-el-diseno-de-planes&category_slug=pu. 
OPS/OMS. (2010). Terremoto de Pisco - A dos años del sismo, crónica y lecciones aprendidas en el sector salud. Washington 
DC: Organización Panamericana de la Salud y Organización Mundial de la Salud. 
Panagiotakos, T. B., & Fardis, M. N. (1996). Seismic response of infilled RC frames strucutres . Eleventh World 
Conference on Earthquake Engineering . 
PEER. (2006). The Open System for Earthquake Engineering Simulation - OpeenSees. Berkley, California, EE UU: 
Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center . 
Phalkey, R., Reinhardt, J.D. & Marks, M. (2011). Injury epidemiology after the 2001 Gujarat earthquake in 
India: a retrospective analysis of injuries treated at a rural hospital in the Kutch district immediately 
after the disaster. Global Health Action. 4(7196), 1-9. 
Pliefke, T., Sperbeck, S., & Urban, M. (2006). The probabilistic risk managment chain. General concept and 
definitions. 
PREDES. (2012). Gestión Municipal para la Respuesta a Terremoto con énfasis en Agua, Saneamiento y Higiene. Lima, 
Perú: Centro de Estudios y Prevención de Desastres. 
Ramos, V. (2010). The tectonic regime along the Andes: present-day and Mesozonic regime. Geol. J. 45(2010), 
2-25. 
Rios, J., & Zavala, C. (2008, October). Impact of the Pisco-Peru earthquake of August 15th 2007 on heath facilities. 
Proceedings in the 14th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering. Beijing, China. 
Rossetto, T., & Elnashai, A. (2005). A new analytical procedure for the derivation of displacement-based 
vulnerability curves for populations of RC structures. Eng Struct, 27(2005), 573-92. 
Rossetto, T., Gehl, P., Minas, S., Galasso, C., Duffour, P., & Douglas, J. (2016). FRACAS: A capacity 
spectrum approach for seismic fragility assessment including record-to-record variability. Engineering 
Structures, 125(2016), 337-348. 
Saatcioglu, M., Ghobarah, A., & Nistor, I. (2005). Effects of the december 26, 2004 Sumatra earthquake and 
tsunami on physical infrastructure. ISET Journal of Earthquake Technology. 42(4), 79-94. 
Saneinejad, A. S., & Hobbs, B. (1995). Inelastic Design of Infilled Frames. Journal of Structural Engineering, 
121(4), 634-650. 
Santa-Cruz, S., Palomino, J., Liguori, N., Vona, M., & Tamayo, R. (2017). Seismic Risk Assessment of 
Hospitals in Lima City Using GIS Tools. In: Gervasi O. et al. (eds) Computational Science and Its 
Seismic performance of hospitals at different scales 
138 
 
 
 
Applications-ICCSA 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10406. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62398-6_25. 
Schuller, M., Mehrabi, A. B., Noland, J. L., & Shing, P. B. (1994). Performance of masonry - infilled R/C 
frames under in - plane lateral loads : Experiments. In. Abrams, Daniel P., ed. Proceedings from the 
NCEER workshop on seismic response of masonry infills. Buffalo, N.Y, National Center for Earthquake 
Engineering Research (Technical Report, NCEER 94-0004) , 27-32. 
SEiSMOSOFT. (2018). Earthquake Engineering software solutions. https://www.seismosoft.com/seismosignal. 
Silva, V., Crowley, H., Pinho, R., & Varum, H. (2014). Investigtation of the characteristics of Portuguese 
regular moment-frame RC buildings and development of a vulnerability model. Bull Earthq Eng, 
13(05), 1455-90. 
SINAGERD et al. (2014). Plan Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastre 2014-2021. (Decreto Supremo N° 034- 
2014-PCM del 12.05.14). Lima, PE: SINAGERD, PCM, SGRD & CENEPRED. 
Tarque, N., Crowley, H., Pinho, R., & Varum, H. (2012). Displacement-based fragility curves for seismic 
assessment of adobe buildings in Cusco, Peru. Earthquake Spectra. 28(2), 759-794. 
Tavera, H. (2014). Evaluación del peligro asociado a los sismos y efectos secundarios en Perú. Lima, Perú: Biblioteca 
Nacional del Perú N°2014-11704. 
Tavera, H., Bernal, I., Condori, C., Ordaz, M., Zeballo, A., & Ishizawa, O. (2017, January). Seismic hazard 
assessment in Peru. Proceedings 16th World Conference on Earthquake. Santiago Chile, Chile. 
UNISDR. (2015). Sandai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. United Nations Office Disaster Risk 
Reduction, Geneva, Switzerland. 
Viveen, W., & Shlunegger, F. (2018). Prolonged extencion and subsidence of the Peruvian forearc during the 
Cenozoic. Tectonophysics. 730(2018) 48-62. 
WHO. (2000). Principles of Disaster Mitigacion in Health Facilities. Washinton, DC: World Health Oraganization. 
WHO. (2015). Safe hospital initiative: Coprehensive safe hospital framework. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health 
Organization. 
WHO. (2015). Hospital Safety Index. Guide for Evaluators. Switzerland: World Health Organization. 
WHO.  (2018). Global Health Workforce Alliance.  Retrieved from 
http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/countries/per/en/.  Retrieved from 
http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/countries/per/en/ 
Yavari, S., Chang, S., & Elwood, K. (2010). Modeling Post-Earthquake Functionality of Regional Health Care 
Facilities. Earthquake Spectra. 26(3), 869–892. 
